Iran has not recovered from the setback of Suleimani's death

Iraqi cleric and Iranian-backed militia leader Moqtada Al Sadr with Qassem Suleimani in Tehran in September 2019. EPA

Two years after the assassination of Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, the diminishing influence of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is evident in this week’s failed drone attacks against US forces in Iraq.

In one incident, two explosive-laden drones were shot down by American C-RAM air defences in an attempted attack on the Ain Al Asad airbase, which hosts US forces to the west of Baghdad. The attack came after the second anniversary of Suleimani’s demise was marked on January 3 by “suicide drones” with “Suleimani’s revenge” written on their wings, which were intercepted and destroyed over Baghdad.

Iranian people carry pictures of the late Iran's Quds Force top commander Qassem Suleimani and Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis during the 40 days memorial in Najaf in 2020. Reuters

Even though both attacks were successfully foiled by US forces, bases hosting them in Iraq and Syria continued to come under fire, with military centres in Iraq’s western Anbar province and the capital Baghdad being hit by Katyusha rockets. In Syria, eight rounds of indirect fire landed inside a base used by members of the US-led coalition. No casualties have been reported in any of the attacks.

While responsibility for some of the attacks has been claimed by a previously unknown group called Qassem Al Jabarayn, US officials believe Iran-backed militias linked to the Revolutionary Guard are the most likely culprits.

Suleimani was killed in a US drone strike authorised by former US President Donald Trump in January 2020, together with Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis, deputy commander of Iran-backed militias in Iraq known as the Popular Mobilisation Forces.

The Iranian commander headed the IRGC’s elite Quds Force, which has responsibility for the organisation’s overseas operations and was a key ally of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq have vowed to avenge his death, as well as calling for the removal of all US forces from Iraq and Syria.

The difficulties being experienced by Iran’s allies throughout the region should certainly be a consideration for western negotiators

The US currently has around 900 troops based in Syria and another 2,500 in Iraq, and while the US-led coalition formally ended its combat mission supporting Iraqi forces in the fight against ISIS last month, they are maintaining their presence to assist with anti-ISIS military operations.

But attempts by the IRGC and its allies in the region to increase pressure on US forces to end their presence are making little headway, a failing that is attributed to the leadership vacuum that has been created since Suleimani’s assassination.

A charismatic figure who had built up an extensive network of contacts throughout the Middle East, for decades Suleimani played a central role in expanding Iran’s influence throughout the region. He was at the forefront of Iran’s efforts to consolidate its grip over the restless Shiite population in neighbouring Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. And his support for the Assad regime in the Syrian conflict proved critical to keeping the regime in power, especially through his efforts to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to provide military support.

His killing therefore constituted a major setback for Iran, one that – to judge by the difficulties Tehran is currently experiencing with managing its regional allies – is still being keenly felt within the IRGC.

While Suleimani was quickly replaced by Esmail Qaani as head of the Quds Force, the organisation is no longer regarded as a key component in the IRGC structure and exercises considerably less influence, both at home and abroad, than it did under Suleimani’s command.

Esmail Qaani attending a mourning ceremony held in Tehran for Qassem Suleimani. AFP

This has led to a significant decline in the standing of some of Iran’s key allies in the region, such as Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In Iraq, his death has been blamed for the deepening discord among Shiite militias, as well as the embarrassing setback that Iran-backed political groups suffered in last October’s general election, when they lost most of their seats.

Suleimani’s absence has also been keenly felt in Lebanon, where Hezbollah, which continues to exercise significant influence over the country’s political system, is increasingly being blamed for causing the dire economic crisis.

Nor are Iran's allies faring much better in neighbouring Syria, where Israel has recently intensified its attacks on Iranian-backed assets, with the recent Israeli air strike against the Syrian port of Latakia, sparking a fire that lit up the Mediterranean seafront, said to have been targeting arms deliveries from Iran.

The difficulties being experienced by Iran’s allies throughout the region should certainly be a consideration for western negotiators involved in the current round of talks on Iran’s nuclear programme, as they attempt to strike a new deal.

While US officials said earlier this week that modest progress had been made in the talks, western diplomats involved in the negotiations paint a very different picture, claiming that, far from being serious about striking a deal, the Iranians are instead indulging in delaying tactics.

To date, Iran’s primary demand in the negotiations, which are attempting to revive the controversial 2015 nuclear deal, has been to call for lifting the punitive economic sanctions that were implemented as part of the former Trump administration’s policy of applying “maximum pressure” on the regime. But instead of focusing on key issues, such as Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Iran has been focusing on relatively minor issues, such as whether UN inspectors can have surveillance cameras operating at key sites.

This has led to mounting suspicions among western intelligence officials that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi is simply playing for time while work continues on Iran’s enrichment activities, which have now moved far beyond the levels agreed in the original 2015 agreement.

But with Iran clearly struggling to maintain its regional network of alliances in the aftermath of Suleimani’s killing, the West should realise that Tehran is approaching the negotiations from a position of weakness, not strength, and not allow Iranian negotiators to avoid making tough concessions on their nuclear activities.