Following the fall of the government of Bashar Al Assad, the question on the minds of those living in Syria and outside is, who will fill the political vacuum in Damascus?
The takeover of city after city in recent days by rebel groups led by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, an organisation proscribed as terrorists by the UN, US and other entities, has raised concerns about the future of the country and of the region at large.
The leader of Hayat Al Tahrir, Ahmad Al Shara, formerly known by the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed Al Jawlani, has been cognisant of this fact and made efforts to rehabilitate his image. In recent days, he has given interviews to international news organisations, positioning himself as a Syrian national figure and distancing himself from his extremist past. Speaking to CNN, he even said that the Hayat Al Tahrir could be dissolved once its objective of removing Mr Al Assad’s government from power was achieved.
Whether Mr Al Shara, who has in the past been affiliated to ISIS and Al Qaeda, will succeed in his image makeover remains to be seen. Syria’s future, however, isn’t linked to just one individual.
Maintaining the state institutions has become a common goal among many actors both within the country and outside. It is worth noting that Mr Al Assad’s Prime Minister, Mohammad Al Jalali, has urged rebels and all citizens to protect these institutions. He has also promised co-operation with any new leadership chosen by its people.
If Mr Al Jalali’s plea is taken seriously by the many rebel groups on the ground – thereby averting further destabilisation of the country – it will provide some relief not just to Syria’s diverse population, but also to foreign powers that have been involved in the 13-year civil war – including the US and Russia.
This brings us to the question of where the various foreign players stand today.
Mr Al Assad’s exit is no doubt a major regression for Russia’s position on several levels – from losing its military bases to ending its presence in the Mediterranean and witnessing the decline of Moscow’s influence in the region, alongside the rise of Turkish and Israeli influence. So is the case for Iran, particularly in the context of its competing interests with the US and Israel.
The departing US President Joe Biden has been co-ordinating with president-elect Donald Trump over the recent developments in the Levant. They both appear to be on the same page regarding the need to reduce Iran’s influence in the region, in large part by aiding Israel in its mission to neutralise Tehran’s most significant asset – Hezbollah in Lebanon – and to deal crushing blows to its strategic capabilities.
Mr Trump has also seemingly not opposed undermining Russian influence in Syria, as it aligns with the US’s grand strategic interests. Moreover, Syria has for years served as a vital link for Iranian militias, and its geography was crucial to the so-called Persian Crescent project. To that extent, the exit of Tehran’s ally in Damascus will be a welcome development for Washington.
Israel, meanwhile, has been co-operating with Turkey by providing the necessary intelligence for Ankara-backed factions in Syria. Its primary aim has been to cut off Iranian military supplies to Lebanon through Syria. Nevertheless, there is a huge trust deficit between Israel and Turkey, bearing in mind that their relationship has often fluctuated in the past, particularly over the issue of Palestine.
However, what all these regional powers – winners as well as losers – are keen to avoid is Syria becoming a breeding ground for terrorism. Washington may have tacitly supported Ankara’s mission to eliminate Russian and Iranian influence in Syria, but it did not endorse support for extremist factions to overthrow the government in Damascus. For its part, Turkey has promised the US that it can help to rein in some of the extremist factions. However, these promises are not necessarily guarantees.
The fact of the matter is that the US, the world’s biggest superpower, is not in the driver’s seat of this speeding train. But Turkey is.
It is, therefore, incumbent upon Washington to use the leverage it has over its allies in the region to influence the developments on the ground to the extent they can – Turkey to Syria’s north and Israel to its south.
With Syria’s future looking uncertain over the next few days, weeks and months, one can’t help but wonder if much of this could have been avoided had the Assad government not made a series of mistakes.
If it had involved the opposition groups in the country’s governance structures and invested in serious reforms – as had been sought by the Arab League when it revoked its suspension of Syria last year – things would have been very different today.
Instead, the country finds itself at a murky crossroads, with little clarity over its future or that of the region, other than the long-term erosion of Iranian, Russian and Hezbollah influence.
