Yemen’s Houthis use the language of the revolution but seek to hijack it

The demands by the Shia Houthis show that they do not want to reform Yemen's current political system - rather, they seek to supercede it, argues Faisal Al Yafai

A follower of the Shia Houthi group looks on during a protest in Sanaa. Houthi rebels are seeking to appropriate the Yemeni revolution, writes Faisal Al Yafai (REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah)

When the revolution in Yemen erupted in early 2011, it pushed to one side what had been the most pressing problem for the government in Sanaa: the festering rebellion in the far north of the country.

For seven years, until the revolution, Houthi rebels had been fighting an insurgency in their stronghold in the far north-west. Although the Houthi rebels are Shia, part of the Zaidi branch that used to rule north Yemen, their original complaints were more about the corruption of the ruler. Since the ruler was the then-president Ali Abdullah Saleh, few disagreed.

When the revolution broke out, the Houthis joined it but were also sidelined by more pressing concerns, in particular the push from the Southern Movement Hirak for independence.

That issue finally had the political sting drawn from it this year by the decision to create a federal Yemen of six regions. It does not end the “southern question”, but at least provides a framework.

That was at the start of this year, and since then the Houthis have started agitating again.

For two weeks now, the capital Sanaa has been disrupted by tens of thousands of Houthi supporters.

Yesterday represented the beginning of what the Houthis call the “third stage” of their revolution. The rebels plan to disrupt traffic in Sanaa, thereby increasing pressure on the government to submit to their “legitimate demands”.

Such language deliberately echoes the language of the revolution. Despite that, though, the Houthis don’t represent, as they claim, “the will of the people”. Rather, they are using real political issues – such as the removal of subsidies – to gain popular support for their real aim of removing the government.

It was the subsidies issue that allowed the Houthis to expand their political support beyond a narrow base. When, in July, the Yemeni president Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi announced that a wide range of subsidies would be ended, ordinary Yemenis were outraged. Understandably so, since subsidies keep fuel affordable in a country struggling with the cost of living.

But the Houthis jumped on the issue and appropriated it and now demand that the entire government resigns. That is despite the president dismissing his cabinet and offering the Houthis a role in government, and despite the UN Security Council, last week, calling on the Houthis to end their rebellion and warning of sanctions.

To see how extreme the demands of the Houthis are, look at the other big issue in Yemen’s political make-up: the push by the Southern Movement Hirak for independence.

Complete secession is still argued for by many in the south – indeed, in some parts of the south, there is de facto separate governance. But the moderate elements in the movement eventually accepted the proposal to move to a federal system. They may quibble about the details, the implementation and how power-sharing would work. But, in essence, rather than splitting up the construction of the state, Hirak has accepted the need to reform it.

That willingness to work within the current construction of the Yemeni state is absent on the Houthi side. The vision that the Houthis appear to have for Yemen is not one that is compatible with the Yemeni state as it is currently configured. It may be that moderate elements within the Houthi movement will emerge. But, for now, the Houthi position entails changes that threaten the very nature of the Yemeni state.

Start with the geography. The Houthis centre of power is the province of Saada. Under the new federal structure, this would be within the region of Azal. But the Houthis also seek to have influence in two neighbouring provinces, one to the east, Al Jouf, and one to the south-west, Hajja. But under the new federal structure, each of these would be in a different region.

Thus what the Houthis appear to want is influence across three of the six regions of the new federal Yemen. Contrast that with the two regions that the southerners will have. And contrast again the disparity of numbers: Houthis are not even the majority in their province of Saada, which numbers around 800,000. The southern provinces account for millions of Yemenis.

Some Houthis, in fact, want to go even further, overturning the entire political structure and reverting to the pre-1962 imamate.

Yemen is deeply divided, between the Houthi rebellion in the north, the movement for southern secession and the Islamist party Islah. There are serious problems with this transitional period – but, for all its problems, the transition is stuttering forward. That is not the case in other Arab Spring countries. By destabilising Yemen at such a critical juncture, the Houthis are showing that they do not believe in genuine reform of the existing system. Rather, they are seeking to supersede it.

On Twitter: @FaisalAlYafai