How the US could benefit from removal of Iran oil sanctions

Nearly all sales are to China and Iran incurs some discounts and risk to export its 'dark fleet' of tankers

A gas flare on an oil production platform in Iran. Reuters

With peace in Ukraine and Gaza elusive, US President Donald Trump needs a diplomatic win. With its major allies devastated by Israeli attacks or overthrown in Syria, struggling with sanctions and energy shortages, Iran too needs a way out. Can an agreement help Tehran and Washington to a durable nuclear accord and a more peaceful and prosperous region?

Most commentary on a possible deal has focused on the implications for Iran’s oil exports. If US sanctions were eased, then Iranian oil exports might rise by 300,000 to 400,000 barrels per day, putting some pressure on oil prices. But more complex, and more interesting, are the wider energy and economic possibilities, and how to combine them with diplomacy.

Of course, big hurdles are still in the way. Iran maintains its right to enrich uranium, while US envoy Steve Witkoff has said, “enrichment enables weaponisation” and “we cannot allow even 1 per cent of an enrichment capability”.

Yet Mr Trump has shown himself willing to overturn Washington’s conventional wisdom and cautious legalism, for bad and good. After a brief meeting with Syria’s new president Ahmad Al Shara, he ordered a swift end to sanctions, a process which dragged out for years in the cases of Iraq and Libya. His recent Gulf visit brought a profusion of announcements of business deals. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has also dangled the carrot of economic opportunities for the US.

The National reports from Tehran before the fifth round of nuclear negotiations

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A durable peace needs to emphasise economic entanglement. From a US standpoint, that would seek to entice Iran from its current dependence on Russia and China. The GCC would be the natural regional partners.

This is not to be naive about the nature of the Iranian regime, its determination to remain in power, its political and ideological objectives. It will probably remain a difficult place to do business: bureaucratic, corrupt, repressive and opaque. Patriotic dual nationals, seeking to revitalise economic and scientific ties, have been imprisoned for long periods on trumped-up charges, such as oil executive Siamak Namazi, finally released in September 2023 after eight years in prison.

We should also be realistic about the US political system, which finds it very hard to honour its promises or stick to a course of action.

But many insiders, even in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have become deeply interested and involved in making money. Why should only China benefit from Iranian oil, the White House may think? There could be a meeting of minds with Mr Trump’s inner circle.

Previous openings purposely excluded US companies. In 1995, Conoco, which operated Dubai’s offshore oilfields, reached a deal to develop the neighbouring Sirri fields on the Iranian side. But president Bill Clinton vetoed their involvement.

After the signature of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015, European oil companies tried to return to Iran. The US continued to shut out its corporations, though. International banks stayed out because the US would not give reassurance over sanctions compliance. Under president Barack Obama, powerful lobbies were determined to destroy the deal, which had no enthusiastic defenders even among its architects, and they succeeded when Mr Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018.

Iran had itself missed its chance, dragging its feet on devising and negotiating its new petroleum contract. This time, both sides need constituencies keen on preserving and building on a reset relationship.

Tehran desperately needs to revive its economy. Oil production has actually mostly recovered from US sanctions, running at about 3.3 million to 3.4 million barrels per day, not far below capacity of 3.7 million to 3.8 million bpd. Nearly all sales are to China, and Iran incurs some discounts and costs in exporting through the “dark fleet” of tankers willing to risk sanctions.

After a deal, the country could recover its lost markets in countries such as India, Japan and South Korea, competing with its GCC neighbours and, in India, with Russia. It would regain ready access to frozen funds, and to essential petroleum industry kit which it currently procures through shady and costly channels.

Gas production has been faltering, mainly because of falling pressure at South Pars. This field, the Iranian sector of what Qatar terms the North Field, provides 70 per cent of Iranian gas output. Iran needs to install complex and costly compression platforms, which it cannot easily build at home.

Rampant demand growth because of subsidies has left Iranian industry short of fuel and causes frequent winter interruptions. Iran has burnt more oil in power stations to cope, but still suffers blackouts in both winter and summer. Exports to Iraq have been unreliable, and anyway targeted by US political pressure.

Iran needs a three-fold approach: cutting demand by improving energy efficiency, increasing gas output, and raising prices to consumers, and boosting non-gas power generation.

Subsidy reform and higher prices to consumers should be easier in the context of a reviving economy. For boosting production, GCC national companies could work with international majors such as Shell, TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil. This could work especially for shared cross-border fields, if a constructive diplomatic framework can be devised.

Out of Iran’s 93 gigawatts of theoretical electricity generating capacity, the share of solar and wind is a truly feeble 1 gigawatt. The Bushehr nuclear power plant adds another gigawatt. The UAE and Saudi together have eight times this much nuclear, solar and wind, and are building more.

Yet Iran’s high-altitude deserts and windy mountain ridges have tremendous potential for renewable installations. This is a major opportunity for the capital and expertise of GCC companies such as Abu Dhabi’s Masdar and Saudi Arabia’s Acwa Power.

The tricky enrichment issue could also become a business opportunity. US, European and other nuclear expertise could help manage a regional consortium to make nuclear fuel safely and transparently, including current or aspiring nuclear power users such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt.

Finally, the reintegration of Iran into the regional and global economy would open up enormous interconnectivity. The Caspian, Central Asia, South Asia and the Gulf could be linked by gas pipelines and electricity cables, transmitting and balancing renewable power between three continents.

Too many chances for an Iran-US rapprochement have been missed on all sides since 1979. Military methods and sanctions have been tried extensively, diplomatic efforts somewhat, business not nearly enough. Great risks remain, disappointment and perhaps disaster are still likely. But visible is the sliver of a resolution that would help Iran, the US and the GCC countries to prosper together.