Syria’s political transition isn’t enough to end its cycle of violence

The funeral of a member of the Syrian security forces killed by groups loyal to the ousted Assad regime, in Hama this month. EPA

When the Syrian Popular Resistance militia, a faction loyal to the erstwhile Assad leadership, attacked the interim government's security forces and civilian hospitals in Latakia this month, the latter responded, but many other armed elements and individuals also joined the fray. In the melee, many hundreds of Alawite civilians were massacred.

It is still unclear to what extent those atrocities were caused by government forces acting outside of directives issued by Damascus, as opposed to armed elements and individuals with loose to no connection to the authorities taking advantage of the chaos to pursue “revenge killings” against Alawites. Nonetheless, the government has largely restored control over Latakia and the surrounding region, declaring that it will hold those responsible for the civilian murders to account.

However, as seen from the terrified reactions from the country’s minority groups in recent days – exacerbated by Iranian and Hezbollah-supported disinformation campaigns that inflated the death count and peddled atrocity propaganda – such tragedies can easily spiral into countrywide instability. And preventing such situations from occurring in the future will largely come down to establishing a representative and inclusive transitional government in Damascus as soon as possible.

Ensuring the centralisation (or at least better integration) of armed elements across the country, as well as enabling a legitimate transitional justice process to hold those guilty of Assad regime crimes to account, are both vital to stop disasters like the one just witnessed from happening again. Failing to establish an inclusive government is the bottleneck that will prevent these two imperatives from being achieved.

An international conference in support of Syria in Brussels on Monday. EPA

The transitional constitution that was released late last week has elements that could be problematic

First, and as I wrote previously in these pages, many armed factions in Syria are refusing to disarm and integrate into the new military because they either question the legitimacy of the new administration or lack confidence in its prospects for inclusive, benevolent rule. Elements of these factions were probably involved in the massacres perpetrated against Alawite civilians.

Second, the fact that holding to account criminals associated with the Assad establishment has not started yet means sections of society are primed to pursue vigilante justice against an Alawite population that made up most of the previous regime. Such street justice, as seen over the past days, often doesn’t distinguish between innocent and guilty Alawites. The solution – an accepted and legitimate transitional justice process – is something that can be achieved only if a transitional government that has the ethos and representativeness necessary to engage with the spectrum of civil society is established.

Unfortunately, last month’s Syrian National Dialogue Conference, a gathering held ostensibly to lay the ground for the formation of such a transitional government, was rushed and didn't cover all the bases.

The conference was not adequately representative. Young people were underrepresented, the leaders of various armed groups were absent, and the Kurdish official leadership from the Kurdish-majority areas of north-east Syria were also absent. Women constituted just 20 per cent of the attendees, and some heavily populated, politically significant and societally diverse provinces had notably fewer representatives than others.

The conference was not sufficiently substantive either. Its final statement – meant to serve as the guiding document for the formation of the transitional government – did not discuss power sharing, the rule of law, government formation, state political identity or governance structures. It also left out key points that had been discussed at the conference. Major disagreements on key issues were not ironed out.

Syria's Al Shara signs constitutional declaration

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It is, therefore, critical for regional and international stakeholders to push the interim administration to address these shortcomings before it proceeds to create a transitional government. The committee that will apparently be formed to draft a permanent constitution should work with the conference preparatory committee to expand the national dialogue process to ensure it is properly representative and substantive.

This can be done by expanding and improving the local consultation process – the two-week exercise preceding the conference that was geared to give communities across the country a chance to be heard by the national dialogue committee. Aside from being rushed, concerns emerged that these consultations lacked sufficient depth, and it was not clear if there was any mechanism for recording attendees’ contributions.

The transitional constitution that was released late last week – which will last for five years until the permanent constitution is consolidated – has elements that could be problematic, like for instance the amount of power granted to the executive office. Accordingly, the new committee tasked with drafting the permanent constitution should work with the national dialogue committee to consolidate a far more systematic, rigorous and sustained process, beginning with local consultations and feeding into the national-level dialogue, addressing the aforementioned deficiencies.

This will provide a much more representative and substantive discourse to inform the drafting of Syria’s new constitution. It will also enable a more deliberative process for setting up a transitional government. All of this is necessary for the formation of a legitimate and genuinely representative transitional state that, by extension, reduces the possibility of tragedies like that just seen in Latakia from happening again.