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Last Thursday, the US announced a 10-day ceasefire “to enable peace negotiations between Israel and Lebanon”. The State Department statement – reportedly agreed to by both governments – marked a significant diplomatic shift. It included an affirmation that “the two countries are not at war”, and a commitment to work towards “full recognition of each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”, as well as “achieving a permanent agreement that ensures lasting security, stability, and peace”.
These are more explicit and far-reaching commitments than the two states have made at any point in their modern history. The announcement followed meetings between the two countries’ ambassadors in Washington under the auspices of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
While the intended end state is now more clearly articulated, the path towards it remains highly complex.
Hezbollah remains heavily armed and operational inside Lebanon and has already framed the ceasefire as a victory – crediting its “resistance” and Iran’s regional leverage for forcing US pressure on Israel. On the Israeli side, the military has expanded its occupation and devastation of southern Lebanese towns and villages to a depth of up to eight kilometres. The Israeli government has signalled that this new “buffer zone” could remain in place for the long term.
Compounding the fragility of the arrangement, the ceasefire statement itself contains a significant loophole: “Israel preserves the right to take all measures in self-defence at any time.”
The diplomatic opening comes amid a dramatically altered regional and domestic context. Hezbollah’s weakening during the 2024 war, combined with the collapse of Bashar Al Assad’s regime in Syria, reshaped Lebanon’s political landscape. For the first time in decades, Lebanon was able to elect a president, appoint a prime minister and form a government without decisive interference from Damascus or Tehran.
President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and the new government reflect a broad domestic push to restore state sovereignty, implement long-overdue reforms and revive a country battered by years of crisis and external domination.
The immediate trigger for the current diplomatic track was the escalation on March 2, when Hezbollah – backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – launched rocket attacks on Israel, prompting a large-scale Israeli military response. In the aftermath, Mr Aoun called for direct talks with Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially resisted, but sustained US pressure – especially in the context of Washington’s parallel diplomatic engagement with Iran – helped bring Israel to the table. The Lebanese government also outlawed Hezbollah’s military and security wings and declared the Iranian ambassador persona non grata.
Lebanon and Israel have a long and uneven history of diplomacy, mostly indirect but occasionally direct. In 2024, they agreed to a US-brokered cessation of hostilities. In 2022, they reached a landmark maritime boundary agreement, also mediated by Washington. Earlier, mediation in the aftermath of the 2006 war helped produce UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
The last direct talks prior to this moment date back to 1993, during the bilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process. Even earlier, following Israel’s 1982 invasion, the two sides negotiated an agreement for an Israeli withdrawal, popularly known as the May 17 Agreement, which ultimately collapsed under regional pressure. Their diplomatic engagement stretches back further still, to the 1949 Armistice Agreement.
The 10-day ceasefire is, of course, far too short to resolve the underlying conflicts. Its real purpose is to create a window for launching substantive talks. If those talks show early progress, the ceasefire could be extended, potentially evolving into a more durable framework.
For Lebanon, the challenges are immense. The state requires large-scale international support to strengthen its military and security institutions in order to contain – and eventually disarm – Hezbollah. It also needs urgent financial assistance to address a deepening humanitarian and economic crisis exacerbated by the latest war. This includes rebuilding devastated areas, particularly in predominantly Shiite regions, and providing state-led services that could reduce reliance on Hezbollah’s parallel structures.
Equally important is the need for a phased security arrangement with Israel. This would involve the gradual redeployment of the Lebanese armed forces to the area south of the Litani River – potentially with support from the US or other friendly militaries – and the creation of conditions for the safe return of displaced civilians. For Israel, such a process must be accompanied by credible and verifiable actions by the Lebanese state demonstrating its ability to assert authority and constrain Hezbollah’s military activities.
Much will depend on the trajectory of US-Iran negotiations. If Washington can secure Iranian agreement to scale back or end its financial and military support to Hezbollah, the task facing Beirut would become significantly more manageable. If, however, Tehran doubles down – as current signals suggest – the Lebanese government will face a far more difficult and potentially destabilising path.
Nevertheless, the diplomatic landscape has already shifted in meaningful ways.
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A man stands in the rubble of a building destroyed in an overnight Israeli air strike on Haret Hreik, in Beirut's southern suburbs. AFP -
Emergency workers at the site of an Israeli air strike on an apartment building in Haret Saida, on the outskirts of Sidon. AFP -
A banner bearing portraits of slain Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah, left, and Hashem Safieddine at the site of a strike on Burj Al Barajneh, in Beirut's southern suburbs. AFP -
Damage from an Israeli air strike in Haret Hreik. AFP -
Downed power lines and destroyed buildings in Beirut’s southern suburbs. AFP -
Emergency personnel tackle a fire after an apartment building in Haret Saida was hit. AFP -
A man holds missile debris in Haret Saida. EPA -
Plumes of smoke rise following Israeli strikes on Beirut's southern suburbs, seen from Baabda. Reuters -
The aftermath of an Israeli air strike in Haret Hreik. AFP -
Emergency workers respond after an apartment was hit in Beirut's Burj Hammoud suburb. AFP -
A damaged building in Burj Hammoud. AFP
The joint acknowledgment by Lebanon and Israel that they are not in a state of war, and their stated aim of achieving peaceful relations, marks a profound departure from decades of entrenched hostility. For years, Syrian and Iranian influence kept Lebanon effectively anchored within the so-called “Axis of Resistance”. Today, a growing consensus within Lebanon supports a different trajectory – one centred on sovereignty, state authority and peaceful relations with neighbours. This evolution further isolates Hezbollah politically, even as it retains military strength.
From Hezbollah’s perspective, it sees the stakes as existential. Its identity and legitimacy are rooted in its role as an armed resistance movement against Israel. Transitioning into an unarmed political party would fundamentally alter its raison d’etre. For Iran, Hezbollah remains a critical strategic asset – a forward deterrent force on Israel’s northern border. Both Hezbollah and Tehran have issued warnings against Lebanese efforts to disarm the group or engage in direct negotiations with Israel, and they have demonstrated in the past a willingness to use force to shape outcomes.
Unlike past rounds of diplomacy, the current talks appear to be oriented towards an eventual peace arrangement. This has drawn the attention of US President Donald Trump, who sees expanding the Abraham Accords framework as a central legacy objective. He has tasked senior officials, including Mr Rubio, with prioritising the Lebanon-Israel track and has engaged directly, encouraging both sides and reportedly inviting their leaders to meet at the White House.
Strong and sustained US leadership will be indispensable. Washington remains the only actor capable of exerting meaningful influence over Israeli decision-making, whether under Mr Netanyahu or any successor government. At the same time, the US will need to mobilise a broader coalition – including Arab and international partners – to provide the military, economic and institutional support Lebanon requires to rebuild state capacity after decades of erosion.
Crucially, US leverage on Iran will be key in trying to find a way to disarm Hezbollah and encourage it to be a normal political party like others in the country, without risking an all-out conflict inside Lebanon.
The path ahead is therefore both promising and fraught. In the near term, the priority must be to initiate substantive negotiations and create the conditions for extending the ceasefire. Over time, these talks should lay the groundwork for a phased process in which the Lebanese state re-asserts control over its territory, Hezbollah’s military role is curtailed or transformed and Israel withdraws from occupied areas while ensuring its security concerns are addressed.
At the end of this uncertain and complex process lies a potentially transformative outcome: two sovereign states co-existing in security and stability, with the prospect of peace replacing decades of recurring war. Whether that outcome is realised will depend on political will, regional dynamics and the ability of domestic and international actors to navigate one of the most intricate conflict landscapes in the Middle East.
