Earlier this month, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, in consultation with the Speaker of Parliament and Prime Minister, appointed Simon Karam as head of the Lebanese delegation participating in the so-called Mechanism, the five-party committee that was expanded to monitor and discuss implementation of the ceasefire agreement reached between Israel and Lebanon last year.
Mr Karam’s appointment was significant because he is a civilian (as well as a former ambassador to the US), whereas the Lebanese delegation participating in the Mechanism had been made up exclusively of military officers. Equally important, he was tasked with leading the delegation, whereas previously Lebanon’s position had been that civilians would be added to the negotiations only as technical advisers.
The change in the Lebanese position came after the US envoy, Morgan Ortagus, in late October asked Lebanon to expand its delegation to include civilians. Beirut was hard-pressed to push back against US demands, because its resources are limited and only Washington can really curtail Israeli military actions in Lebanon. The Israelis recently escalated their nation-wide air strikes against alleged Hezbollah targets.
It is clear that the US objective is to lock Lebanon into negotiations with Israel that lead to a normalisation of their relations. The Lebanese, in turn, reject this, and still adhere to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, which offers Israel peace in return for a withdrawal from all Arab occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
The administration of US President Donald Trump is supportive of Israel, and not particularly sympathetic to the Lebanese position. While it may acknowledge Lebanese constraints, the Americans are especially keen to pursue the Abraham Accords trajectory, which Israel also wants. Success in this would give Mr Trump a major political victory.
At the same time, Mr Trump and those around him may be influenced by an emerging nexus in Washington that includes institutions close to Israel and Lebanese individuals who believe Lebanese-Israeli peace would marginalise Hezbollah and help Lebanon to prosper. Some of these individuals have used their media outlets to advance normalisation, for example interviewing Israel’s ambassador in Washington on Lebanese-Israeli peace.
The problem, however, is that shoehorning Lebanon into policy with little purchase in Lebanese society could lead to a major rift in the country, and even provoke foreign efforts to undermine any prospect of a Lebanese-Israeli settlement. To presume that Hezbollah is the sole obstacle to Lebanon-Israel peace is a mistake. Lebanese-Israeli normalisation has many critics in the region, not to say quite a few Lebanese who see no good reason at present to go beyond agreeing security measures with Israel in the south.
For example, forcing the issue could very well lead to Iranian and Turkish efforts to undermine what is achieved. The reason for this is that the broader dynamics today in the Levant are being defined by an Israeli, Turkish and Iranian contest to expand each country's respective sphere of interest – or in Iran’s case, mainly to preserve what still remains.
Lebanon and Syria find themselves at the heart of this regional tug of war. Turkey and Israel have clashing interests in Syria, and the Turks and Iranians have moved closer because of a common desire to contain Israeli power, even if Turkey wants to prevent Iran from destabilising Syria. Notably, Hezbollah recently sent a delegation to Istanbul, led by its foreign relations head, Ammar Al-Moussawi, to participate in a conference on Palestine. This allegedly followed other meetings between the group’s members and Turkish officials.
Turkish interest in Lebanon may not have been strong previously, but it has increased in light of Turkey’s growing tensions with Israel and its major influence in Syria. The Turks were particularly incensed by a recent deal between Lebanon and Cyprus to delineate their maritime border, which they believe encroaches on their own preferences for the maritime border with the Turkish portion of Cyprus, as well as with Syria.
Moreover, defining the maritime border between Lebanon, Israel and Cyprus in theory facilitates any potential deal to export Lebanon’s offshore hydrocarbons, if they exist, in co-operation with Israel and Cyprus. The Turks, in turn, would like the main transfer route of oil and gas from the Levant to Europe to pass through Turkey, a transit point for numerous pipelines from Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East towards Europe.
Therefore, the Lebanese cannot afford to place themselves outside an Arab consensus on Israel, and will certainly not seek a rapprochement that might exacerbate their own ties with Turkey and Syria. Knowing that Iran and Turkey have a shared interest in ensuring Lebanon isn’t absorbed into an Israeli-aligned sphere, the Lebanese cannot allow schisms in their society that could be exploited, and widened, by outside powers.
That is why the US pressing on normalisation with Israel is a terrible idea. When divided states are forced to take sides among contending regional powers, the results can be disastrous as this only aggravates domestic conflict. Ukraine is an example, and Lebanon would fare no better. Lebanon and Israel must ensure that cross-border attacks against each other end, but beyond that, normalisation is a step too far today.
