Lebanon's leaders should build on the Biden-Trump tandem to end the Israel-Hezbollah war

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon patrols a road in the southern Lebanese city of Marjayoun, near the border with Israel, on Friday. AFP

The behind-the-scenes co-operation between US President Joe Biden and president-elect Donald Trump on Lebanon and Israel is remarkable, resulting in a ceasefire between the two sides and a draft agreement aimed at demarcating their borders and resolving their disputes.

Both men stand to take some of the credit for this achievement. There are those who might argue that it is premature to assume that Israel, Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran will fully adhere to the agreement endorsed by the Lebanese government. However, the determination and clarity shown by both Mr Biden and Mr Trump in dealing with the issue suggest that this is not merely a temporary arrangement but rather a framework for a lasting peace between Lebanon and Israel.

While this effort is significant in and of itself, it could also take on greater regional importance if key Arab powers are able to invest in it. Indeed, the timing is ideal for some of these countries to re-engage with Lebanon, benefiting all parties involved.

This also aligns with Mr Trump’s broader vision for the “Deal of the Century”, a plan that extends beyond Arab-Israeli normalisation to include recalibrated relations between Israel and Iran.

The Biden-Trump collaboration is a positive indicator of the US’s resilience as a global power, despite political divisions. Lebanon has become a focal point of this bipartisanship for substantive reasons, even as fundamental differences persist on other strategic issues, such as the war in Ukraine and relations with Russia.

Indeed, both American leaders have pursued the normalisation between Arab countries and Israel. Both have sensed the seriousness of the collective Arab position, particularly Saudi Arabia’s insistence on a two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state as prerequisites for normalisation. Both leaders have also acknowledged that resolving the Gaza conflict is far more complex than addressing the conflict in Lebanon.

Finally, they both have understood Iran’s central role in the equation with Israel and adopted a policy focused on reducing Tehran’s regional influence as a prerequisite for any future negotiations with it.

For their part, Iran’s leaders have understood the US’s core strategic message: the door to normalisation remains open if Tehran fundamentally revises its ideology, which relies on proxies to expand its influence in the Middle East, and abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of its regional dominance.

Tehran’s leadership realises that if it continues to adhere to its proxy and nuclear doctrines, the incoming Trump administration will escalate sanctions to the point of triggering Iran’s economic collapse and authorise Israel to systematically eliminate its proxies. Additionally, Israel could even receive full US support for military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The Biden administration has already empowered Israel with the tools to counter Iran’s regional proxies and deliver a severe blow to its air defence capabilities. Tehran recognises that Mr Biden is not like his former boss, former president Barack Obama, who offered concessions, tolerated Iranian-backed proxies and effectively rewarded its regional conduct by refraining from applying pressure.

Once in power, the Trump administration is expected to continue Mr Biden’s approach, employing a combination of strategies to deal with Iranian-affiliated militias. These may include direct conflict, as in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, and containment efforts, as in the case of the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq.

Mr Trump will probably fully support Israel, block any efforts to lift sanctions on Iran, and prevent the resumption of nuclear negotiations if Tehran responds with defiance and if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps dodge the demand to rein in their proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Iran’s compliance with the ceasefire in Lebanon and its pressure on Hezbollah to accept the agreement stem from significant US political and strategic pressure, coupled with Israeli military escalation supported by the US. Iran had no other choice, especially after Lebanese leaders conveyed that the time had come to end Tehran’s control over Lebanon and its use of the country as a pawn for its regional ambitions.

The developments in Lebanon do not represent a victory for Iran or Hezbollah, despite their public claims to the contrary. Hezbollah’s miscalculations have alienated its base and forced Lebanon as a whole to pay the price for its flawed strategies in support of Gaza against Lebanon’s will, leading Israel to reoccupy parts of Lebanon.

The group has lost because the costly outcome of its actions was to force the separation of the fates of Lebanon and Gaza, abolish the equation of the “people, the army and the resistance”, and eliminate the logic of resistance itself because now borders will be eventually demarcated between Lebanon and Israel.

In contrast, the Lebanese state emerges as a big winner. The agreement ratified by the cabinet strengthens Lebanon’s military and security institutions, particularly in the area south of the Litani River, and enforces full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Its terms include the disarmament of Hezbollah and Palestinian factions inside Lebanon, effectively restoring the state’s monopoly on arms. Meanwhile, US and French guarantees for adherence to the ceasefire by Israel, Hezbollah and Iran lend credibility to the agreement and underscore its seriousness.

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati no doubt played crucial roles during this critical phase. However, significant challenges remain, particularly in finalising the demarcation of land borders within the next 60 days. The announcement of a presidential election early next month is another major development, reflecting a shift in Mr Berri’s priorities. He appears determined to leave behind a legacy of reconstruction in the south.

This is where key Arab powers, it is hoped, will respond positively to calls from the US, EU and Lebanon itself for their return to playing a role in the country particularly as the process of rebuilding is expected to follow. However, this historic opportunity depends on Beirut’s leaders addressing the country’s endemic corruption.

Without meaningful reforms to ensure accountability and transparency, Lebanon risks squandering this unique chance to reinvent itself.