A grand ceasefire deal in Gaza is as plausible – or unlikely – as a full-scale war

A man reacts inside a school used as a temporary shelter for displaced Palestinians in Gaza City, after it was hit by an Israeli strike on August 10, which killed more than 90 people. AFP

A ceasefire in Gaza is still being negotiated. As efforts continue to buy time to reach a deal, both Israel and Iran, along with Iran-backed proxies, are using this period to gauge each other’s military strategies and strengthen their preparations for potential scenarios.

A nerve-racking tension grips the region, leaving the world on edge between escalating rhetoric and the fear of its consequences.

Incremental solutions and battles have replaced the sprint towards either a grand deal or a large-scale war – but both outcomes are simultaneously plausible and unlikely. The Biden administration is hedging its bets on both fronts, advocating for a ceasefire and a gradual, transitional approach to the Gaza conflict, while simultaneously working towards a broader goal: reshaping the Middle East through a grand bargain.

At the same time, the administration maintains a deterrent stance, bolstering its military presence in the region to emphasise its readiness to support its key ally Israel if a regional war erupts between Israel and Iran and its proxies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Hezbollah supporters at a ceremony marking a week since the killing of Hezbollah's top commander Fouad Shukr, in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Reuters

People Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah giving a speech, in Tyre, Lebanon on August 1. Reuters

Critics may argue that the US appears duplicitous, acting as both mediator and participant in the conflict. Indeed, the Biden administration publicly criticises the policies of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu while providing nearly unlimited military support for Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. The rhetoric may be humanitarian, but the actions are not.

Those well-versed in international policy understand the nature of strategic alliances. The US-Israeli relationship is a deep, qualitative alliance, and it would be a mistake to assume any American president would abandon Israel in a regional war, especially during the final months of a US presidential election. This principle is shared by both Republicans and Democrats and has long been established.

Nasrallah's most notable statement is his belief that a war of nerves – psychological warfare – is necessary, even if it means exhausting the nerves of the Lebanese people

The American public, by and large, does not want the US drawn into another war, particularly with Iran. While some Americans are wary of Israel’s attempts to drag the US into conflict with Iran, this sentiment will not fracture US-Israeli relations. The shift in American sympathy towards Palestinians reflects disapproval of the bloodshed in Israel’s war on Palestinian civilians, but it does not translate into support for Hamas, its leaders, or Iran and the resistance axis it leads. This sentiment is not likely to evolve into a strategy, nor will it cause progressives in America to dismantle the enduring relationship with Israel.

All this intersects at what is currently happening between Iranian leaders and Mr Biden's team in the White House. Here lies the potential for transitioning to a grand Middle East deal that many believe involves normalisation between Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel. This is certainly a significant aspect of the deal, but the Islamic Republic of Iran is not excluded; rather, it is a silent participant.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken disembarks from an aircraft upon his arrival in Tel Aviv from Cairo. The Biden administration publicly criticises the policies of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu while providing nearly unlimited military support for Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. AFP

True, American officials have warned Iran of "severe" consequences if it decides to attack Israel. These consequences may involve a nuclear dimension, as Israel could drag the US into targeting Iran's nuclear facilities, which are a national priority for Tehran as it approaches the threshold of acquiring nuclear capabilities.

But the US-Iranian dialogue happening behind the scenes, through intermediaries and in closed rooms where Americans and Iranians engage in bilateral and regional horse trading, marks a key difference between the Obama-Biden policy and that of former US president Donald Trump.

Indeed, Mr Biden’s team, led by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, has made several strategic errors, including the public acknowledgment of Iran’s pivotal role in determining the fate of Arab Palestinians. The Obama and Biden administrations’ deference to Iranian conditions, particularly regarding Iran’s use of militias and non-state actors in sovereign Arab countries – giving Tehran the upper hand in determining the fate of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen – is an unforgivable strategic sin.

Some may argue that Mr Biden’s success in containing the Gaza conflict, preventing it from escalating into a regional war, deserves recognition. This success, however, is directly tied to the US policy towards Iran originally adopted by Mr Obama and advanced by Mr Biden – and the above is its price.

While Mr Biden’s team is co-ordinating with several Arab countries, including Egypt, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, to find a resolution to Israel’s war on Gaza and achieve a ceasefire, the deeper conversation is with Tehran. The Biden team has empowered Iran to negotiate the nature, scope and "legitimacy" of its regional roles, including its encroachments on the sovereignty of Arab states, with Lebanon at the forefront.

This is why Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah exudes confidence, even as he trembles at the prospect of a direct war with Israel that would sacrifice Lebanon for Iran's greater interest. He balances on a tightrope between the dictates of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the internal divisions in Iran, the hijacking of Lebanon, its people, and its sovereignty; risking their fate and that of his party if a large-scale war erupts.

Nasrallah's most notable statement in one of his speeches is his belief that a war of nerves – psychological warfare – is necessary, even if it means exhausting the nerves of the Lebanese people, who do not want this war in the first place, while Hezbollah drags them into it by force.

No other Arab country has volunteered to become an open front for war with Israel in support of Gaza. Even in the West Bank, the Palestinian leadership has refrained from opening a front with Israel. Egypt and Jordan, both neighbouring Israel, have chosen neutrality. Syria, too, has not opened a front with Israel for Gaza’s sake. Only Nasrallah has decided to drag Lebanon into a direct conflict with Israel, inviting Palestinian and extremist militias, including ISIS copycats, into the fray.

Experts close to intelligence agencies in various countries suggest that upcoming developments will involve "massive" strikes, but that the battle will be short-lived, not escalating into a full-scale war between Iran and Israel. There seems to be a predetermined script for a war with clear boundaries and a limited timeframe. American supervision appears to be guiding this scenario, ensuring the containment of "necessary" retaliatory strikes by both Iran and its allies, as well as Israel.

Revenge is one of the acceptable elements in containment strategy. Perhaps this fits into realpolitik, but the colossal error lies in the tactic of incrementalism adopted by Mr Biden's team from the start in its de-escalation efforts. Thus, it became hostage to compromises that should never have been accepted. Now, it finds itself compelled to negotiate directly and indirectly with Hamas's new political leader, Yahya Sinwar, who the US and Israel accuse of masterminding the events of October 7 and classify as a "terrorist."

Mr Netanyahu sees himself as the eventual victor as US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin publicly affirms that the US will stand by Israel if Iran opens a direct war against it. As for the war on Lebanon, it has its own different rules. It is true that Nasrallah is a direct enemy of Mr Netanyahu on the Lebanese-Israeli border and that the cost will be high for both, as well as for Lebanon and Israel. However, it is also true that Mr Biden's team has effectively conceded Lebanon's fate to Iran, which controls Nasrallah.

Where do we stand now? We are on the brink, between the potential destruction of Lebanon if Iran and Israel go to war, and a deal that Washington hopes to broker, factoring in mutual revenge, and leading to a ceasefire in Gaza, followed by a grand deal.

Tehran's rulers are ready to engage with Mr Biden's team because they do not want Donald Trump to return to the White House and lose the billions that Mr Biden's administration allows Iran to cash in, either through the release of assets in third countries or through oil sales. Mr Trump's return to the White House would mean pushing Iran back into bankruptcy due to the re-imposition of severe sanctions.

The big mistake remains the reliance of Mr Biden's team on incremental tactics in both negotiations and the battles they sanction. Everything is transitional and phased in this team's calculations, which still dreams of that grand deal that they hope will follow this war of nerves.

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