Lebanon and Israel are in Rome this week for the sixth round of US-mediated talks. These talks come after the signing last month of a framework agreement between the two sides in Washington, in which they committed to ending the conflict, supporting the sovereignty and security of both countries and ultimately establishing peaceful relations.
But the Rome meeting moves from broad principles to the challenges of implementation in which there are still deep differences between the two sides.
The negotiations are also occurring as the Middle East, and Lebanon’s own immediate geopolitical environment, are going through profound changes. How far can Lebanon use the various tools of diplomacy at its disposable to regain its sovereignty while also rebuilding its independence from costly regional rivalries is a key challenge for its authorities as well as for its friends.
It is no small matter that the Lebanese and Israeli states agree on several fundamental matters: they commit to respecting each other’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity; Israel declares no territorial ambitions and supports the establishment of a sovereign and capable state in Lebanon; both agree that Hezbollah must be disarmed and that the Lebanese state must have a full monopoly of arms and full command of the decisions of war and peace; they also commit to ending the state of war between them, and working towards establishing peaceful relations. And the US is party to, and supportive of, this fundamental understanding.
In other words, there is agreement on the desired end state of two sovereign states, in control of their respective territories, living side by side in security and peace. But on the pathway to getting there, there are still serious challenges.
The first challenge is over sequencing.
From the Israeli perspective, the sequencing is to disarm Hezbollah first, and then Israel will halt its military operations in Lebanon and withdraw from occupied Lebanese territory. The Lebanese position is very different: Israeli withdrawals and the posting of the Lebanese armed forces should proceed together in a phased process that steadily replaces and weakens Hezbollah and puts the state in a much stronger position to ultimately weaken and disarm the group in the entirety of the country.
The “pilot zones” mentioned in the framework agreement are an attempt to bridge this divide. The Lebanese delegation in Rome will expect a rapid implementation of at least the first of these pilot zones. But the extent of these pilot zones is left vague in the framework agreement.
Israel’s position is that they might agree to a few that are largely outside of their self-declared buffer zone of occupied territory but not more; the Lebanese position is that if the first pilot zones are a success and show that its armed forces can fully implement its side of the security bargain, then these zones must be followed by others, most importantly in areas currently under Israeli occupation. Beirut must show that it has a negotiated diplomatic pathway to gradually bringing its people back to the South, or else it will be in a weak position to confront Hezbollah and its wide popular support base in other parts of the country.
The other challenge is over differing views of the wider regional context.
For Lebanon, the talks are somewhat narrowly focused on ending the recurring wars with Israel, securing a full Israeli withdrawal, getting support to rebuild full state sovereignty and disarm Hezbollah, and establishing secure and eventually peaceful relations with Israel. While Israel shares most of these goals, it is already looking further down the road in order to use its leverage to pull Lebanon into its future sphere of influence and alignment in the region.
The Israeli insistence on Rome rather than Washington as a venue for negotiations is indicative of this perspective. A key component of Israeli strategy going forward is to cement its partnerships with Cyprus, Greece and Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean in what it sees as a strategic long-term contest against Turkey. Israel is keen to bring Lebanon into this alignment.
Beyond the negotiation over sequencing withdrawals and bilateral security steps, the talks in Rome are also expected to start addressing Article 12 of the framework, which commits the two sides to begin discussing the details of a final peace agreement. Israel will probably press for the establishment of technical working committees on several issues that will be part of a final agreement in which they can use their leverage to elicit Lebanese commitments in these longer-term areas.
The Lebanese will be reluctant to move in this direction for at least two reasons.
First, the political context inside Lebanon is already very polarised and is just barely enabling the continuation of the current negotiation process without major incident; but it will be more difficult for Lebanon to make long-term commitments to a full peace agreement, while large-scale Israeli occupation persists. Second, while the Lebanese state is committed to secure and peaceful relations with a post-withdrawal Israel, it does not want to be dragged into a regional alignment that will effectively put it into conflict with its neighbour Syria, its main backer Turkey and other regional powers.
Beirut and Damascus have committed to rebuilding a positive and mutually beneficial relationship after decades of conflict. And it is no secret that the new authorities in Damascus have close relations with Turkey as they do with Saudi Arabia, and other key regional countries. After years of suffering from being a proxy ground for regional conflicts, Lebanon does not want to be dragged into a regional alignment one of whose primary functions is to confront Turkey.
In Rome, Lebanon is not only negotiating to restore and rebuild its sovereignty, but also struggling to rebuild its independence from regional alignments. The framework agreement achieved an important goal in stymying Tehran’s attempts to regain its influence over Lebanon through the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding; in rebuilding its independent decision-making authority, Lebanon does not want to replace one regional-power influence with another.
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Smoke rises after an Israeli strike near the southern Lebanese city of Tyre. AFP -
A woman makes her way through the rubble of a residential building hit in an Israeli attack, near Burj Al Shamali, on the outskirts of Tyre. AFP -
The aftermath of bombing by Israeli jets in the city of Nabatieh. AFP -
Civil defence members search for victims in the rubble in Burj Al Shamali. AFP -
Strikes near Beaufort Castle, seen from Marjayoun. Reuters -
Lebanese soldiers in Burj Al Shamali. AFP
The administration of US President Donald Trump is a party to the framework agreement and to the ongoing talks. It is also the key player in building up Lebanese state capacity, mediating between Lebanon and Israel, and using its leverage to bring about an Israeli withdrawal. The US, and its representatives in Rome, should differentiate between the various agendas and visions brought to these talks and prioritise steps that are win-wins for both sides and that build confidence and momentum.
The clear pathway here is to prioritise the “pilot zones” approach, implement the first zones immediately, and if they prove a success, then expand the process to more areas of the south, including those under Israeli occupation.
Regional states also have an important role to play. They are very supportive of Beirut’s insistence on rebuilding sovereignty and a monopoly on the use of arms, and on its insistence not to be dragged into new regional alignments that will put it in conflict with other key neighbours in the region. These states, given their own resources as well as their close relations with the Trump administration, can help ensure that the negotiation process between Lebanon and Israel moves steadily forward, while also supporting Beirut’s needs to regain not only sovereignty but also the independence of its foreign policy decision-making.
