After Turkey secured the grand prize of the collapse of Bashar Al Assad's rule at the hands of its allies, who now control Damascus and other Syrian cities, it will be crucial to see how Turkey will play its cards in Syria.
Yet Turkey – and Israel's – emergence as dominant regional players does not negate Arab influence. Indeed, key Arab states still possess crucial tools to position themselves strategically within this shifting balance of power.
Globally, power dynamics have also shifted. Russian influence in the Middle East and Africa has waned, driven by its diminished foothold in the Mediterranean and the collapse of the regional and potentially domestic positions of its key ally, Iran.
For their part, China is bracing for the economic confrontation anticipated from US president-elect Donald Trump, while Europe feels the weight of its staunch support for Ukraine, fearing that cornering Russia might provoke a tactical nuclear conflict.
This year has proven disastrous for Iran, culminating in its abrupt withdrawal from Syria as armed factions – backed by Turkey and Israel – toppled the Assad government.
Iran quit Syria to avoid a ground war it deemed too costly, abandoning its long-standing military, political, and economic investments, leaving behind a legacy of mismanagement that failed to deliver for the Syrian people.
Moscow is said to be more enraged by Tehran – which it had entrusted with safeguarding the Assad government – than it was by the victory of the armed rebels and by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Russia was blindsided by Iran's inability – or unwillingness – to protect the Assad government in Damascus, creating a rift in their partnership.
Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin had envisioned a strategic agreement with Iran, similar to its pact with China. However, after the events in Syria, the future of this agreement is in jeopardy. Both sides will likely exchange blame, directing their frustration towards the Syrian military. While reconciliation between them might occur later, trust between them has been deeply shaken.
The severe blow Turkey dealt to Russia and Iran fundamentally altered their relationship, especially since the three nations had previously considered themselves partners in determining Syria's future through the Astana process. Suddenly, Turkey assumed pole position in shaping Syria’s destiny, as well as in defining the scope and nature of Russian and Iranian influence in the Middle East.
It is possible that Mr Putin may not forgive Mr Erdogan for what he might well have perceived as a significant betrayal. Indeed, Russia had provided Turkey with discounted gas, and viewed their relationship as strategic, particularly given Turkey’s strained ties with its Nato allies.
Turkey had, however, reassessed its strategic and national interests, deciding that improving relations with Nato countries presented an opportunity. Ankara found common ground with these nations in Ukraine, where Turkey has financial, economic and military ties – particularly through the production of drones vital to Kyiv's war effort.
Mr Erdogan postponed his meeting with Mr Putin three times, and it's likely to remain indefinitely postponed as Turkey's bargaining process with Russia gets under way, particularly concerning the fate of Russian air and naval bases in Syria's Hmeimim and Tartus.
The military bases are critical for Russia’s presence in the Mediterranean and its access to Africa, especially via Libya. Ankara has assured Moscow that the bases will not face military threats from armed groups, while the new government in Damascus has sent signals to Russia that it will not target the bases for now – possibly out of fear of provoking a ground battle given the bases' formidable defences.
While bargaining between Russia and Turkey has yet to begin in earnest, Ankara clearly holds more leverage. Turkey controls matters on the ground now and remains a lifeline for Russia, which is dealing with the weight of Western sanctions.
Turkey's offer will likely be to secure a peaceful and dignified withdrawal for Russia from the two bases, but this would come at a significant cost, one that Moscow might find impossible to pay.
Ultimately the future of these Russian bases depends on decisions made by the US and Turkey, not by the new government in Damascus. Washington may find its interests are best served by shutting down the bases or converting them into Nato – or even American – bases, to contain Russia’s influence in the Mediterranean.
For Turkey, the key goal is to consolidate control over Syria, while dismantling Kurdish aspirations for statehood. This is the focus of its negotiations with the US.
In return, Turkey is offering to rein in armed factions and prevent the spread of terrorism or militant extremism in Syria. However, these are pledges, not guarantees. Still, Turkey’s offerings align with the goals of the US and European nations, whose main aim is to remove Russia from the Mediterranean and strengthen Nato's dominance in the region. And Turkey is ready to support Nato's ambitions, particularly through its control of Syria and Libya.
Israel, for its part, has positioned itself well within the shifting dynamics. Its achievements include inflicting significant blows on Iran within its borders, undermining Iran’s regional influence strategy by hitting its proxies led by Hezbollah, and neutralising Tehran’s regional ambitions. Israel also dismantled Syria’s military infrastructure, accelerating Iran's retreat from Syria following the fall of Mr Al Assad.
As Turkey positions itself within Nato as a strategic partner with a unique role in the Middle East, Israel likewise positions itself as a strong ally to the US, instrumental in shaping the emerging Middle East. While Israel is exuding a sense of triumphalism stemming from its military successes in Lebanon and Syria, Israeli leaders are aware that these victories were achieved with direct US support.
In light of Turkey's ambition to cement its place in global and regional power dynamics, Israel's firm positioning, and Iran's diminishing influence, where do Arab states stand? Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, are at the forefront of Arab leadership during this historical phase. So, what are the options and the road map for Arab countries in the regional and global balance of power?
The vision and capabilities exist. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 encapsulates national and regional ambitions that are developmental, pragmatic, and visionary. It envisions a Middle East resembling Europe – a secure Arab region that looks into the future with peace and prosperity.
But meaningful engagement is required with sectors marginalised by despotism, such as in Syria. If Arab nations are serious about preventing Syria from falling under Turkish or Israeli influence – or succumbing to extremism – they must engage with Syrian Arab tribes and the elites sidelined by the Assad rule.
The objective of this engagement is not merely to appoint people to sovereign ministries but to ensure their active participation in civil infrastructure sectors, such as the economy, industry and transportation. Strengthening Arab tribes also serves to hinder extremism, a looming threat to Syria's future. Gulf Arab states also hold the keys to Syria’s reconstruction – not Turkey, Israel, or Iran – the latter has swiftly abandoned its investments in the country.
Turkey lacks the financial resources to secure control over Syria’s future, while Israel is unlikely to be accepted as a player in broader reconstruction efforts. Only Gulf Arab states possess the necessary resources to rescue Syria from darkness, ensuring it remains a secular Arab state in the truest sense.
As for the road map for Arab positioning in regional power dynamics, this remains an ongoing discussion worth tackling in the future.
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