After Myanmar's military regime marked National Armed Forces' Day on Saturday by committing their greatest massacre of protesters so far – killing 114 men, women and children – the coup-installed government of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing received another round of international condemnation.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he was "horrified" and denounced "the military's reign of terror". The UN special rapporteur Tom Andrews said the junta was committing "mass murder" – and this just after the defence chiefs of 12 countries, mainly western, but including South Korea and Japan, had published a statement condemning "the use of lethal force against unarmed people by the Myanmar armed forces and associated security services".
The sentiment that “something must be done” to end the violence and restore parliamentary democracy is understandably urgent. But what and by whom? The precedents are not encouraging. As Aung Zaw, editor-in-chief of the respected Irrawaddy news group, once wrote: “When the Burmese regime decides to act, it moves quickly, crushing its opponents without hesitation or regard for public or international opinion.”
In 2009, shortly before the country’s hybrid democracy – in which considerable powers were reserved by the military – was launched – Aung Zaw published an essay which noted that at that point neither sanctions, “constructive engagement”, nor mass popular uprisings had “succeeded in forcing the generals to weaken their stranglehold” on the country that they had ruled since 1962.
This time is different, though. While the half million strong Tatmadaw, as the armed forces are known, may remain largely cohesive, conditioned by their positions as the "guardians" of Myanmar and as a privileged state-within-a-state, the citizenry are proving hard to cow. Maung Zarni, the Burmese co-founder of Forces of Renewal South-East Asia, a cross-border network of pro-democracy scholars and activists, points out that the "hundreds of thousands of civil servants engaged in the Civil Disobedience Movement" who have not returned to work since the coup of February 1, have "deprived" the military "of a functioning state".
Moreover the generals’ seizure of power, Dr Zarni tells me, has “radicalised the entire generation of about 15-20 million youth, some of whom are now undergoing training in urban guerrilla warfare with ethnic armed groups”. The latter, drawn from the numerous ethnic groups that do not belong to the majority Bamar, have been battling the central state since independence. Many are now offering shelter in their borderland strongholds to the National League for Democracy (NLD) lawmakers turfed out by the coup, who are operating as an alternative government known as the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
With an unrepentant military, a defiant population, and a nascent alliance between the ousted NLD government and the ethnic armies, the stage is set for a devastating civil war. Dr Zarni and the Indonesian analyst Evan Laksmana both warn of a Syria-like scenario in South-East Asia's neighbourhood. And that is why inaction is not an option for Asean, the Association of South-East Asian Nations to which Myanmar and all the region's states, bar Timor-Leste, belong.
As someone who has been writing about the plight of the Rohingya for the best part of 10 years, it galls me that the mass ethnic cleansing and atrocities they have suffered in Myanmar prompted little action in real terms, while the murder of a far smaller number now seems likely to spur more decisive measures.
But the reality is that nothing compelled Asean to act then. It was even controversial when in 2017 Malaysia’s then prime minister, Najib Razak, called on the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation to end the Rohingya’s “humanitarian tragedy” – he was accused of violating the Asean principle of non-interference in each others’ internal affairs.
A civil war in Myanmar, however, would threaten the image of Asean as "a progressive, dynamic and integrated community, at the centre of wider regional mechanisms and architectures", ranging from the East Asia Summit to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership mega-trade agreement, as Thomas Daniel, my former colleague at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia, puts it.
Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, right, and her Singaporean counterpart, Vivian Balakrishnan, during their meeting in Jakarta on Thursday. AP Photo
Beyond the damage to Asean as an institution, the wave of refugees and the economic catastrophe that civil war would cause would seriously affect India, China, Japan – a huge investor in Myanmar – and others, too.
Asean, though, is divided. Indonesia and Malaysia have called for an urgent summit to address this issue, but some others prefer the path of quiet dialogue. Then there is the question of leverage; and it is not clear that any Asean member state, with the possible exception of Thailand, which doesn't want to force the issue, has sufficient influence to push the junta to do anything.
As Asean's giant by population, Indonesia can – and is – taking the lead in trying to engage China, Japan, Russia, India and the US. A recent analysis in the Foreign Policy magazine argued that Japan and India, which both have strong ties to the Tatmadaw as well as major economic interests in Myanmar, could play very useful roles. If they "use the full extent of their influence, they can end the impasse in Myanmar sooner than expect", was the authors' conclusion.
That sounds too optimistic for Dr Zarni, a long-time activist whose independence is attested to by the fact that his commentary has been attacked by both the Tatmadaw and allies of Aung San Suu Kyi, the deposed civilian leader, over the years. "Backdoor diplomacy" won't work, he says, with what he labels an "intransigent terroristic regime". He calls for a summit of the 12 defence chiefs who issued the statement, along with those from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
This alliance of concerned states, including Asean countries, should explore all possible options for ending the killings, he tells me. This, “more than any sanctions by the West or statements from the UN ought to drive the fear of God into the coup regime”, he says. “You cannot mediate in this essentially zero-sum war. But you have to help empower 54 million people vis-a-vis 400,000 terroristic men.”
