On May 14 and 15, Lebanon and Israel held the third round of direct negotiations in Washington, the first at the level of delegations, after two meetings between the country’s ambassadors. There is a large gap between the two sides, but there was a success when they agreed to extend their so-called ceasefire by 45 days.
Following the discussions, the US Department of State issued a statement announcing that the delegations had agreed to a framework for negotiations. This would involve advancing on two parallel tracks – a military track, which would be launched on May 29 at the Pentagon, and a political track, which would reconvene on June 2 and 3.
There has been much speculation about where the talks might lead, as Lebanon holds few cards. The extension of the ceasefire, while a modest feat given that fighting in south Lebanon continues unabated, nonetheless means that inhabitants of mainly Shiite quarters of Beirut continue to have a respite from Israeli bombing.
Lebanon is trying to secure several things from Israel – a withdrawal from the south, a permanent ceasefire, an agreement on security guarantees, delineation of the Lebanese-Israeli border, a release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel and a revival of the Mechanism, the five-party committee to discuss implementation of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement.
Israel, in turn, has demanded as a condition for agreeing to these steps that Lebanon disarm Hezbollah. This raises questions as to what the security track seeks to accomplish. Recently, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Fox News: “[W]hat we’re working towards establishing is a system … where vetted units within the Lebanese armed forces have the training, the equipment and the capability to go after elements of Hezbollah and dismantle them so Israel doesn’t have to do it.”
Israel, at least in its public statements, has greater ambitions in that it wants a full peace agreement with Beirut. Lebanon’s restraint is the result of two factors: domestic divisions over negotiating with Israel and regional pushback against peace talks that would weaken the consensus around the 2002 Arab Initiative, which conditions Arab recognition of Israel on the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Domestically, Hezbollah has denounced the Washington talks. However, it might be more accurate to say the group and its leading ally, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, are willing to allow them if they can stop Israel’s destruction of south Lebanon.
The security track will be especially worrisome to Hezbollah and Mr Berri. It will also trouble many Lebanese officials and regional states who do not want to see the Lebanese army pushed into a military confrontation with Hezbollah. This would not only risk civil conflict, but there are no guarantees the armed forces would prevail, doing irreparable damage to the Lebanese state.
What the US fails to understand is that Hezbollah’s role has undergone profound change in the past two and a half years. From what had been part of Iran’s forward defence strategy to create an independent deterrent that absorbed Israeli attacks and protected Iran, the group now is a support front for Iran, which is being bombed and has its own deterrence capacities. Hezbollah’s heavy weapons no longer serve much of a role, as it focuses on fighting Israel’s occupation with lighter weapons.
In other words, while disarming Hezbollah will mean concentrating on seizing its heavy weapons – since confiscating easily concealable light weapons is a near impossibility for an army – this will have little impact on its undertakings for Tehran. The Lebanese army will resist being forced into such a fool’s errand, which would create tensions with Hezbollah and the Shiite community as a whole.
Israel is aware of this. Its army was unable to disarm Hamas in Gaza, a territory it controls substantially better than the Lebanese army controls Lebanon. In April, the Israelis conceded they could not disarm Hezbollah, which would require a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. If so, why presume the much less potent Lebanese army can succeed?
Traditionally, disarmament processes take time and involve political trade-offs. For the US to plan a security track in the Lebanese-Israeli talks indicates impatience. Yet the track also gives Lebanon an opening to devise a plan that, if it does not disarm Hezbollah, at least could limit the group’s margin of manoeuvre and allow the army to control areas north of those occupied by Israel. This would facilitate a non-violent approach with Hezbollah until a regional package deal addresses its weapons.
It is imperative that Lebanon be more proactive, as there is a general impression among foreign governments that the Lebanese state can get nothing done. This judgment may be harsh, but if Lebanon does not put together a serious proposal to deal with Hezbollah, it will soon find that the Israelis and Americans will try to enforce their own plan, which could be highly destructive for Lebanon.
However, regional powers may be able to play a significant role in averting this. Hezbollah is Iran’s concern, and Tehran will be the final decider on its weapons. In this context, regional states, eager to put together a new Middle Eastern security architecture as the war with Iran rewrites the regional balance, may address Iran’s proxies with Iranian officials. This could open a door to a solution in Lebanon.
However, for the moment, it’s important for the Lebanese not to be strong-armed into a rash military operation. Negotiations with Israel will only really work if both sides are convinced that it is to their advantage to carry through on their commitments.
