Washington’s current policy towards Iran reflects an approach centred on maximising pressure while deliberately avoiding a slide into an open military confrontation. Rather than seeking a rapid resolution of the conflict, the US administration prefers to manage tensions within carefully calculated limits, keeping deterrence options on the table without allowing them to escalate into a full-scale war. This approach is rooted in a strategic assessment of the costs of direct confrontation and a precise reading of regional power balances, where preserving relative stability has become an objective in its own right, not merely a byproduct of conflict.
Within this framework, US President Donald Trump’s approach to Iran reflects a clear pattern in managing international conflicts – one that relies on economic and diplomatic pressure, backed by military force, to recalibrate an adversary’s behaviour without resorting to comprehensive military engagement. This policy does not proceed from the assumption that war is a preferred option, nor from a conventional negotiation track, but rather from viewing tension itself as a political instrument.
Relations with Iran are managed as an open-ended file, subject to escalation or de-escalation at the discretion of the White House, rather than as a crisis to be decisively resolved in one stroke. Pressure is used as a tool to compel Tehran to reassess its regional calculations by raising the cost of its choices, without directly targeting the political system. The objective is not regime change, but rather to narrow Iran’s regional room for manoeuvre and recalibrate the deterrence balance.
This policy is built on keeping the option of escalation present and credible, without deploying it immediately. The threat, in this context, is not mere rhetoric but an active component of the deterrence equation. The core idea is that possessing the capacity to escalate – while controlling its timing and scope – grants Washington political and strategic leverage without bearing the costs of an open war. This explains the combination of harsh rhetoric and stringent pressure measures alongside a calculated restraint from direct military confrontation.
Within this fluctuating management of tension, Washington cannot rule out limited escalation options aimed at disrupting or temporarily degrading Iranian military capabilities without engaging in a full-scale war. In this context, scenarios are discussed ranging from a precise military strike to high-impact technological and cyber operations, carried out at a carefully chosen moment and below the escalation threshold. Should such options be implemented, they would likely be accompanied by continued economic and political pressure, with reliance on internal factors – including protests – as part of a long-term attrition strategy, rather than as a substitute for a military decision.
Conversely, Iran has approached the pressure policy as a war of patience rather than a direct confrontation. Instead of engaging in open escalation, Tehran has adopted a mix of relative economic resilience, the development of deterrent capabilities and the expansion of its regional manoeuvring space, enabling it to absorb pressure without making fundamental concessions. This approach has not eliminated the impact of sanctions, but it has limited their ability to force a strategic shift in Iranian behaviour and reinforced Tehran’s conviction that managing tension, rather than breaking it, represents the least costly option in confronting Washington.
At the same time, reality has shown that Iran has managed to preserve the cohesion of its political system despite mounting pressure. This cohesion, however, has come at the expense of the economy and technical and financial capacities, which have been clearly depleted. As a result, the conflict has evolved into a long-term confrontation managed through sanctions, isolation, and indirect pressure, rather than swift military resolution.
The military factor has remained present within a framework of mutual deterrence. The US retains the option of force and signals its readiness to use it when necessary, while Iran maintains its deterrent capabilities without moving toward direct confrontation. Between the two sides, a grey zone has taken shape – neither war nor settlement – managed through political and security signalling and the testing of red lines.
At the heart of this equation, Iraq emerges as one of the most sensitive arenas affected by this approach. Baghdad is neither treated as a fully neutral party nor as an open battlefield, but rather as a balancing space expected to absorb the repercussions of US-Iranian tensions and prevent them from escalating into direct confrontation. The Iraqi leadership operates within a narrow yet effective margin, based on avoiding overt alignment, keeping communication channels open with both sides, and managing the security file through containment rather than confrontation.
This approach reflects an awareness of the nature of the current phase, in which safeguarding internal stability takes precedence over registering political positions. Yet the continuation of a controlled-tension policy poses a constant challenge for Iraq, as any increase in pressure between Washington and Tehran is directly reflected in its security, economy and political decision-making. This makes adopting an approach that prioritises Iraqi national interests and focuses on fortifying the domestic front a practical way to reduce the costs of this conflict.
In sum, Washington’s policy toward Iran is based on managing the conflict rather than resolving it, and on employing pressure and deterrence as calibrated tools aimed at avoiding war, not provoking it. While this approach may yield tactical gains, its regional repercussions remain open-ended, particularly for states situated along the lines of friction, foremost among them Iraq.
