The ceasefire that ended the Hezbollah-Israel conflict in November 2024 gave new life to what is known as the Mechanism, expanding it to a five-party military committee to discuss implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The body includes the US, as chair, Lebanon, Israel, France and the UN.
There are signs today, however, that the US and Israel are seeking to drop the Mechanism, or replace it with a three-party format from which France and the UN would be excluded. Their apparent aim is to initiate bilateral contacts between the Lebanese and Israelis, mediated by the Americans, to reach a peace agreement.
While French diplomatic sources point out that they persuaded the US to maintain the Mechanism, it’s unclear what implications that might have, if true. At the same time, moving to a three-party format poses major risks for Lebanon.
First, transcending the Mechanism could implicitly render Israel’s obligations under the ceasefire agreement more or less void. Israel has already largely failed to implement the ceasefire agreement’s conditions anyway, as it continues to bomb Lebanon almost daily. The deadline for an Israeli withdrawal in January last year was ignored, as was a subsequent deadline. However, for Lebanon to formalise this by accepting a new negotiating format would only compound their problem.
Second, Lebanon is hardly capable of standing up alone to the US and Israel if they collude in a trilateral format to compel Lebanon to sign on to the Abraham Accords. That this is the final objective was made fairly clear in comments last August by special US envoy to Lebanon Tom Barrack, who stated that “a peace agreement with Israel is a path to prosperity and stability”.
Another US envoy to Lebanon, Morgan Ortagus, worked for months to secure civilian representation from the Lebanese in the Mechanism, which had until December 3 included only military representatives. This led to the appointment of Simon Karam, a former ambassador in Washington, as head of the Lebanese delegation. What was this step other than one aimed at laying the groundwork for talks that could ultimately lead to a peace treaty and normalisation with Israel?
The third risk of a three-party format is that it would allow the US and Israel to push the Lebanese beyond where they are willing to go today. The Lebanese position on the Mechanism is that it is a forum for negotiations to implement the ceasefire and delineate the land border with Israel – the first step in agreeing mutual security guarantees. This is the maximum of what Beirut is willing to do today, at least officially.
However, the question is whether Lebanon would be able to set limits on the scope of negotiations with Israel if the Israelis and Americans demanded more. The latter two have leverage to do just that. Israel occupies areas of southern Lebanon and may impose conditions on Beirut before agreeing to withdraw from these territories – while continuing to bomb Lebanon. What could the Lebanese do if these conditions involved advancing on economic co-operation, for example, or heightened co-ordination between the Lebanese and Israeli militaries within Lebanon’s borders?
The potential outcomes of such pressures would be both internal and external. Internally, there is little broad support for a peace agreement with Israel, so that any measures perceived as leading in that direction could provoke domestic tensions, as certain groups or communities mobilise against them.
Externally, a Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement could mean that Lebanon finds itself in Israel’s sphere of influence. It is unlikely that other regional powers, especially Turkey, which has significant influence in Syria, would welcome or allow such a development on Syria’s borders. But the Turks are not alone. In a region where major powers are competing to prevent the hegemony of rivals, especially Israel, Lebanon could turn into an arena for regional competition.
In March 2014, Henry Kissinger, a former US secretary of state, wrote an influential article on Ukraine that well describes Lebanon’s predicament. His argument was simple: Ukraine was divided, therefore any attempt by one side in the country to dominate the other “would eventually lead to civil war or breakup”. Therefore, Mr Kissinger concluded, “[I]f Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other – it should function as a bridge between them.”
While Lebanon and Ukraine are different, the dynamics are not so unalike. Lebanon is also a divided country in which most communities seek backing from regional powers; therefore, any arrangement that allows one regional power to gain the upper hand in Lebanon over regional rivals would probably lead the losing power or powers to marshal their supporters inside Lebanon against the arrangement, dividing the country further. Lebanon serves better as a bridge than a battleground.
One key distinction with Ukraine is that Israel doesn’t really have a local ally in Lebanon, as there is no lobby inside the country pushing for peace. But once external regional powers involve themselves in Lebanese affairs, it is highly probable this would widen rifts between the Lebanese communities anyway.
Despite the confidence of certain Lebanese officials that they retain control over the negotiating process with Israel, nothing seems more doubtful. What we have in the US-Israel tag team is a partnership that is difficult to push back against, particularly by a feeble and divided Lebanon. That is why the Lebanese must try to avoid any efforts to widen the scope of the Mechanism, and acknowledge that efforts to push them into a peace agreement with Israel are likely to bring regional intervention to prevent it.
