What a Democratic-controlled US Congress can and cannot do in the Middle East

The resounding Democratic win in the US midterm elections will make life harder for President Donald Trump, but it won’t flip US Middle East policy any time soon. The bigger shift is political. On Iran, military aid to Israel and Gulf security, the new majority can start questioning long-unchallenged assumptions and testing what Washington will actually sustain.

Officials in the region – Tehran above all – will be asking two things: Can Democrats rein in Mr Trump? And will the political shift outlast him?

Mr Trump is still commander-in-chief. He runs diplomacy, controls the military and holds a veto that Democrats probably can’t override. But control of both chambers lets them hold investigations, set the terms of debate and make his choices costlier. They can narrow his options even if they can’t close them off.

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The Iran war will dominate the discussion. Mr Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched operations on February 28 without asking Congress, and the war has proved costlier and messier than advertised. Petrol has hit a record high, and diesel is up 71 per cent on last year. A Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey last month found 68 per cent of Americans thought the war wasn’t worth it, and Reuters/Ipsos has Mr Trump’s approval at a record-low 31 per cent.

Expect Democrats to demand answers on costs and war aims. The real test is whether they will use appropriations to restrict operations.

History suggests caution. Democrats won Congress in 2006 on anger over Iraq, and then-president George W Bush sent in the surge the following year. Congress cut off Vietnam funding in 1973, but only after the Paris Peace Accords had mandated withdrawal of the remaining troops, and after they were already gone. Congress can change a war’s politics much faster than the facts on the ground. Democrats can make the Iran war harder to defend. Forcing Mr Trump to end it is another matter.

The President reportedly wanted the war wrapped up right after the midterms, and Qatari mediators carried a new proposal to Tehran in the campaign’s last days. The elections may matter more as his own deadline than as a check from Congress. Democrats would probably back a negotiated settlement, but many share the administration’s worries about Iran’s nuclear programme, missiles and armed allies. Their argument is over the response, not the threat.

For Israel, the long-term effects run deeper. American favourability towards Israel has fallen to a record low, especially among Democrats, straining the bipartisan consensus that once shielded the relationship. Expect efforts to attach conditions to military aid, more hearings on civilian casualties and Gaza, and proposals to block specific weapons sales.

A full break is unlikely. Israel retains real Democratic support, and the President holds considerable sway over aid. But backing from Congress can no longer be taken for granted, and talks on a successor to the 10-year aid agreement expiring in 2028 will show how far conditions can go. Democrats are split, too: progressives such as incoming Michigan senator Abdul El-Sayed openly challenge the old consensus.

Republicans will seize on that split and accuse Democrats of abandoning Israel. Democrats must show that scrutiny of Israeli policy isn’t abandonment of Israeli security, and offer a real alternative on Iran, Hezbollah, Gaza and Houthi attacks on shipping. Criticism by itself isn’t a strategy.

For Gulf partners, the shift is subtler but still matters. Washington sent its proposed Saudi nuclear co-operation agreement to Congress in late August, tying it politically to Saudi-Israeli normalisation. Democrats will make that deal and arms sales harder to approve. None of that has to undermine core security ties, since Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have spent decades cultivating bipartisan relationships. But Riyadh must show the partnership serves American interests broadly, not just deals with Mr Trump.

Democrats can now start defining the Middle East policy they would pursue if they win the White House in 2028

The Iran war has already led Gulf governments to doubt American reliability. A sceptical Congress could deepen the worry that US support rises and falls with domestic politics, speeding up diversification. Even so, a real shift away from Washington is unlikely. American military power and technology are very hard to replace.

There’s a paradox, too. Blocked at home, Mr Trump may devote more energy to foreign policy, where he has more freedom, so tougher oversight could make his approach less predictable without making it more restrained.

The election’s biggest effect may come later. Democrats can now start defining the Middle East policy they would pursue if they win the White House in 2028: whether to cut back US military involvement and ask partners to do more, pursue diplomacy with Iran along the lines of the 2015 nuclear deal, square Israel’s security with accountability and build a workable Gulf security framework. Without clear positions, their majority risks becoming a vehicle for opposing Mr Trump rather than shaping what comes after him.

In the near term, Democratic control complicates Mr Trump’s Middle East policy without transferring it. The message isn’t American abandonment but less predictable engagement. Regional leaders will need bipartisan ties, stronger co-operation among themselves and more defence capacity, not just access to the White House.

For officials in Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Iran, the question goes beyond Mr Trump’s policies: is America’s regional commitment changing in a fundamental way, and what comes after 2028?

Midterms rarely redirect foreign policy overnight. They change what is politically possible, and perceptions of American reliability can count as much as military power.