Pictures of a middle-aged couple about to board a boat for an Antarctic cruise are not usually the stuff of politics in the Middle East. Especially not Iranian politics. But the recent dismissal of Shahram Dabiri, one of the Vice Presidents of Iran, says more about political pressures inside the country than the attractions of touring one of the ends of the Earth.
Iran is under the microscope because US President Donald Trump wants to force a new juncture in the nearly-50-year schism in relations between Washington and Tehran. A crisis in which Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian loses his close ally – the pair go back to time spent in the political structures of the country’s sensitive north-west – is a chink in the country’s system.
The official explanation for Dr Dabiri’s dismissal revolves around the hardships facing the Iranian people. The politics of austerity is difficult even for western countries, but in Iran it is particularly severe given that it is a resource-rich country, albeit one that’s been brought to its knees primarily by US-led international sanctions.
There is a second undeniable driver for the sacking. Iran is run by a revolutionary regime, wherein the ideology of solidarity is a useful tool to its leaders. Propaganda around the importance of that virtue is incessant for its people. In other words, it is a firm pillar for the establishment.
Travelling to the far Southern Hemisphere through a number of countries for an exotic experience over the Nowruz season has been seen as an extravagance for the doctor-turned-high official. This isn’t surprising, given that scandals within the establishment form part of a picture of high-level graft that fuels dissatisfaction among Iranians outside a small elite circle.
Mr Trump’s letter to Iran’s leadership demanding talks on its nuclear programme, as well as other aspects of the decades-long confrontation, has set a new baseline for what comes next.
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has for years pursued a two-pronged strategy that involves pushing forward his country’s regional and foreign policy goals while allowing for cycles of complicated diplomatic talks with the US and other western powers. These two processes operate independently, but fulfilling its regional ambitions is considerably more important than making progress in the diplomatic field.
Substantial changes have shaken this position, beginning with the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, a high-ranking official in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, under the first Trump administration in early 2020. The conflict in Gaza led to Israel’s war on Hezbollah and Lebanon. This was followed very quickly by the rejuvenation of Syria’s opposition and the subsequent demise of the Tehran-aligned Bashar Al Assad government.
Now in its first substantial overseas action, the Trump presidency has orchestrated heavy bombing of Yemen to count out the Houthi war threat in the Red Sea and beyond. And so collectively, a number of the Iranian government’s key pillars have been kicked away.
With its tariff actions opening up new uncertainties, it is almost impossible to predict the prestige that the US will bring to any negotiations with Iran in four or five months’ time. But leaving that huge caveat aside, we can see that Tehran’s previous diplomatic track is busted.
It has exhausted every shred of faith with the Europeans, who worked hard alongside the US and Iran to secure a deal in 2015 to limit Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme. A decade later, Iran has accelerated its production of uranium enriched to near-weapons grade levels.
Today, Tehran’s reserve of ballistic missiles and its engagement with the Russians, underpinned by its supply of drones towards Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine, are among the few functioning assets left. It also enjoys strong ties to China on the diplomatic front, which helped to foster new relations with Riyadh and revive diplomacy with the rest of the Gulf countries. This rapprochement seems to be holding throughout the fast pace of current events.
It has been assumed that Iran still has enough tools domestically for its regime to survive. But what it doesn’t have is a way of answering why its people are unhappy with its leadership. That boils down to the country’s revolutionary stance against America. It serves as the establishment’s supreme distinguishing feature, and yet it clearly acts as a dividing line between the leadership and a huge swathe of the Iranian public.
How long can this situation be bottled up for? Ordinary Iranians have come out in waves to try to challenge the resulting isolation. For example, the demonstrations of 2009 – not long after the emergence of Twitter as a messaging tool – were among the world’s first mass efforts that used social media for change.
Iran has undoubtedly adopted a conciliatory approach towards its neighbours. But despite these friendly ties, there is no compensating for the absence of a move to overcome its foundational divide with the US.
Indirect talks, said to be hosted by Oman, are on the cards after Dr Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the President of the UAE, delivered Mr Trump’s letter to the Iranian leadership. But what the US President really wants are direct discussions, and he has exerted pressure on Iran’s diplomats to shake off their habitual fudging on the way to a deal. Whether his strategy works, only time will tell.
