Both in public and private, Lebanese officials are expressing frustration with the US team currently dealing with Lebanon. “They have no experience or institutional memory,” one senior minister recently told me. Since the Biden administration imposed a ceasefire in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah last year, the situation has settled into a status quo, in which diplomacy has stagnated.
Recently, the culture minister, Ghassan Salameh, made his views known in a television interview, when he commented on the many, often contradictory recent statements by Tom Barrack, the interim US envoy to Lebanon. As a former UN envoy himself, Mr Salameh said that he had learnt two things when playing this role: talk less and learn the history of the country you are dealing with.
The rebuke was harsh, but it also spoke to a very real sense of confusion in Lebanon about American messaging. For example, Mr Barrack stated recently in an interview with The National, “The Lebanese … all they do is talk [about Hezbollah’s disarmament],” without taking action. This came only weeks after he had said the precisely the opposite, praising the Lebanese for taking a decision in cabinet to disarm all non-state actors, including Hezbollah.
At the time, Mr Barrack had declared: “The Lebanese government has done their part. They’ve taken the first step. Now what we need is for Israel to comply with that equal handshake.” Mr Barrack indicated he could secure Israeli concessions, such as getting Israel to withdraw from some areas it occupies in Lebanon and reduce its attacks in the country, which the Lebanese could use as leverage to persuade Hezbollah to surrender its weapons. Yet when he returned to Beirut, he said Israel had refused to budge.
In other words, Mr Barrack had no White House or State Department backing for his efforts, damaging his credibility. Equally significant, Mr Barrack had told the Lebanese the US would provide $1 billion annually to the Lebanese army, which he admitted was underequipped to take on Hezbollah. Yet upon his return, he didn’t bring the matter up. Though a friend of US President Donald Trump, Mr Barrack just couldn’t deliver.
Nor did Mr Barrack do himself any favours when he stated in the interview with The National: “We’re not arming [the Lebanese army] to fight Israel… We’re arming them to fight their own people.” It’s not often that US envoys admit they are encouraging a civil war.
There has also been puzzlement about who speaks for the Trump administration. Initially, the Lebanon envoy was Morgan Ortagus, who made way for Mr Barrack. However, when he made valid but controversial remarks in Beirut – declaring that Iran could not be ignored, and that Hezbollah had to be given something in return for surrendering its weapons – Ms Ortagus, a vocal supporter of Israel, was suddenly accompanying Mr Barrack on his Lebanon visits.
On Mr Barrack’s last trip, not only was Ms Ortagus in tow, but also another prominent Israel backer, Senator Lindsey Graham. Mr Graham subsequently travelled to Israel and declared, “If we cannot reach a peaceful disarmament solution for Hezbollah, then we need to look at plan B. Plan B is disarming Hezbollah by military force.”
The belief that the Americans simply have nothing to offer is permeating a segment of the government that is normally friendly to the US. The Lebanese are well aware that, even if this is true, the Trump administration cannot be ignored. However, it may be time for the government to embark on more multifaceted, imaginative diplomacy, in such a way as to secure a margin of manoeuvre from Washington and Israel.
What might this involve? Certainly, a willingness to open discreet contacts with Iran, the final decision-maker on Hezbollah’s weapons. Nothing may come of it, but the Lebanese need to get a sense of Iranian thinking on the question, beyond public statements, and determine whether Iran might consider a quid pro quo on the party’s weapons. Hezbollah is a card Iran won’t surrender for nothing in return, so Beirut has to get a better sense of possible openings if they exist.
The Lebanese should also explore whether other countries can help with Hezbollah. Russia has strong ties with Iran, and there is no reason not to see if there are potential advantages on that front. China has also played a central role in reconciling Iran and Saudi Arabia, so testing the possibilities there might be worthwhile.
Any contacts that take place must be under the radar and isolated from the thrusts and parries of Lebanese politics. The rival political calculations of the country’s parties, particularly in a pre-election year, could well thwart Lebanon’s diplomatic efforts.
The Lebanese would have to be careful how to manage the US in this situation. The Americans would have an incentive to torpedo all such talks. However, in the end, this is a sovereign Lebanese decision, whose sole aim would be to disarm Hezbollah, advance Lebanese interests and maintain contacts with all sides, but also affirm that Lebanon’s decisions cannot be imposed by the US, Iran or Israel.
If so, the Americans must be kept apprised of what happens, but only enough so that Lebanon has space to act as best it can. This is much easier said than done, of course, given Lebanese divisions, American assertiveness and Israel’s predisposition to undercut any decisions that deny it the latitude to enforce its preferences.
Yet for the first time in decades, Lebanon has the chance to engage in a degree of sovereign diplomacy. Many outside actors may be unhappy with this, but the multi-polar nature of power in the region lends itself to thinking outside the box. If the American intention is to subcontract Lebanon to Israel, then wholly aligning with Washington requires a rethink.
