Donald Trump continues to use the threat of military action to draw Iran to the negotiating table to discuss its nuclear weapons programme. Yet a few factors have contributed to the US President stepping back from actually striking the country.
Mr Trump’s decision to block a potential Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear sites, reportedly planned for May, was meant to send a message to Benjamin Netanyahu: it is the US President – not the Israeli Prime Minister – who will decide such a move. The writ followed months of debate within the Trump administration itself over its Tehran policy.
This doesn’t mean that Mr Trump’s advisers have no influence, especially given their shared objective of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The difference between them only lies in the methods and details.
One camp, which includes National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, doubts that a deal with Iran is possible, believing Tehran will neither dismantle its nuclear programme nor accept international monitoring beyond the International Atomic Energy Agency. This faction believes that Iran is weaker than ever, that the US need not make concessions, and that a military strike is both viable and necessary now.
The opposing camp includes Vice President JD Vance, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth and special envoy Steve Witkoff. They want Mr Trump to consider American concessions in order to facilitate a diplomatic breakthrough. They believe that Iran is ready for limited compromises and that it is in the President’s own interest to avoid military entanglement – especially given his self-styled image as the man who will make peace where it was previously impossible.
They note the lack of American public appetite for putting US troops at risk in military bases across the region, and the potential economic fallout, such as a surge in oil prices, particularly now as the US economy is suffering under the weight of its trade wars with China and other countries.
Mr Trump has yet to make a final decision. Set to complete his first 100 days in office on April 30, he has taken a step back, choosing to capitalise on Riyadh’s growing role as Washington’s diplomatic bridge to the world.
The US President, who is due to visit Saudi Arabia next month, believes that his bigger objective is to broker a “deal of the century” between Israel and the Arab world. Dragging Washington’s allies and partners in the region into a confrontation with Tehran would run counter to that goal. Mr Trump appears to have concluded that buying time is in his interest as well – not just Iran’s – at least until he reaches the 100-day milestone.
It’s also true that Mr Trump doesn’t have a substantive accomplishment to boast about. He hasn’t achieved the outcomes he hoped for in his global tariff war, which forced him to walk back a range of tariffs with many countries. Nor has he made the breakthroughs he expected to end the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.
Europe has for the most part opted to stay out of the US-Iran talks, preferring instead to wait and watch. Italy may have hosted the second, and most recent, round of talks between Washington and Tehran, but in the US President’s view, Europe is currently marginal to the issue and won’t deviate from the western consensus on the Iran nuclear file anyway.
Of course, Europe’s role is pivotal at the UN Security Council – whether in containing Iran diplomatically or to legitimise US-led military action. But the continent’s leaders oppose the military option because it precludes the possibility of compromise and concessions, and because it risks destabilising the region.
Russia, another Security Council member, will try to adopt a tough stance on the surface. This is especially since Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently visited Moscow to deliver a message from his country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, urging Russia to play its part in restraining the US from choosing a military path.
Moscow may consider offering some sort of quid pro quo to Washington, amounting to the US giving Iran leeway in exchange for Russia withdrawing from parts of the Western Hemisphere where it has influence, such as Venezuela. From my conversations with strategic thinkers in Moscow, I am given to understand that such an understanding – which would reflect a return to a time when spheres of influence reigned – is conceivable. But from the American perspective, the deal to ease pressure on Iran would probably need to be in exchange for Russia downgrading its strategic alignment with China.
Whatever the outcome, these are some of the chips that are quite possibly on the bargaining table right now.
Where does Iran stand on all this? For starters, it wants more from Russia than just political support. It seeks diplomatic backing at the Security Council, specifically a veto to block any US resolution legitimising military action against its nuclear sites. Iranian diplomats have also been seeking assurances that Moscow provide military backing to Tehran in the event of an attack. This, in particular, would be difficult for Russia to guarantee given its own evolving relations with the Trump administration.
Both Mr Trump and Mr Khamenei find themselves on the edge of an abyss. Each has conveyed his red lines to the other. Both prefer to pull back from confrontation and reach a deal. The world watches closely to see whether either, or both, is ready to deal or to wage war.
Riyadh’s involvement, therefore, is crucial – not only due to its bilateral ties with both Washington and Tehran, but also because Saudi Arabia is central to Mr Trump’s strategic vision for the broader Middle East. This explains Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman’s trip to Tehran on Thursday.
Mr Trump has no qualms about stepping back after escalating tensions with Iran – just as he did with his decision to impose reciprocal tariffs on several countries before withdrawing them, albeit temporarily. He certainly has no qualms about giving negotiations with Iran more time. But if he senses that Tehran’s objective is to stall, he won’t hesitate to make a drastic move.
And if, as seems probable, he is frustrated by his inability to deliver on any of his grand promises on the global stage, the US President may resort to radical exceptions – or exceptional concessions. No one knows what he will do, except Mr Trump himself.
