Despite the two-week ceasefire announced in the war against Iran, there remains little clarity over whether Lebanon is part of the arrangement. While Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sherif tweeted that the ceasefire includes Lebanon, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said it does not.
However, whether the conflict in Lebanon continues or is brought to an end, there is a narrative taking shape that the country may be on the cusp of a new civil war. While the rifts in society are real, this apocalyptic conclusion needs to be examined more carefully.
The reason for predicting civil war goes something like this. In the early days of the war, Israel ordered people to leave Shiite villages south of the Litani River, and later many villages further north, up to the Zahrani River, as well as Beirut’s southern suburbs, a majority of whose inhabitants are also Shiites. Much of this population has been pushed into areas in which majority communities are not Shiite – and hold great resentment for Hezbollah’s initiation of the war – generating tensions.
Since Israel is razing Shiite villages in the south, many of the displaced may not have a home to which to return. If they permanently settle in non-Shiite areas, which would be accompanied by the presence of Hezbollah members, this could lead to the outbreak of violence and conceivably escalate into domestic armed conflict.
The reasoning is credible, but it also fails to take into consideration factors that play against war. Israel, whose ability to disarm Hezbollah is limited, doubtless sees an interest in tying Hezbollah down in an internal civil conflict. The Israelis recall that the Palestine Liberation Organisation was also drawn into Lebanon’s civil war between 1975 and 1982, when its leadership left Beirut, and paid a heavy political price for it.
Yet Israeli certitudes about societies in the region are often characterised by a misreading of realities. Several factors suggest why Lebanon is not on the cusp of a new civil war, even if certain elements are in place that appear to make one likely.
Firstly, while there are indeed profound divisions in Lebanese society, civil war requires a vast machinery of mobilisation and funding that can sustain armed militias. Hezbollah may have that capacity, albeit in a limited way today, but none of the other communities has really moved in that direction, nor does there appear to be any appetite regionally to fund a new conflict that would morph into something far worse.
Secondly, while Hezbollah does have the foundations of a military force that can engage in a civil war, it is probably the actor least likely to provoke one. The reason is simple: Iran will not allow it at a time when Hezbollah is anticipating reviving its resistance dimension, with Israel preparing a new occupation in southern Lebanon. Therefore, it has zero interest in wasting its forces on an internal conflict it is certain to lose.
Thirdly, if Hezbollah were to try to turn its military capabilities inward, against other Lebanese communities, it would soon find itself confronting a Sunni community that has felt empowered since the fall of Bashar Al Assad's regime in Syria. The party definitely does not want to become embroiled in a war with Sunnis, who would likely be supported by the new regime in Damascus, as it could not hope to prevail.
Fourthly, Lebanon’s Christians are in a different mood from others in the country. In civil wars, the aim is to gain control over as much territory as possible. Yet many Christians are in a defensive mindset, focused on creating an entity for themselves that is autonomous, if not fully independent. They would probably approach a war by trying to clean out Christian-majority areas of potentially hostile forces, meaning they are unlikely to collaborate with other communities against Hezbollah elsewhere.
Instead, counter-intuitively, what may happen is that Hezbollah might try to lower tensions with the other communities and put all its efforts into combating the Israeli presence in the south. This could potentially be acceptable to multiple parties: Iran, as it would provide it with a pressure point against Israel; Christians, who would see the party focused on the south; Sunnis, who have some sympathy for anyone opposing Israel, and prefer to see the party fixated on areas away from Sunni concentration; and Hezbollah itself, which aims to bolster its legitimacy and firm up Shiite support.
Yet a major prerequisite here would be for Hezbollah to abandon any effort to revive its hegemony over other Lebanese communities. If it were to try doing so, it is certain it would meet with strong resistance, which could transform itself into armed resistance.
Such restraint would be easier said than done. In response to Hezbollah’s rocket attack against Israel, which led to the outbreak of the current war, the Lebanese government declared the party’s military and security activities illegal. Hezbollah would have to reverse this in order to anchor its activities in greater national legitimacy. However, doing so could lead it into a major altercation with the state and other communities, which would only highlight how isolated Hezbollah is nationally.
In parallel, the party would simultaneously have to resolve the problem of the Shiites displaced by Israel, who rely on the party. Having been responsible for losing a significant portion of the south, it would have to persuade its own community that, had it not provoked the war, Israel would have done so itself. Hezbollah would have to resettle its population in areas where this would not cause sectarian opposition. While many will move back to Beirut’s southern suburbs, it’s unclear today how much of the south Israel intends to occupy, therefore how many of the displaced will return home.
However Hezbollah fares in the post-war environment, the party will have a mountain to climb once the fighting stops. It would be a grave mistake to assume it is finished, but it would also be very surprising to imagine it would have the means, energy and manpower to embark on a new war against its opponents inside Lebanon. Civil war may be far less probable than the present circumstances indicate.
