Last Wednesday, a day before the arrival in Beirut of a Saudi envoy, Yazid bin Farhan, Saudi Arabia announced it would lift all restrictions on Lebanese exports to the kingdom. The move was widely interpreted as Riyadh’s support for the Lebanese state, in particular President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam.
The measure provided a much-needed economic boost for a country currently facing major destruction by Israel and that finds itself in the midst of a proxy war between Israel and Iran. In recent months, the Saudis have been working with Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and Pakistan to contain Israeli power in the region while also striving to reduce tensions inside Lebanon and avoid any kind of domestic conflict.
In trying to contain Israel, the five countries are not acting out of any ideological rationale. Rather, they are adopting classical “balance of power” reasoning, looking to curtail the ambitions of any single state that seeks to dominate the region in light of the anticipated void that would be left by US disengagement. These states are just as keen to prevent Iranian hegemony as they are Israeli.
With respect to the situation in Lebanon, the Saudis and their partners have sought to soften American and Israel efforts to push the Lebanese government to use force to disarm Hezbollah, fearing where this might lead. Weeks ago, Riyadh hosted Ali Hassan Al Khalil, an envoy of Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, who is a major interlocutor with Hezbollah, to tell him that they did not want sectarian violence in the country.
In line with this aim, the Egyptians last year formulated a plan for the “containment” of Hezbollah’s weapons – as opposed to its forcible disarmament, which could lead to armed conflict between the group and the Lebanese army. A document outlining this plan is currently circulating and, according to those familiar with it, had Saudi input, albeit focused on full implementation of the Taif Agreement, the Saudi-backed plan that served as the basis to amend the Constitution in 1990, but was only partly applied.
The inclusion of Taif in the effort suggests that the Saudis view Hezbollah’s surrendering of its weapons – in a process described in the document as an “'organised gradual transition' rather than forced disarmament” – to be part of a broader effort to give the Shiite community a greater role in the state in exchange for the group’s weapons. Hezbollah presented its observations on the document, but these indicate that more negotiations are needed.
In light of this, it is interesting that Lebanon’s armed forces commander, Gen Rodolphe Haykal, was recently invited to Pakistan. It isn’t clear what was discussed, but some observers couldn’t help but tie it to Islamabad’s role as a mediator between the US and Iran. It is conceivable that the Pakistanis are helping to define a role for the army in the south that would avoid a clash with Hezbollah, one that could obtain Iranian endorsement.
The key takeaway from the initiative, however, is that Lebanon is better off relying on a regional approach to the Hezbollah problem than on a scheme designed to precipitate its armed forces into a devastating confrontation with the group. At the same time, the present ceasefire between the US and Iran creates an opening to place the Lebanese crisis on the negotiating table between Washington and Tehran, something Iran has long resisted. If this happens, the coalition’s plan could potentially represent a road map to address Hezbollah’s weapons.
That regional dynamics are coming to the fore was evident in remarks last week by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He declared that Israeli attacks in Syria and Lebanon threatened Turkey, effectively and explicitly expanding his definition of Turkish security. This shows how countries are beginning to define zones of influence and red lines in ways we have not seen previously under Pax Americana.
In this shifting environment, Lebanon has to be aware how regional dynamics might affect its fate. Mr Aoun and his government continue to believe that by tying their country to an American agenda, they will be able to save Lebanon from Israeli destruction. However, neither the US nor Israel has much concern for what is needed to reinforce domestic Lebanese civil peace, which is why regional initiatives like the one advanced by the coalition of five countries are so valuable for Lebanon.
In times of crisis, Lebanon has always relied on some form of regional intervention to resolve its problems, so divided is its society. While it would be a mistake to assume that the Lebanese can stop the Israeli onslaught without US backing, it would be equally mistaken to assume that the country could advance towards a solution for Hezbollah and its weapons without regional participation to facilitate an agreement.
The reason for this is that Hezbollah and its arms represent much more than a local issue for Lebanon. They feed into regional rivalries, which suggests strongly that only a regional solution – one involving members of the coalition of five states, along with the US, and, most importantly, Iran – can secure an acceptable outcome. That is why the Lebanese would do well to try to integrate the five-nation coalition plan and its proposals on Hezbollah’s disarmament into the US-Iran talks that are set to begin.
