Why Jordan's 1994 peace treaty with Israel is gathering dust


Marwan Muasher
Marwan Muasher
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October 25, 2024

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Saturday marks 30 years since the Jordan-Israel peace treaty was signed. In the decades since, has peace in the region become more attainable? Unfortunately, the answer is a decisive no.

Looking back to that day, October 26, 1994, King Hussein was reluctant to sign a peace treaty with Israel until he felt that the Syrians had reached agreement with the Israelis in a separate accord, and that the Palestinians had chosen their own track through the Oslo process. The Jordanian monarch’s motives for agreeing to such a deal went beyond water rights and recovering Jordanian land that had been occupied by Israel.

Jordan’s principal aim with regards to the treaty was to have Israel acknowledge the Jordanian state and system, prevent any mass transfer of Palestinians to Jordan, and bury once and for all the “Jordan is Palestine” argument put forward by then fringe and radical elements in the Israeli political system.

Jordan also felt it could use its newly formed relationship with Israel to facilitate Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and help establish a Palestinian state on Palestinian soil. By establishing economic and security relations between the two countries, Jordan also felt it could help moderate Israel’s position regarding the peace process with the Palestinians.

Thirty years later, none of these aims seem to have been realised. An Israel led by the likes of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin or a coalition government willing to engage in peace talks seems like a distant memory. Today, that coalition has been replaced by a right-wing government that is the result of a marriage between radical forces, both secular and religious.

King Hussein of Jordan, right, and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin exchange documents relating to the two countries' peace treaty at the Beit Gabriel conference center in Israel on November 10, 1994. Much of the optimism that surrounded the deal has dissipated over the past 30 years. AFP
King Hussein of Jordan, right, and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin exchange documents relating to the two countries' peace treaty at the Beit Gabriel conference center in Israel on November 10, 1994. Much of the optimism that surrounded the deal has dissipated over the past 30 years. AFP

Some members of today’s government, such as Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, publicly and repeatedly commit themselves to an Israel that stretches “from the river to the sea”. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that a two-state solution is “a reward for terrorism” and Israeli society appears to be increasingly and permanently shifting to the right. A survey carried out by the Israel Democracy Institute in February found that 63 per cent of Jewish Israeli respondents are opposed to a Palestinian state. This sentiment was reflected in a law passed by the Knesset in July opposing Palestinian statehood in principle; the legislation was endorsed by all major Jewish Israeli parties.

After October 7, 2023, the mass killings of Palestinians in Gaza, the destruction of the territory’s infrastructure to the point where it is near uninhabitable and the attempted ethnic cleansing of Palestinians by settlers in the West Bank – supported by the Israeli army – have all revived Jordanian fears that an Israeli desire to transfer the Palestinian population seems not to have been relegated to the past.

An Israel led by the likes of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin or a coalition government willing to engage in peace talks seems like a distant memory

Radical groups in Israel that are committed to the “Jordan is Palestine” argument, were on the political fringe when the 1994 treaty was signed. Today, they are part and parcel of the Israeli government. Hopes that any successor to Mr Netanyahu would be more open to ending the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state on Palestinian soil are being dashed amid an Israeli society where the divide today is between only pro and anti-Netanyahu factions. On the issue of peace, Israeli society seems to be largely united against it.

Where does this leave Jordan? If a Palestinian state is regarded by Israel as a reward for terrorism, what then, official Jordan is increasingly asking, is Israel’s long-term plan? Is it continued occupation – basically apartheid? Is it trying to get rid of as many Palestinians as possible, through direct killings or mass transfer to reverse the current the reality of a Palestinian population that has overtaken Jewish Israelis?

The answers to the questions above seem highly problematic, not only to Palestinians, but to Jordan as well. Whereas public opinion in Jordan has been extremely hostile to Israeli policies for quite some time, these challenges have seeped into the thinking of Jordanian officials. The significance of the 1994 peace treaty to Jordan is severely diminished today, given the absence of a path towards Palestinian statehood.

One thing is clear: Jordan’s relationship with Israel after October 7 cannot be the same. The model of a warm peace that might moderate Israel and facilitate negotiations has failed. Israel today is more radical than it has been since it signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. And although Jordan will not abrogate its treaty with Israel, which would result in difficulties that Amman does not want to face, the agreement is already – in the words of current Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, “sitting on the shelf and gathering dust”. Plans for co-operation with Israel on water and energy issues have been abandoned, and any future economic ties will be fiercely resisted by a Jordanian population more hostile to Israel than ever before.

Jordan will have to walk a tightrope in the coming period, trying to balance its relationship with the US and the international community if it maintains its current anti-Israel stance and rhetoric, and between an angry public who will reject going back to the pre-October 7 relationship with Israel.

The absence of any serious political vision to deal with the aftermath of the war can only complicate matters further. Without a vision to end the occupation, it will be difficult to argue for a warm relationship with a country that seems to have hostile designs not only against the Palestinians, but against Jordan as well. Thirty years later, the treaty has lost almost all its lustre.

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7. Limited time periods for audits

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8. Pillar 2 implementation 

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Contributed by Thomas Vanhee and Hend Rashwan, Aurifer

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Key figures in the life of the fort

Sheikh Dhiyab bin Isa (ruled 1761-1793) Built Qasr Al Hosn as a watchtower to guard over the only freshwater well on Abu Dhabi island.

Sheikh Shakhbut bin Dhiyab (ruled 1793-1816) Expanded the tower into a small fort and transferred his ruling place of residence from Liwa Oasis to the fort on the island.

Sheikh Tahnoon bin Shakhbut (ruled 1818-1833) Expanded Qasr Al Hosn further as Abu Dhabi grew from a small village of palm huts to a town of more than 5,000 inhabitants.

Sheikh Khalifa bin Shakhbut (ruled 1833-1845) Repaired and fortified the fort.

Sheikh Saeed bin Tahnoon (ruled 1845-1855) Turned Qasr Al Hosn into a strong two-storied structure.

Sheikh Zayed bin Khalifa (ruled 1855-1909) Expanded Qasr Al Hosn further to reflect the emirate's increasing prominence.

Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan (ruled 1928-1966) Renovated and enlarged Qasr Al Hosn, adding a decorative arch and two new villas.

Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan (ruled 1966-2004) Moved the royal residence to Al Manhal palace and kept his diwan at Qasr Al Hosn.

Sources: Jayanti Maitra, www.adach.ae

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First-round leaderbaord

-5 C Conners (Can)

-3 B Koepka (US), K Bradley (US), V Hovland (Nor), A Wise (US), S Horsfield (Eng), C Davis (Aus);

-2 C Morikawa (US), M Laird (Sco), C Tringale (US)

Selected others: -1 P Casey (Eng), R Fowler (US), T Hatton (Eng)

Level B DeChambeau (US), J Rose (Eng) 

1 L Westwood (Eng), J Spieth (US)

3 R McIlroy (NI)

4 D Johnson (US)

Updated: October 25, 2024, 6:00 PM