Arab silence is no substitute for policy on a troubled Iran

Iran's increasingly violent contest between the heterogenous opposition and a hardened regime is nothing if not opaque, complex and uncertain.

The world is justifiably perplexed by how the popular uprising in Iran will shape that country's future. The increasingly violent contest between the heterogenous opposition and a hardened regime is nothing if not opaque, complex and uncertain. From Iran's closest Arab neighbours, what is most perceptible is their silence. Beyond a principled reluctance to comment on another country's internal affairs and a muted relief at seeing the Iranian system questioned from within, the silence is also explained by political caution and strategic confusion.

From the prism of Arab Gulf interests, there is no need to pick a side in this fight, especially when it is not clear who will win and whether it will make a difference anyway. Indeed, in most Arab capitals, Iranian factions are seen as largely the same in their regional outlook - and profoundly inimical to Gulf interests. Erring on the side of prudence, however, should not preclude contingency planning. The Gulf states have mostly been worried that Iran's growing regional influence and nuclear resolve could lead to one of two dreadful outcomes: a regional war or a grand bargain with the US that would subordinate their interests to an Iranian hegemony in the region. Avoiding these two futures, however unlikely, has been the focus of Gulf diplomacy in recent times.

But the Green movement is now a mainstay of Iranian politics, so it is time to examine how its potential success could affect both Iran and Gulf security. Although Iran is increasingly absorbed by its own turbulence, regional policy has not changed. To counter protest slogans like "No Gaza, No Lebanon, My life to be sacrificed for Iran", the regime has further asserted its regional power to justify its aggressive foreign policy. Domestic bickering has sabotaged the Geneva nuclear agreement, but it has not significantly affected its nuclear trajectory.

In fact, a troubled Iran might cause more problems in the region in the short term. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guards could seek abroad the vindication they are denied at home, declaim pan-Islamic rhetoric, and feel compelled to fight their perceived enemies on foreign battlefields. Mr Ahmadinejad has just announced that Iran will enrich uranium to a higher degree, hoping to tap into a reservoir of Iranian nationalism. In fact, an angry Iran spells trouble, and military pressure from the US or Israel, real or perceived, would only compound it with regional ripple effects.

But there is another possibility that the Gulf states must ponder as well: a success in the medium term by the Green movement. Regime change might be welcomed by the West but the risk is that a honeymoon period would let Iran off the hook. Some western analysts think that a secular, nuclear Iran is something the world can live with. It is possible that a new government in Tehran would at first maintain the current foreign policy. There is no guarantee that even a democratic government would change the policy of supporting Hizbollah or Hamas, which provides Iran with needed regional leverage. However, it would be hard-pressed to continue devoting attention and resources to these groups when the Iranian population is so incensed by such costly sponsorship. Ultimately, internal dynamics rather than outside pressure would have the greatest influence on Iran's relationship with its proxies and regional alliances.

To avoid an unsatisfactory outcome, the Arab side needs to devote more thought to how a normal relationship with Iran could and should look like. Because the US has acted as the grand architect of Gulf security for so long, there is little understanding and interaction between the two shores of the Gulf. Only by being proactive and constructive can the Gulf states shape their own strategic environment.

The goal should be to define the broad contours of Iran's regional integration while reassuring Tehran that its vital interests will be addressed. The best model is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), which embeds the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. No one in the Gulf wants Bahraini sovereignty questioned by Iran anymore. This brainstorming needs to take into account the presence of foreign military forces in the Gulf. Iranians from across the spectrum say this is the unnecessary cause of regional instability, but the Gulf states should insist that foreign forces on their soil is a matter of sovereignty and an integral part of their security posture.

In parallel, however, they should expand the principle of collective security, and offer ideas for a security arrangement that creates mutual obligations and transparency. They can find inspiration from the complex web of non-aggression and conventional forces treaties in Cold War Europe that helped to keep military build-ups in check. A central element of such an architecture should be a nuclear arms free zone in the Gulf. In addition, and in exchange for Iran accepting intrusive safeguards and limits on its nuclear programme, the Gulf states would obtain from their allies a commitment that they would not deploy or use nuclear weapons in the Gulf. A treaty limiting missile proliferation would also be required.

A more democratic Iranian government would be unlikely to accede to the UAE's demand that the dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs be arbitrated by the International Court of Justice, but a common GCC position could offer Iran a comprehensive delineation of borders should it accept it. Ultimately, it is the promise of greater economic interdependence that constitutes the Gulf's greatest leverage and promise of stability. The Gulf states can provide much-needed capital and know-how to modernise Iran's economy, especially in its neglected south. From water projects to gas deals to joint petrochemical investments, the Gulf has much to offer a quieter, inward-looking Iran.