The visit of Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to Syrian President Ahmed Al Sharaa in Damascus earlier this month was far more than a diplomatic courtesy call. It marked the beginning of what could become a fundamentally new relationship between the two neighbours after decades of mistrust, domination and conflict. It also comes at a moment when the Middle East is undergoing profound geopolitical and geoeconomic change.
For much of the past half century, Syria and Lebanon have endured an uneasy and often deeply unequal relationship. The Baathist and Assad regimes in Damascus consistently questioned Lebanon’s sovereignty, supported armed non-state actors and sought to shape or control Lebanese political life. Syria aligned first with the Soviet Union and later with Iran, while successive Lebanese governments struggled to maintain close ties with the Gulf states, Europe and the US. During the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah crossed the border to fight alongside government forces against the Syrian opposition.
The fall of the Assad regime and the emergence of new leaderships in Damascus and Beirut represent a historic opportunity. For the first time in decades, the two states are broadly aligned within the same geopolitical coalition and can rebuild their relationship on the basis of mutual sovereignty and respect. More broadly, this change opens the possibility of reintegrating the Levant into the wider region as a zone of connectivity, trade and stability rather than a source of chronic conflict and fragmentation.
The first and most important task is political. Lebanon and Syria are redefining their relationship around the principle that each state fully respects the independence, territorial integrity and decision-making autonomy of the other.
For Syria, this means recognising that a stable and sovereign Lebanon is an asset rather than a threat or a sphere to be dominated. For Lebanon, it means taking the responsibilities of sovereignty seriously and managing relations with Syria on a state-to-state basis. For both countries, it requires overcoming the bitterness of the past to build trust and co-operation based on mutual respect and mutual interests.
The discussions in Damascus highlighted the breadth of the bilateral agenda. The presence of ministers responsible for energy, transport and the economy underscored the determination of both governments to focus on practical issues of immediate national importance.
Security along the lengthy Lebanon-Syria border remains a priority. Both governments have a strong interest in curbing the smuggling of weapons, narcotics, fuel and other contraband. Full delineation and demarcation of the border is also overdue, including sensitive areas such as the Shebaa Farms, whose status has implications for Lebanon’s own border negotiations with Israel. Humanitarian and political issues also demand attention, including the fate of detainees and missing persons.
Economic co-operation is also a central focus of their bilateral agenda. There is a shared interest in streamlining customs procedures, reviving commercial exchanges and co-ordinating on electricity, energy, water, transport and trade. Restoring these practical ties could yield substantial benefits for both countries and help lay the foundations for broader regional integration.
Lebanon and Syria were historically part of a single economic ecosystem. During the late Ottoman period and well into the Mandate and early independence periods, the two countries were integrated through shared markets, transport networks and strategic infrastructure.
Major pipelines linked the region to Gulf energy supplies. A pipeline from Kirkuk in Iraq carried oil through Syria to Baniyas on the Syrian coast and Tripoli on the Lebanese coast. Another pipeline carried oil from Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia through Jordan, Syria (including the Golan Heights) to Zahrani near Sidon on the southern Lebanese coast. Beirut and Tripoli served as major ports for Syria and the deeper Arab hinterland.
Today, this historical logic is re-emerging. Gulf states are investing in new transport, digital, trade and energy corridors through Syria and Jordan, connecting the Arabian Peninsula to the Levant, Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. The strategic vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz – highlighted by recent regional tensions – has reinforced the importance of overland routes to the northwest. Lebanon can and should be part of this regional reintegration.
A fourth and highly sensitive dimension of Lebanese Syrian relations concerns Israel. Both Lebanon and Syria remain in conflict with Israel, and both currently face Israeli occupation. At the same time, each has entered into direct negotiations aimed at reaching durable security arrangements and a permanent cessation of hostilities. Peace might be beyond the current horizon but is a longer-term possibility.
These parallel diplomatic tracks create both opportunities and risks. Closer co-ordination between Beirut and Damascus would strengthen their negotiating positions with Israel and the US, help preserve Arab support and reduce the possibility that one country’s negotiations might undermine the other’s interests.
However, the challenges differ significantly. Syria must address the enduring issue of Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. Lebanon faces the equally difficult challenge of reversing a new and expanding Israeli occupation and of re-establishing the state’s sovereignty over the Iran-backed armed power of Hezbollah.
There is also a broader strategic concern. Israel views Lebanon’s current government as a potentially pragmatic partner, while it is deeply suspicious of Syria’s new leadership and its ties to Turkey. Both Beirut and Damascus should avoid being drawn into rival regional alignments or external agendas that could pit them against one another.
The normalisation of Lebanese-Syrian relations should be strongly supported by the Gulf states, the wider Arab world, Turkey, Europe and the US.
A stable and co-operative relationship between Beirut and Damascus would advance the security and prosperity of both countries. It would also help reintegrate the Levant into the broader Arab and Eastern Mediterranean order after more than half a century of division and geopolitical fragmentation.
Different regional actors hold varying views of Syria’s new leadership, but they should not let these views stand in the way of closer Lebanese-Syrian ties. The strategic imperative is clear: to anchor Lebanon and Syria within a constructive regional framework based on sovereignty, connectivity and co-operation rather than proxy conflict and ideological rivalry.
For decades, Lebanon and Syria were linked by geography but divided by coercion, mistrust and competing regional alignments. Today, both countries have an opportunity to turn a difficult history into a more balanced and mutually beneficial partnership.
If Beirut and Damascus can rebuild their relationship on the foundations of sovereignty, resolve outstanding bilateral issues, reconnect economically and co-ordinate wisely on regional diplomacy, they can help transform the Levant from a zone of chronic instability into a corridor of trade, energy and connectivity linking the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe.
The success of this effort would not only benefit Beirut and Damascus. It would contribute to the emergence of a more stable, integrated and prosperous Middle East at a moment when the region is searching for a new strategic order.