All avenues should be explored, and I would place greater hopes on dialogue than Dr Zarni does. But this is a case when “something” really “must be done”. Asean and the wider region have to act with as much co-ordination as they can muster. They cannot allow Myanmar to descend into a Syria-type quagmire without having taken all steps possible to save the country from that hell.
Sholto Byrnes is an East Asian affairs columnist for The National
1. Domestic VAT refund amendments: request your refund within five years
If a business does not apply for the refund on time, they lose their credit.
2. E-invoicing in the UAE
Businesses should continue preparing for the implementation of e-invoicing in the UAE, with 2026 a preparation and transition period ahead of phased mandatory adoption.
3. More tax audits
Tax authorities are increasingly using data already available across multiple filings to identify audit risks.
4. More beneficial VAT and excise tax penalty regime
Tax disputes are expected to become more frequent and more structured, with clearer administrative objection and appeal processes. The UAE has adopted a new penalty regime for VAT and excise disputes, which now mirrors the penalty regime for corporate tax.
5. Greater emphasis on statutory audit
There is a greater need for the accuracy of financial statements. The International Financial Reporting Standards standards need to be strictly adhered to and, as a result, the quality of the audits will need to increase.
6. Further transfer pricing enforcement
Transfer pricing enforcement, which refers to the practice of establishing prices for internal transactions between related entities, is expected to broaden in scope. The UAE will shortly open the possibility to negotiate advance pricing agreements, or essentially rulings for transfer pricing purposes.
7. Limited time periods for audits
Recent amendments also introduce a default five-year limitation period for tax audits and assessments, subject to specific statutory exceptions. While the standard audit and assessment period is five years, this may be extended to up to 15 years in cases involving fraud or tax evasion.
8. Pillar 2 implementation
Many multinational groups will begin to feel the practical effect of the Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax (DMTT), the UAE's implementation of the OECD’s global minimum tax under Pillar 2. While the rules apply for financial years starting on or after January 1, 2025, it is 2026 that marks the transition to an operational phase.
9. Reduced compliance obligations for imported goods and services
Businesses that apply the reverse-charge mechanism for VAT purposes in the UAE may benefit from reduced compliance obligations.
10. Substance and CbC reporting focus
Tax authorities are expected to continue strengthening the enforcement of economic substance and Country-by-Country (CbC) reporting frameworks. In the UAE, these regimes are increasingly being used as risk-assessment tools, providing tax authorities with a comprehensive view of multinational groups’ global footprints and enabling them to assess whether profits are aligned with real economic activity.
Contributed by Thomas Vanhee and Hend Rashwan, Aurifer
1. Kylian Mbappe - to Real Madrid in 2017/18 - €180 million (Dh770.4m - if a deal goes through)
2. Paul Pogba - to Manchester United in 2016/17 - €105m
3. Gareth Bale - to Real Madrid in 2013/14 - €101m
4. Cristiano Ronaldo - to Real Madrid in 2009/10 - €94m
5. Gonzalo Higuain - to Juventus in 2016/17 - €90m
6. Neymar - to Barcelona in 2013/14 - €88.2m
7. Romelu Lukaku - to Manchester United in 2017/18 - €84.7m
8. Luis Suarez - to Barcelona in 2014/15 - €81.72m
9. Angel di Maria - to Manchester United in 2014/15 - €75m
10. James Rodriguez - to Real Madrid in 2014/15 - €75m
THE LIGHT
Director: Tom Tykwer
Starring: Tala Al Deen, Nicolette Krebitz, Lars Eidinger
Rating: 3/5
'The worst thing you can eat'
Trans fat is typically found in fried and baked goods, but you may be consuming more than you think.
Powdered coffee creamer, microwave popcorn and virtually anything processed with a crust is likely to contain it, as this guide from Mayo Clinic outlines:
Baked goods - Most cakes, cookies, pie crusts and crackers contain shortening, which is usually made from partially hydrogenated vegetable oil. Ready-made frosting is another source of trans fat.
Snacks - Potato, corn and tortilla chips often contain trans fat. And while popcorn can be a healthy snack, many types of packaged or microwave popcorn use trans fat to help cook or flavour the popcorn.
Fried food - Foods that require deep frying — french fries, doughnuts and fried chicken — can contain trans fat from the oil used in the cooking process.
Refrigerator dough - Products such as canned biscuits and cinnamon rolls often contain trans fat, as do frozen pizza crusts.
Creamer and margarine - Nondairy coffee creamer and stick margarines also may contain partially hydrogenated vegetable oils.
