The interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria over the past two decades stand as stark reminders of the perils of foreign-imposed regime change. These actions, often justified under the banners of humanitarian protection, democracy promotion or counterterrorism, have not only devastated the targeted nations but also inflicted lasting damage on the intervening powers and the broader international order.
Regardless of the very problematic nature of the regimes that were overturned, at their core, these operations violated fundamental principles of international law, eroding the collective security framework established after the Second World War to ensure global peace and stability. This article examines the consequences of these interventions on the principles of international law, with a particular focus on their legal implications, and distills key lessons for the future of international relations – further illuminated by the dramatic fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and now with the removal of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.
The UN Charter, adopted in 1945, forms the bedrock of modern international law. Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, except in cases of self-defence under Article 51 or with explicit authorisation from the UN Security Council under Chapter VII. The principle of sovereign equality, enshrined in Article 2(1), mandates that all states be treated equally, regardless of their size or power. Yet, the regime change pursued in Iraq and Libya, and the prolonged proxy conflict in Syria, exposed the fragility of these norms when confronted by the ambitions of powerful states.
In Iraq, the 2003 US-led invasion exemplified a disregard for international law. The George W Bush administration invoked a doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence, claiming Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and posed an imminent threat. However, no such weapons were found, and the invasion lacked UN Security Council approval. The pretext of maintaining international peace in the post-9/11 era masked long-standing US plans for regime change, dating back years before the attacks. This unilateral action not only contravened the Charter's prohibition on aggressive force but also undermined the authority of the UN.
The Libyan intervention in 2011 further illustrated the manipulation of legal frameworks. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorised "all necessary measures" to protect civilians amid Muammar Gaddafi's crackdown on protests. Framed under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine – endorsed by the UN in 2005 to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity – this resolution was intended for humanitarian purposes. However, Nato forces, led by the US, UK and France, expanded the mandate to support rebel forces and expedite Gaddafi's ouster. This overreach raised profound questions about the legality, legitimacy and feasibility of forcible regime change. The interveners eroded trust in the UN system, making future consensus on humanitarian interventions more elusive.
The Syrian conflict, escalating from 2011 protests into a protracted civil war involving proxy forces from the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey and others, initially avoided direct forcible regime change by western powers. Western support for opposition groups contrasted with Russian and Iranian backing of Bashar Al Assad, leading to vetoes in the Security Council and paralysing UN action. The prior noncompliance in Iraq and mandate abuse in Libya bred deep scepticism among permanent members, particularly Russia and China, who feared R2P could be weaponised for geopolitical gain. This division severely hampered the international response to Syria's humanitarian catastrophe, allowing atrocities, chemical weapon use and massive displacement to persist.
Ultimately, however, regime change in Syria was achieved not through direct western intervention but via a rapid rebel offensive in late 2024. Led by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham and other Syrian opposition forces, rebels captured Damascus on December 8, 2024, forcing deposed president Bashar Al Assad to flee to Russia. This outcome, while ending Assad's rule, stemmed from the prolonged proxy war that fragmented the country and weakened the regime over years.
These cases underscore a deeper crisis in international law: ambiguity surrounding the legality of regime change. R2P permits military action only as a last resort to halt mass atrocities, not to install new governments or promote democracy. Yet, powerful states have exploited this grey area, masking strategic interests – such as securing resources, countering rivals or containing threats – under humanitarian pretexts. The interventions divided the Security Council more profoundly than any issue since the Second World War, pitting advocates of strict non-intervention against those favouring flexible interpretations. This schism has fuelled global political conflict, weakening the collective security framework designed to treat all nations equally.
The relationship between major powers and international law is inherently symbiotic. Superpowers like the US enforce global norms when it suits them, deriving legitimacy from the system while often exempting themselves from its constraints. American exceptionalism – a cultural belief in the US's unique role – has often justified such exemptions, including withdrawals from treaties and selective adherence during the War on Terror.
Social factors, as noted by scholar Moshe Hirsch, further complicate compliance: identity, values and economic stakes influence behaviour. This selective approach has created a two-tiered sovereignty: "first-class" states wield full authority and impose obligations on others, while "second-class" states face interference. Such imbalances damage international law's legitimacy, which requires universal support to function.
The central question remains the status of regime change under the UN Charter. Justifications in Iraq and Libya proved inconsistent; in Syria, proxy dynamics and prior legal erosions constrained action, yet ultimately facilitated internal collapse leading to change. These events highlight the need to affirm that a government's form is an internal matter. Force, even in extreme cases, must be a last resort focused on protection, under strict UN supervision.
Reform is vital: recognise sovereign equality, hold powerful states accountable and foster collaboration. Legitimacy must derive from impartial law, not manipulation. The fall of Assad in 2024, amid ongoing transition challenges, reinforces these lessons.
Yet, the appetite among superpowers for pursuing regime change has not ended. As of late 2025, there were escalating US military operations in the Caribbean – framed as counter-narcotics efforts in Venezuela. However, by January 3 it became apparent that they were a tool to remove the Maduro government. This is a signal that similar scenarios are unfolding in different geographical areas, this time in Latin America. The future of the international order hinges on equitable enforcement and self-restraint by major powers to prevent repetition of these costly manoeuvres.
