How will Donald Trump handle Iran's 'Axis of Resistance'?

The US election winner's previous term could be a rough guide to how Washington will handle regional tensions next year

Donald Trump and Melania Trump arrive on an unannounced trip to Al Asad Air Base in Iraq in December 2018. AFP

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There are many scenarios that could play out for Iran in Donald Trump's second term, from an all-out escalation in hostilities to “striking a grand deal”, analysts have told The National.

In the short term, his victory will make Tehran “think very hard” about how it responds to Israel’s damaging air strikes last month. One reason for this is Mr Trump's previous “madman” approach to foreign policy, involving dangerous unpredictability when no bargains can be struck.

“A new Trump administration will likely take a much stronger stance towards Iran both bilaterally with Israel and unilaterally,” said Michael Mulroy, former deputy assistant secretary of defence for the Middle East under Mr Trump.

“It should also be highlighted as it is widely reported that Iran has had a continuing operation to assassinate President Trump and many of his former senior advisers. This effort is likely not to go unanswered.”

Mr Trump's unpredictability was starkly on display in 2020, when he ordered the killing of Iran's most revered general, Qassem Suleimani, in a drone strike, after one US contractor was killed by Iran-backed militias a week previously. Iran has promised revenge for the strike.

His win could also lead to a reset of Iran’s entire regional “axis of resistance” strategy, with the US now more likely to give Israel greater latitude for military action.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah is the most well-armed part of the axis, equipped by Tehran over decades, and in Yemen, the Houthis have blockaded the Red Sea with Iranian weapons, choking about 12 per cent of global maritime trade.

With these levers of armed influence, some believe Iran is not currently thinking about backing down from its causes, including supporting a large network of regional militias attacking US forces in Iraq and launching assaults on Israel from there and Syria.

However, given Mr Trump’s unpredictability, experts believe outcomes in the region could range from the extreme of joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear bases to a surprise thaw in relations.

Restrain or retaliate?

Judging from the tone of tweets by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, along with his far-right national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, “you certainly feel a Trump victory gives them greater licence to operate with unchecked American oversight,” said Dr Sanam Vakil, a Middle East expert at Chatham House think tank.

“This is going to be presented as a unique opportunity to press Iran and its proxies and that narrative is compelling in Washington, among Trump advisers.”

That could lead Iran to “double down” on its relations with Russia and China to strengthen its defences and accelerate its nuclear programme.

Iran's Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missile was unveiled last year in a ceremony attended by the minister of defence. It has a range of 2,000km and a warhead weight of 1,500kg. Irna

Tehran has explicitly threatened retaliation against Israel’s October 26 air strikes, but with Trump coming into power “the Iranians will be thinking long and hard whether they really do want to take their promised revenge”, said Richard Pater, director of the British Bicom think tank.

“That will give Israel the opportunity to hit Iran even harder than last time, so the ball is very much in Iran's court for now.”

An Israeli security source indicated the country would “be leaning towards a more kinetic approach” to Iran and said that once Mr Trump was inaugurated Israeli air strikes might expand into Iraq.

Today, it is hard to imagine a worse crisis as observers wait for an Iranian counter strike on Israel, after Israeli air strikes against Iran on October 26 and two Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Israel on April 13 and October 1.

The remains of ballistic missiles are displayed by Israel's military at the Julis army base on October 9, days after an attack by Iran on Israel. Reuters

Mr Trump’s 2017-2021 term could be a rough guide to whether the US will get sucked into this confrontation due to its support for Israel. Washington has sent $17 billion in military aid to Israel since the Gaza war began last October.

Mr Trump’s vice presidential choice, JD Vance, takes a tough line on Iran, although, like Mr Trump, he says he wants to avoid further regional wars. He is a strong advocate for even greater US support for Israel and says he wants to “empower” Washington’s allies to defend themselves without direct US involvement.

But US jets could also join in a joint attack if the severity of any Iranian action merited it, the Israeli source added, but he argued that Mr Trump’s victory could also be a “de-escalatory factor” on Tehran’s activities.

