After months of castigation from many quarters for not combating the threat of ISIL, Turkey has come a long way in a short time. Last week, its parliament gave authorisation for the Turkish army to deploy to Syria and Iraq, permitted the deployment of foreign troops on Turkish soil, authorised the establishment of a buffer zone inside Syria, and provided for the training of Syrian opposition fighters.
More than “waking up” to the jihadist threat, the Turkish parliament has given the government a legal framework to take on ISIL, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its Kurdish nationalist affiliates in Syria, and the Bashar Al Assad regime, as well as to engineer the nucleus of a new Syrian state and even redraw its border.
Turkey’s particular conundrum has been that international military action against ISIL has bolstered Ankara’s main foes – the PKK, its affiliates and the Assad regime. With this new framework, Turkey is effectively demanding that coalition aims in Syria and Iraq be broadened from a narrow anti-ISIL campaign to one that ousts Mr Al Assad. The Kurdish nationalist movement, as represented by the PKK and its affiliates, is to come on board or become a target.
One could hear the overture to this policy last month when Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in New York for the opening of the United Nations general assembly. Having played coy for months, Mr Erdogan arrived with a strong hand and gained everyone's attention. The 46 Turkish citizens who had been held hostage by ISIL since June had just been freed; Turkey's hands had presumably been untied. Simultaneously, ISIL attacked the Syrian Kurdish enclave of Kobani, right on Turkey's border, making clear Turkey's exposure to ISIL's front line.
A flood of refugees from Kobani dramatically reminded the world of the enormous and costly job Turkey has done in sheltering about 1.5 million Syrians since 2011. And so, with the world listening, Mr Erdogan interwove descriptions of Turkey’s ISIL policy with rejoinders that no country outside Syria and Iraq was under as much pressure as Turkey, that Mr Al Assad was Syria’s fundamental problem, and that no one should doubt Turkey’s resolve to fight terror because Turkey had fought the PKK for decades.
On Mr Erdogan’s return home, Turkish legislators gave his views a legal basis. Turkey is now in a position to take ownership of the crisis, especially in Syria. But to what degree will it seek that ownership? And at what cost?
Having authorised fighting “all terrorists” in Syria and Iraq, the Turkish parliament has granted the wish of the coalition countries that Turkey join the fight against ISIL. But at home, the term “all terrorists” clearly also refers to the PKK and its Syrian Kurdish affiliates.
A buffer zone will allow Turkey to both protect refugees and keep them from reaching Turkish territory, but will also dispossess PKK-affiliated Kurdish nationalists of autonomous territory. As Turkey fears Kurdish autonomy, Kurds will consider any buffer zone a Turkish occupation. Because Turkey is not defending Kobani and is even preventing its Kurdish citizens from travelling to reinforce the enclave, some observers believe it wants ISIL to vanquish the Syrian Kurds so that a future Turkish buffer zone takes territory not from Kurds, but from jihadists, which the anti-ISIL coalition will applaud. Others say Turkey won't help Kobani until the Syrian Kurds agree to fight Mr Al Assad. Kurdish outrage is profound.
A Turkish buffer zone is likely to encompass the tomb of Suleyman Shah, a patch of Turkish sovereign territory about 30 kilometres inside Syria, guarded by Turkish soldiers and now surrounded by ISIL. It’s difficult to imagine Turkey not annexing land so that the tomb becomes contiguous Turkish territory – in short, redrawing its border.
A buffer zone will require a no-fly zone, which has so far been resisted by the Americans. Such a no-fly zone would directly target Mr Al Assad’s air defences.
Training Syrian opposition forces may provide the ground troops required to protect a buffer zone. If such a force were successful against Mr Al Assad, it would form the core of a new Syrian national army and, by extension, the foundation of a new Syrian state – one much in Turkey’s debt. Presumably, there are others in the region who would not look favourably on the emergence of such a “neo-Ottoman” province.
Among many other plausible complications – including ISIL reprisals inside Turkey, collisions with Iranian and Israeli interests, and any event that requires Nato to collectively defend Turkey – the potential collapse of the nominal peace deal with the PKK could be the most profound. To start with, Mr Erdogan will lose the Kurdish electoral support necessary to amend the Turkish constitution and create an executive presidency.
Settling the “Kurdish question”, which comprises much more than, but hinges on, a PKK peace deal, will again be postponed. And as the “Kurdish question” is about nothing less than Turkey’s right to call itself an advanced democracy, this too will be postponed.
Caleb Lauer is a freelance journalist who covers Turkey
