Syria is open for business. That was the message the country’s Foreign Minister, Asaad Al Shibani, conveyed at January’s meeting of the World Economic Forum. “There is no economy,” he said – perhaps the first diplomat ever to market that as a selling point. But, he concluded, that means “big opportunity for investment”.
The country’s nascent administration, led by former militant President Ahmad Al Shara, has, to its credit, worked hard to give weight to Mr Al Shibani’s claim by trying to strengthen Syria’s stability as it recovers from more than a decade of civil war. It has eschewed international conflict, even with an Israel engaged in land-grabbing on its southern border. It has deployed technocrats to forge a path ahead to recover from the Assad-era socialist security state and plans to privatise state-owned ports and factories.
Mr Al Shara has also toured regional capitals in recent weeks to make commitments in person. In Riyadh, he signalled a shift in foreign policy away from Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance”. In Ankara, he spoke of taming militias near the Turkish border. In Amman, he promised co-operation with Jordan against drug smuggling.
There is, however, some distance to travel between “open for business” and “business as usual”. Having “no economy” may indeed present a lot of upside for growth, but most investors want strong institutions and predictability. At present, Syria has neither.
A “national dialogue conference” in Damascus on February 25, held after many delays, did more to expose the scale of the task ahead than to achieve it. Its closing statement made encouraging allusions to female empowerment and inclusivity but provided no direction on the system of government or the legal code. The latter, in particular, is a source of worry for many, considering Mr Al Shara’s previous job was leading a militant group that executed people for adultery.
Another source of instability is a spate of armed clashes in several pockets of the country. The administration is meeting resistance from loyalists to the previous regime, sectarian militias and opportunistic warlords. The level of violence is not yet significant, but the risk of it spiralling is.
The likely solution to all of this is for Mr Al Shara to get on with the task of institution-building as quickly as possible. His administration – currently balancing secular national governance against the extremist ambitions of its militants, many of them foreign fighters – is meant to be a transitional one. His appointment on Monday of a seven-member team to draft a “constitutional declaration” that will “regulate the transitional period” shows he is trying, but it also means Syrians are in for a longer transition than many hoped.
No one thinks establishing a new Syria can – or should – be done hastily. But there are things the international community can do to help Damascus stay on track. Investors with a robust risk appetite – including governments – should grasp the opportunity Mr Al Shibani speaks of by putting money into rebuilding Syria’s infrastructure and economy. To make this easier, some international sanctions imposed on the country should be eased, as Arab governments have advocated and as the UK announced it would do on Thursday. And the world should get more involved in helping Mr Al Shara ensure security. Pressuring Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory and getting foreign fighters’ home countries to take more responsibility for them would be good places to start.
Syrians fought to oust the Assad regime so that their country’s future could be in the hands of its citizens. But that does not mean they have to go at it alone.
