As DP World announces plans to invest in Syria, here's what other investors need to watch out for

The lifting of western sanctions against Syria is set to attract more investors to the country. Reuters

Last week, DP World – the Dubai-based global ports operator – signed an $800 million agreement with the Syrian government to develop and expand the north-western port of Tartus. This is the first foreign investment announcement – albeit a memorandum of understanding – since US President Donald Trump announced during his Gulf trip that American sanctions on Syria would be lifted.

It is a pretty notable sum from DP World. Judging by the available data, $800 million is just under 7 per cent of DP World’s $11 billion of global port infrastructure investment over the past decade (although it is unclear how much of the $800 million would go directly to the port project, as opposed to investment in broader logistics). The point is this: now the shackles of sanctions have been lifted, a whole lot of foreign investment interest is set to focus on Syria.

The benefits of this for rebuilding the country are clear. For instance, plenty of reinforcing feedback loops are in the offing: in the case of the Tartus port, its modernisation and improved performance should attract further investment, which should lead to enhanced trade capacity and thus spin-off job development. This in turn should create the incentive for further foreign investment in the port and more like it.

However, reconstruction environments are highly delicate settings that need a lot of care and forethought to avoid exacerbating lingering or latent grievances and the conflict drivers that inevitably remain. It is crucial that investors and their local counterparts consider how such investments might undermine stability in such a fragile situation, and make sure to mitigate that risk.

One way in which investments can affect stability is if the project’s benefits are perceived to advantage certain groups over others. In the case of Tartus, the city is in an area of the country that benefited disproportionately under the Assad regime, in no small part due to the leadership’s family and sectarian links there. Accordingly, if other significant investments are not dispersed across other regions, then sectarian sentiment across much of the rest of Syrian society could be further enflamed.

Societal destabilisation could come from other directions, too. Networks of violent smugglers that are already well entrenched in Syria’s coastal regions could inadvertently be provided with opportunities to expand their criminality through the port expansion, not only undermining social cohesion but also degrading security. Social cohesion will also be harmed if commercial elites are allowed to establish crony, corrupt or rent-seeking linkages to the rejuvenated business ecosystem set to surround the port.

Reconstruction environments are delicate settings that need a lot of care to avoid exacerbating lingering grievances

In a similar vein, members of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, the militant group that led the ousting of the previous government, have featured heavily in municipal and port appointments during Syria’s transition period. Public trust in the reconstruction process more broadly could be undermined if those appointees favour associates in their circles for investment project benefits.

So, to avoid destabilising this combustible environment, what are some initial steps that should accompany future investments?

One key objective is for investors to push for transparent and accountable governance structures around their investments to mitigate corruption, cronyism and rent-seeking behaviour.

A useful starting point here is to ensure the investment aligns with local priorities by meaningfully engaging with affected communities, local authorities and civil society organisations throughout the project’s lifecycle. Transparent information-sharing, inclusive consultation and mechanisms for community participation in decision-making are key. In addition, establishing independent oversight mechanisms, strengthening public financial management systems and empowering civil society to monitor the project is similarly critical.

Capacity building for these relevant local stakeholders will thus be important to enable their effective engagement. The institutionalisation of civil society, which such capacity building could start to achieve, is also imperative for the success of the transition period in Syria more broadly. Assistance in such capacity building would not only provide meaningful corporate social responsibility for investors but would also be helpful in improving the sustainability of their investment, and thus also their returns.

It is crucial for investors and local public stakeholders alike to adopt the mindset of avoiding the “shifting the burden” pitfall. This dynamic describes a situation where a problem symptom, for example a lack of infrastructure, prompts an actor to intervene and "solve" it with a superficial solution, such as infrastructure investment. Over time, this form of intervention increases while the focus on improving the problem-solving approach necessary to solve the root cause of the problem – that is systemic governance issues that led to conflict – is ignored.

Foreign investment is essential for Syria’s reconstruction. However, it is critical that these investments are not viewed as a quick-fix solution. If they are, and are not co-ordinated within a broader, cohesive reconstruction strategy that addresses institutional and governance deficits, then such investments will merely treat symptoms rather than addressing the systemic political-economy issues that led to the outbreak of the civil war in the first place. Merely treating symptoms can often make the underlying problem much worse.

There is a vast amount of low-hanging fruit available for foreign investors in Syria’s reconstruction that could return immense mutual benefit for them and Syrian society if engagement is geared thoughtfully, utilising conflict-sensitive approaches that account for the abovementioned dynamics. If not, then the benefits of such investments will be at best highly sub-optimal, and at worst a trigger for relapse into open conflict.