Ultimately, the fear among Tehran’s rulers over Mr Trump’s unpredictability could have a “more powerful impact” and “bring more pressure to bear on the Iranians”, said Mr Pater.

Whither the war?

Mr Trump in recent weeks indicated that he was prepared to give Israel freer rein, provided that the war ended by the time he entered office, said Dr Burcu Ozcelik of the Rusi think tank.

“What happens between now and January [the inauguration] will be watched closely, and nervously, by those in the Middle East,” she said.

The region will be “braced” for how his campaign pledge to “end wars” will translate on the ground in Gaza and Lebanon and in a region “teetering on the brink of deepening instability”.

The return of transactional diplomacy was a certainty, and the leading Gulf states may see an opportunity for “US security guarantees, arms deals, and a tougher stance on Iran”, she added.

Dr Vakil agreed that it would be a “barter of security arrangements”. She said it would be “give and take, where the Palestinians will certainly be the biggest losers, who will have to take what’s given to them”.

Given the economic strain, as well as the growing casualties, it could well be in Israel’s interests to end the Gaza and Lebanon wars.

“Trump could in the next 75 days to his inauguration loom large over this, and could help force through a deal,” suggested Mr Pater.

But a western security official was “genuinely worried” about the next president’s term because “he's unpredictable, unreliable, and does stuff only to make him feel good”.

Some argue the Trump administration could also use its political and military capital to seek a lasting settlement in the region, securing an enduring legacy.

“For Trump, it’s all about these transactional ties and the potential to reinvigorate a grand bargain within the region” that would include normalising Israeli and Saudi Arabian relations, said Mr Pater. He said this could realistically be done within the four-year presidential term.

Dr Vakil agreed that Mr Trump would want to deliver “normalisation” in expanding the Abraham Accords between Israel and Saudi Arabia, but the kingdom would also need strong incentives such as Palestinian statehood and a “cemented” US-Saudi Arabia defence pact.

This would still leave serious tensions between the US and Iran, particularly in the nuclear realm.

Maximum Pressure on Iran?

Amid swirling questions over the wider regional crisis, there also looms the risk of direct Iran-US clashes.

This is despite Mr Trump’s promises to end US military involvement in the region, only to kill Mr Suleimani in a drone strike in 2020, which led to Iran firing dozens of ballistic missiles at US bases, injuring 100 soldiers with many narrowly escaping death.

Tensions were already high a year previously when Mr Trump came close to authorising strikes on Iran after Tehran shot down a $120 million drone near its airspace.

US soldiers inspect the damage from Iranian missiles at Ain Al Asad Air Base in Iraq's Anbar province in January 2020. Reuters

Experts say a crucial reason for previous tensions was Mr Trump’s decision to walk away from the “nuclear deal”, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The US, EU, China and Russia backed a plan from 2015 to 2018 that allowed UN inspectors to limit Iran’s nuclear programme in return for the lifting of sanctions.

Instead, Mr Trump hit Iran with a sanctions regime called “Maximum Pressure”, placing sharp restrictions on Tehran’s oil exports and slashing them from about three million barrels per day in 2018 to an average of 775,000 barrels per day in 2021.

Maximum Pressure supporters argued the JCPOA allowed Iran to return to its nuclear programme at a future date. It caused lasting economic damage but was accompanied by two things: Iran ramped up its nuclear programme and is now close to obtaining a bomb, the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency warns.

Secondly, Iran lashed out with several attacks on oil tankers linked to the US and has been linked by UN analysts to a 2019 Houthi attack on Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure. Iran’s exports have averaged 1.7 million barrels per day in 2024 so far.

Critics of the Biden administration say it is because the US is not punishing Iran for its foreign adventurism, but the extent to which Iran responds to punishment is not clear.

“One of the foreign policy areas that may shift between a Biden administration to a second Trump administration is on the policy towards Iran. The Biden administration focused on getting back into the JCPOA or a version of it. And many of the sanctions levied by the prior Trump administration were removed,” said Mr Mulroy.

Iranian and European negotiators at a meeting discussing Tehran's nuclear programme in December 2021. Reuters