What would happen if Iran were to acquire the bomb?

Gerald Du/ The National

The recent attacks on Iran and its nuclear facilities shocked the global community. While the world watches closely for further developments and hopes for a diplomatic resolution to this crisis, the attacks on Iran and its next steps will have a profound impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, established to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), negotiated in 1968. It enjoys nearly universal membership and was instrumental in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by another two dozen states, as was predicted before the treaty was put in place.

Iran, a party to the NPT, threatened to withdraw even before the attacks. If Iran were to leave the NPT and focus on resurrecting its nuclear programme to build nuclear weapons, it would deal a major blow to the non-proliferation regime and its credibility. Moreover, regardless of Iran’s decision about its membership in the NPT or pursuit of nuclear weapons, the damage to the efforts to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons has already been done.

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The 21st century has witnessed several attacks by nuclear-armed states against non-nuclear-weapon states, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq, with the rationale of preventing the alleged acquisition of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Some countries, like Libya, agreed to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons and were nonetheless attacked later.

Ukraine, which inherited a nuclear weapons arsenal from the Soviet Union, gave them back to Russia and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Many in Ukraine today ask themselves whether the decision to forgo nuclear weapons was the right one, and whether Ukraine would have been attacked if it had chosen to keep them.

Countries also look at North Korea, which left the NPT and rushed to build nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the US as a deterrent against military attacks. So far, this strategy has worked, and North Korea continues to expand and enhance its nuclear arsenal, proudly exhibiting it to ensure the US and others get the message.

With the waning reliability of US commitments to its allies, some states may decide that they can only protect themselves with the ultimate deterrent – nuclear weapons. In South Korea, for example, public opinion already favours the nuclear weapons option.

Iran’s nuclear programme has made countries in the Middle East and beyond nervous for decades. We’ve heard disconcerting statements from Turkey and Saudi Arabia regarding a potential pursuit of nuclear weapons if Iran were to acquire the bomb. Would attacks on Iran and its nuclear programme shift the calculus of some of these countries regarding their own nuclear ambitions, serving as a catalyst for further nuclear proliferation?

Iran insists on the peaceful nature of its programme. However, several elements of it were developed without a particular need for an existing or even planned nuclear energy programme and have been a source of proliferation concern.

Iran was on the verge of having everything, including significant stocks of highly enriched uranium, but the bomb itself. It played the nuclear hedging game for over two decades but vastly expanded and accelerated it in the last couple of years. Future proliferators will take note of the risks posed by the ambiguity of their intentions while acquiring nuclear technologies and capabilities that could lead to weaponisation.

It remains to be seen whether Iran will leave the NPT and focus on resurrecting its nuclear programme. Iran has already moved forward with the suspension of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, a key component of the non-proliferation regime that inspects nuclear activities and facilities and is a legal obligation under the NPT.

It would be in its own interest to return to full co-operation with the IAEA and offer full transparency of its nuclear programme. Ultimately, further proliferation in the region, ignited by Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT and pursuit of nuclear weapons, would be against Iran’s own interests.

Beyond a diplomatic solution to the existing crisis, there are several steps that NPT states could pursue to prevent further proliferation in the Middle East and beyond. One of these is an explicit legal obligation or regional agreement not to pursue national programmes for uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel – two critical elements of the nuclear fuel cycle capable of producing fissile material for nuclear weapons.

In this regard, the UAE stands as an example of steering clear of any ambiguity in its nuclear power programme. In its agreement on nuclear co-operation with the US (the so-called 123 agreement), it took on an obligation not to pursue these sensitive technologies.

Another option is for any new facility involving enrichment and reprocessing to be established as an international or multilateral facility subject to international safeguards. One could argue that robust regional and international co-operation on nuclear energy and its peaceful applications could eventually pave the way for co-operation, transparency and trust-building among countries in the region.

Another way to alleviate proliferation concerns in the Middle East is the establishment of a regional verification arrangement to supplement IAEA safeguards, modelled on the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Such an arrangement could build confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear activities.

In recent years, interest in nuclear power as a carbon-neutral energy source has significantly increased, including in the Middle East. It holds the promise of reliable and clean energy, with uses in various other applications beyond electricity generation, including desalination of water and many other benefits. For this promise to be realised, the NPT must hold firm, and the system of checks on proliferation must remain in place.