There is absolutely no doubt that the sudden listing of Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis on Iraq’s terror list earlier this month was not some technical error.
No one accidentally drops two of Iran’s most prized proxy groups into the terror-designation basket, certainly not in Baghdad, where every move involving armed factions carries political weight. As one diplomat put it, nothing this big ever happens without a political trail.
Theories surfaced immediately. Some suggested the move was a test balloon, floated to see who would panic or rush to defend Hezbollah or the Houthis. Others argued it was a pre-emptive strike aimed at blocking Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani from securing a new term. And then there was the bolder idea: that elements in Iraq’s intelligence apparatus were sending Washington a friendly message, a political preview disguised as bureaucratic chaos.
But beyond the intrigue, one message stood out: the region’s tolerance for militias is collapsing, and Iraq may finally be aligning itself with a broader Middle Eastern shift. The door to confronting armed non-state groups, long welded shut by fear or paralysis, has cracked open.
It was a blunt reminder of the region’s proxy network and that the fall-from-grace trajectory facing Iran-backed groups is accelerating. This shift is not isolated; it is tied to a growing regional desire to restrain or eliminate non-state armed actors, whether through gradual integration, forced disarmament or political sidelining.
Across the region, governments of those countries are tired. After decades of militias dictating national policies, dragging states into wars and operating with impunity, leaders and citizens alike have reached a breaking point. With geopolitical winds shifting and populations increasingly restless, states are looking to seize back control.
Lebanon offers the clearest example. Hezbollah, once the untouchable champion of resistance, is militarily weakened and politically exposed. Even long-standing allies have begun whispering that “enough is enough”. Pressure is mounting for the group to negotiate a path that eventually leads to turning in its weapons or accepting a new national arrangement. It will not happen easily, and Hezbollah will not let its arms go quietly nor without a price and a secured political future, but the process has already begun.
In Gaza, Hamas faces similar pressure. To preserve a ceasefire with Israel and secure any kind of political future, it must rethink its armed posture. Hamas leaders have acknowledged, cautiously, that their weapons strategy is on the table.
The Houthis in Yemen, meanwhile, have long hinted at their desire to become a legitimate political force. Their attacks in the Red Sea were less ideological and more about gaining leverage in any future settlement. But if the region is shifting towards restraining militias, the Houthis may soon be forced to choose between remaining an armed rebellion or becoming part of a national deal.
Even Iran appears to sense the ground moving. Tehran is signalling, quietly, that the days of confronting Israel and the West solely through proxies may be nearing an end. Stronger states, not fragmented militias, may now be more useful allies. One Iranian diplomat put it simply: resistance can take many forms. In other words, Iran is updating its posture, not abandoning the game.
Two years ago, the Middle East looked like a proxy playground. Co-ordinated attacks on Israel, militia encampments stretching from Yemen to Lebanon to Iraq, and a thick Iranian imprint across the region. Today, the landscape looks very different.
Syria provides an unexpected lesson. If an armed rebel faction like Hayat Tahrir Al Sham can wake up one morning in the presidential palace in Damascus and decide it wants to be a political authority, then other groups can maybe imagine similar futures. HTS has been drifting from international isolation into deep engagement, with doors opening from the East to the West. Its leader, Ahmad Al Shara, recently defended two decades of fighting in insurgencies, but, nevertheless, announced it was time for diplomacy and political work.
Whether Syria’s new authorities succeed is unclear. Rights violations and governance failures continue. But the idea that an armed group can rapidly pivot towards political legitimacy reinforces the wider trend, and the militias can sense that the era of armed rule is fading.
Back in Iraq, the terror-list episode did not land in a vacuum. It revealed that some Iraqi officials, security leaders and a growing segment of the public believe the country cannot move forward while militias operate as a parallel state. With the US applying consistent pressure, Baghdad may be approaching a moment of reckoning. The opportunity to dismantle or domesticate militias has never been more visible.
Some argue that this path began with the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, the architect of Iran’s proxy empire. Others say it began last year with the killing of Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, whose charisma once anchored the proxy network.
Today, we in the Middle East may be witnessing something long thought impossible: the beginning of the end of the militia era. It will not be clean, peaceful or quick. But the direction is unmistakable. There is no doubt that states are slowly reclaiming authority, proxies are recalibrating, and Iran is rewriting its path.
It seems Arab countries plagued by non-state actors may be inching towards a future shaped more by governments and less by militias. And Iraq, intentionally or not, may have just announced the grand opening act.
