Iran’s absolutist position on the Strait of Hormuz has taken a long time to be seen for what it is in European capitals. This is despite the fact that Europe has, by and large, backed an initiative of the French and British to build a coalition of naval assets seeking to open up the strait.
The broad-based support for a process to put together a plan for deployment has been welcomed both in the Arabian Gulf and, a little more warily, by Washington.
The UK’s departing Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, and French President Emmanuel Macron met on Monday to discuss this plan as well as a longstanding initiative to deploy air defence systems to Ukraine. These parallel offers of support have made a significant diplomatic splash and are pillars of Europe’s accommodation with the shift in Washington’s global policies since the start of US President Donald Trump’s second term last year.
Following the recent Nato summit in Turkey, the Atlantic Council think tank issued a note that found encouragement in new ways of working between the Gulf and Europe. “The Gulf, Europe and Nato allies are deepening their co-operation. It’s easy to understand why, as Europe’s stability and energy security are increasingly tied to the Gulf, while Gulf states are looking to diversify, not replace, their security partnerships as they pursue a more assertive strategy of multi-alignment,” it said.

The analyst noted that the Iran war has led to a “growing recognition that trade routes, energy security, drone threats and regional crises now connect the Gulf, Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean more directly than before”.
Yet there are several reasons to believe that the European offer of support to open up the Strait of Hormuz is not a fully fledged solution that can make a difference to the supply chain crunch that threatens the global economy.
One signifier that not everything is as it seems is the size of the coalition, which keeps fluctuating when the planning teams hold meetings. At one point, it was more than 40 nations and at other points, the attendees numbered in the 30s. There have also been suggestions in statements that the participants in some sessions are in the 20s of nations. The difference between dozens and scores of countries, or navies in this case, is significant and stark.
A number of legal considerations have not been resolved in the briefings either.
Would a UN Security Council resolution be required to get the mission up and running? The German government would certainly need to have cover for any contribution, especially given that the German Navy has some prime assets to open up the shipping lanes in the Gulf. Sea mines that were laid during the conflict require top-class mine hunters, while electronic countermeasures against drones and missiles will be a necessary component of the operation – should it ever be launched.
The EU itself is awkwardly juxtaposed in the evolving plans.
The bloc’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, has pushed for expanding the remit of Operation Aspides – which seeks to counter the Houthi threat to shipping in the Bab Al Mandeb – to include clearing mines and conducting security operations in the Strait of Hormuz. But a caucus of member states have pushed back, preferring that Aspides “stay in the Red Sea”.
Speaking on Monday ahead of an EU summit with the Gulf states, Ms Kallas reiterated that her recommendation “just needs to change the operational plan” of Aspides. But she also conceded in a media interview that none of the potential participants are clear on how to make the deployment work at a time when Iran has not consented to the operation and may not withdraw its threats against it.
Meanwhile, at an International Maritime Organisation meeting in London last week, member state after member state spoke out about the absolute importance of the provisions of the international law of the sea on free passage across the strait. But what we’re left with are tenuous talks that appear to satisfy the need for headlines, but not the security needs of the moment.
Under the current set-up in Iran, there is no prospect of an easy return to an open shipping situation in the strait. That is why the ceasefire is hanging by a thread and hostilities are currently increasing.
The strategic outlook for Europe is that its security is compromised, and that it does have binding shared interests with the Gulf nations as the Atlantic Council research outlined. But to play an active and productive role, the European nations will need to step up to the plate with an active containment strategy that would ameliorate, counter and – over time – degrade the threats posed by Iran regionally.
This not going to be easy, especially as Europe has not yet got its head around coming up with a viable strategy, much less made a commitment to devote the resources and leadership to carry it out. Orchestrating containment is something that requires imagination, a superior strategy and more advanced technology to pin back the adversary.
In an ideal world, Europe would be the best-placed diplomatic and military power to knit together global backing not just from the rich countries but a good section of those countries that need their supplies to the Gulf restored. However, the real test for the backers of the Hormuz coalition is whether they can rip up the technical plans and offer a more adequate solution to the threat.











