Live updates: Follow the latest on Israel-Gaza
Israel's account of the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in southern Gaza suggest his killing was the result of a chance encounter with troops rather than a carefully planned operation.
Drone footage released by the Israeli military of what it said were Mr Sinwar's final moments show the “mastermind” of the October 7 attacks on Israel slumped over in an armchair on the upper floor of a destroyed home. He is covered in dust with his head wrapped in a scarf and is not clearly recognisable.
He sits motionless for a few seconds, apparently watching as the drone hovers several metres away, before he throws a stick at it.
The soldiers who spotted Mr Sinwar and two other militants in Rafah on Thursday were regular infantry rather than an elite unit, and only realised his identity after he was killed. They used a small drone for reconnaissance and tank support – not an air strike as some initially believed – as they engaged the militants in a brief gun battle. Details from the Israeli forensic report leaked on Friday suggest that it was a shot to the head “from a distance” that killed him.
He was reportedly carrying grenades and, according to one unverified account, a pistol captured from an Israeli Druze lieutenant colonel, Mahmoud Khir Al Din, who was killed in a 2018 raid in Gaza.
According to some reports, the Hamas commander had emerged from one of the group's vast tunnel complexes in search of supplies or possibly to communicate with his commanders.
The raid stands in contrast to typical operations to kill what armed forces sometimes call “high-value targets”. Terror group commanders are often killed in raids which the attacking side spends months planning and where it takes few chances. High-risk US Special Forces raids against Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi are famous examples. The two commanders evaded years-long manhunts, even after their organisations were largely destroyed.
Reconnaissance assets, including drones, satellites and electronic warfare aircraft that intercept mobile phone signals, are often surged over the area where the suspect is hiding. People in that area are offered large rewards – $400,000 in the case of Mr Sinwar – for information.
People suspected to know the location of the target are interrogated to build up a picture of the network around them – the “network analysis” that was key to capturing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003 and killing Bin Laden in 2011.
It is not clear to what extent Israel had been using these tactics. Shin Bet, Israel’s internal intelligence service, said that military operations had restricted Mr Sinwar’s movements, suggesting an element of planning. But it was not the pinpoint intelligence that has been used to eliminate other wanted militants, including the numerous Hezbollah commanders who have been killed in Lebanon, even in moving vehicles.
Israel said it had “intelligence that indicated the suspected locations of senior members of Hamas”, without specifying Mr Sinwar.
The Israeli military said its 162nd Division had been deployed in the area where Mr Sinwar was thought to be hiding – a force of about 10,000 men rather than a small counterterrorism unit.
The patrol that found him was from the 450th battalion of the Bislamach Brigade – the military’s School for Infantry Corps Professions and Squad Commanders. In peacetime, it has a role training officers and is not considered an elite front line force.
Shifting away from Hamas
“They basically train squad commanders, units of about 10 men,” said Noam Ostfeld, a military analyst at the Sibylline risk consultancy.
Mr Ostfeld believes Israeli intelligence services are currently focused on Hezbollah, militarily a far greater threat to Israel than the diminished Hamas.
“Hezbollah and Iran are the main adversary, the main threat for Israel, and Israel is more focused on them. The [Israeli military] I think has closed down many of its capabilities in Gaza,” he said.
The 450th had fought in Gaza in December and March and would have been familiar with the dense urban terrain and risks of operating there, including ambushes from tunnels at point-blank range.
Mr Ostfeld said an early conclusion from Mr Sinwar's killing was that Hamas's operations were increasingly “boxed in” by Israeli units. It is also unclear to what extent Israeli operations to destroy Hamas tunnels had limited Mr Sinwar’s ability to move underground.
His death stands in contrast to those of Al Qaeda leader Bin Laden and Al Baghdadi, where the US used “tier one” Special Forces operating in potentially hostile territory. The raid on Bin Laden's home in Pakistan was carried out by the elite Seal Team Six, while Al Baghdadi's hideout in Syria was raided by Delta Force.
In Israel, units dedicated to such operations include Yamam, members of which are selected from other elite units to train for specialist raids, including raiding buildings where militant commanders are hiding, and rescuing hostages. Israel also has Shayetet 13, often compared to the US Navy Seals.
Both units work alongside Unit 669, an elite helicopter force for medical evacuation, rescue and “extraction” of forces in hostile situations.
An incidental demise
Mr Ostfeld said the fact that this was not a classic operation to kill a senior commander and capture his body – rather than destroy it in an air strike – was ominous. It suggests remaining Hamas leaders have tight operational security, communicating through couriers and avoiding the “signals intelligence” risk of the modern battlefield.
Modern armies can locate enemy positions using Communication Intelligence and Direction Finding equipment. On the ground or on drones, these can intercept and locate radio communications, even ones that jump between frequencies to evade detection. In the air, devices on aircraft called IMSI catchers can intercept and locate phone signals.
“Israel did all it can to in order to box in Hamas and Sinwar in particular,” Mr Ostfeld said. “Now they have killed, along with Sinwar, a lot of commanders. Hamas has elements of a military organisation, but the key point here about ‘decapitating’ the organisation is that the more militarily organised you are, you will always have someone that is likely to come back or step up to take their place.
“We’ve seen this with Hezbollah, who are more organised than Hamas. Losing a lot of commanders in a short time will reduce your capabilities considerably.”
In the long run however, Mr Ostfeld says the Israelis need to reorient their strategy to consider the impact of the war on Gazans. The enclave has been almost destroyed and more than 42,500 people, mostly civilians, have been killed in just over a year of fighting.
“You will degrade Hamas, you will degrade the organisation. Maybe you even managed to dismantle it completely, and there will be no Hamas. The issue is that when Israel uses too much force, it creates opposition for the long term.”
