In physics, the interaction of two bodies is relatively predictable; introduce a third body, and the system is almost impossible to predict. The Middle East is caught in a war among three countries – the US, Israel and Iran – each of which is going through internal reconsiderations, and the interaction of which over the coming months is impossible to predict with any certainty. But what is also clear is that however the next months evolve – whether through diplomacy, military escalation or a continuation of the “no war, no peace” status quo – the stand-off between the three is not likely to be fundamentally resolved.
For the countries of the region, in the short term, this means continuing urgent diplomacy to bring about a de-escalation but preparing for the worst; and in the long term, factoring in long-term risk and uncertainty through building up resilience, deterrence, defence and sustained diplomacy.
The historic Democratic victory in the American midterm elections was a resounding rebuke to President Donald Trump and his Republican Party, and expressed overwhelming public dissatisfaction with the economic costs of the Iran war, as well as the President’s decision to take America to war after he had expressly promised the opposite.
This would normally suggest that the administration would try to wind down the conflict and urgently look for a deal and a way out. Indeed, this was the early signal as Vice President JD Vance reached out to Iranian security chief Mohsen Rezaei in Tehran and peace talks appeared to be on the frontburner. But Mr Trump is not an ordinary president. After initially appearing dazed by the defeat, he pivoted back to his more accustomed combative stance, doubling down on hardline policies by appointing Stephen Miller as his chief of staff and taking Mr Vance off the diplomatic track, announcing that the US did not need a deal with Iran.
As if the three-body problem is not enough, Mr Trump himself is unpredictable. While the midterm elections favour diplomacy, and the President is probably still open to a deal that opens the Strait of Hormuz and manages Iran’s nuclear programme, he has indicated that he prefers continuing the current blockade, and has also assembled an American armada to keep his escalation options open.
Iran might be banking on Congress’s ability to shape Mr Trump’s foreign policy. But he has already shown that he will be largely defying a hostile legislature for the next two years, and he is likely to use his presidential powers, especially in foreign policy, to the last day of his term.
Even former president George W Bush, after his defeat in his 2006 midterm elections, doubled down in Iraq with what was known as the “Surge”, sending tens of thousands of troops to Iraq. And it is important to note that Mr Trump does not seem particularly concerned about how his policies might affect others in the party or indeed the party itself. What matters most to him is his legacy as president and how he ends this war, which he led his administration into – with Israel.
There is also uncertainty in Israel. Like many elections there, the Knesset results do not directly determine which leader and which coalition is going to assume executive power. For now, Gadi Eisenkot has been tasked with forming a government, and if he fails, caretaker Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have another chance at power.
But with Mr Eisenkot, it is not clear what policy differences, if any, we can expect. He is no less of a security hawk than Mr Netanyahu; he is famously the author of the “Dahiyeh Doctrine” and will be equally intent on confronting and guarding against threats, both near and far. But he will also have other concerns that might coax him in slightly different directions.
First, Mr Eisenkot will need to repair relations with the US; the midterm elections were as much a rebuke of the Republicans as they were of Israel, especially Israel under Mr Netanyahu. This means he is likely to feel compelled to rein in the more extreme policies pursued by far-right Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir in the West Bank and Gaza, while also paying closer attention to US diplomatic priorities in negotiations with Syria and Lebanon. He might also be more open to an American deal with Iran, if the deal manages the latter’s nuclear threat.
Second, while Mr Netanyahu was partially driven by an existential personal need to cling to power, prolong wars, and avoid a reckoning that might end his political career and land him in jail, Mr Eisenkot should be able to take a more strategic and long-term approach to policy, and try to turn military gains into more lasting negotiated arrangements. But Mr Eisenkot is no dove, and while he might be open to an American deal with Iran, he will also not hesitate to engage in war with its regime if he sees the need.

The uncertainty extends to Tehran. The dominant hardline voices interpret the electoral defeats delivered to Mr Trump and Mr Netanyahu as vindication of their policies of resistance and escalation. In debates that are aired in the Iranian media, these voices argue that the hardline policies are working and hence should be sustained until the US accedes to Iran’s demands.
Other, more pragmatic voices argue that Iran should take the win, and translate its battlefield and political victories into a deal that will end the blockade, release frozen funds and lift at least some sanctions. Those voices know that Iran needs room to recover, at a time when its economy is suffering from an annual average inflation of 76 per cent, and it has suffered major military blows.
While Mr Trump himself is unpredictable, in Tehran, the uncertainty comes to a large degree from the apparently continuing struggle in decision-making among various factions of the regime, nor is it clear that supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei has the level of control that his father, Ali Khamenei, had built after many decades. Iran could also misread either the US or Israel, or both, miscalculating what their electoral defeats may mean for foreign policy.
The ambiguity surrounding each of the three capitals leaves the region in a condition of open-ended uncertainty. While the scenario of major escalation, which was the overwhelming expectation even just days before the two elections, seems now less inevitable, it is still a very possible scenario: either initiated by Mr Trump to show his defiance of the midterm elections; or rushed into by a desperate Mr Netanyahu still clinging to power; or triggered by Iran that is seeking a way to break out of the stifling economic stranglehold.
Two other scenarios remain quite possible as well: an open-ended continuation of the current status quo, with ongoing costs for all parties involved; or a limited agreement that at least reopens Hormuz and temporarily manages the Iranian nuclear threat but leaving the region at risk of another conflagration some years in the future.
States and economies are not comfortable with uncertainty, but long-term risk and uncertainty are what states might have to factor into their policy planning. No matter how this current round of conflict ends, it is not likely to end the open-ended enmity between the three warring parties.
But the states of the region are not powerless in this conflict system. Key Arab states, as well as Turkey and Pakistan, have engaged in diplomacy with Iran, and can use their influence to edge both sides closer to agreement. However, they have less leverage in Israel, especially after the very extremist policies of the Netanyahu government; but if Mr Eisenkot pivots back to engagement with the region, as he must do with the US, that might give regional powers more of a diplomatic opportunity to also work on de-escalating the Israel-Iran conflict axis.
In the meantime, the countries of the region, including in the Gulf, will have to factor in long-term uncertainty and the risk of recurring conflict. This will mean investing in building national and regional resilience, hardening critical infrastructure, diversifying energy and trade routes, and building up national and regional deterrence and defence.
War may be the continuation of politics by other means. But in today’s Middle East, sound policy must be designed not only to prevent the next war, but also to withstand it if prevention fails.










































