Can the US use its Ukraine tactics to get Middle East minerals?

Al Amar gold mine, south-west of Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has six gold mines owned by the Ma'aden Gold and Base Metals Company. Reuters

The US deal granting it future revenue and access to Ukraine’s mineral sector raises a broader question: is this the beginning of a model for American foreign policy, one that links strategic resource access to long-term diplomatic and financial commitments?

Shaped by the exceptional circumstances of war, the Ukraine deal may appear to be a one-off. Yet US President Donald Trump’s recent Middle East visit, in which the White House claimed more than a trillion dollars in investment deals were signed, points to a broader trend: Washington’s increasing willingness to align foreign policy with long-term economic interests, particularly in critical minerals.

It is tempting to imagine the US might apply the Ukraine model in the Middle East, particularly with countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, where mining has become a growing policy focus. Riyadh especially is pursuing large-scale development of critical minerals as part of its economic diversification strategy to lessen dependence on oil.

Riyadh has also overhauled its mining laws to attract foreign investment and accelerate exploration. Its state-owned mining giant, Ma’aden, has already entered partnerships with global firms like Barrick Gold and Ivanhoe Electric, signalling serious intent to build a world-class mining sector.

But unlike Ukraine, neither is in a position of acute geopolitical distress. Saudi Arabia is wealthy, and critically, not short on suitors. It boasts a huge sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund, that finances domestic megaprojects.

While Jordan's aid dependent economy is struggling, especially after the sudden suspension of US aid in February, it fairs better than Ukraine's dire straits of enduring a more than three-year war.

Therefore, neither country is under pressure to pledge away its resources at a loss. That may not preclude Mr Trump from exploring similar proposals, however unlikely their acceptance.

The American president has long preferred diplomacy with a balance sheet. His latest Gulf tour was no exception, with discussions focused on investment deals and economic co-operation, including energy sales. 

Administration officials have indicated a growing interest in financing structures that expand US access to critical minerals without increasing federal spending.

Minerals race

Minerals are no longer just commodities. Lithium, copper, and other rare earth metals are national security assets. From electric vehicles to semiconductors, the green transition is mineral-intensive, and China controls much of the supply chain. China processes more than 80 per cent of rare earths, dominates refining of lithium and cobalt, and plays a major role in battery and solar manufacturing.

For Washington, ensuring access is becoming as vital as defending shipping lanes.

Still, any notion of Saudi Arabia or Jordan signing over future profits or access to the US is, at best, aspirational. Riyadh has no intention of sharing control, or upside, of its mineral development. It might accept a US partner in a technical capacity, especially to access mining expertise or green tech. But anything more is unlikely.

This does not mean deals will not be struck. Rather, the model would be likely to differ from used in Ukraine’s. In Jordan’s case, Washington might offer technology transfer or enhanced security guarantees, particularly in light of regional tensions with Iran, in exchange for priority access to minerals or a stake in local mining projects.

Jordan, while more modest in scale, has significant reserves of phosphates and is exploring its potential in rare earth elements. The country’s established mining infrastructure and close ties to Washington could make it a more flexible partner for future mineral agreements.

With Saudi Arabia, it’s harder. Saudi Arabia doesn’t need a deal; the US does. That’s leverage, and Riyadh knows it.

Diplomatic capital

Even if formal resource-sharing deals are unlikely, Washington’s economic footprint in the Gulf is not insignificant. Access can take less visible forms. 

One route is through US companies that attract investment from Gulf sovereign wealth funds, like Abu Dhabi’s ADQ, the Qatar Investment Authority and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund. Capital often travels with a diplomatic agenda. 

In 2021, for instance, Saudi Arabia’s PIF gave $2 billion to Jared Kushner, Mr Trump’s son-in-law and former senior adviser, for his newly launched private equity firm, Affinity Partners. Many in the region regard the move as a gesture aimed at maintaining ties with Mr Trump’s inner circle.

However, if the US is indeed pivoting to a resource-driven foreign policy, it is doing so late in the day. China has spent two decades building state-backed mineral partnerships across Africa, Latin America, and increasingly the Middle East, often under its flagship Belt and Road Initiative.

The US, by contrast, is just now scrambling to catch up. In this context, resource-sharing arrangements, however opaque, may become a new diplomatic currency.

But even within Washington, the path forward is uneven. The push to secure minerals is tied closely to the green transition, a central concern for US tech giants, who need stable supplies for electric vehicles, batteries and data infrastructure.

Yet on Capitol Hill, the political will is fragmented. While some Republicans support domestic mining as part of a broader push for energy independence and competition with China, many in the Make America Great Again wing of the party remain sceptical of the green agenda itself.

Still, lithium, cobalt, rare earths are vital to American interests. Electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced batteries all depend on them. But securing reliable access to these materials will take more than high-profile deals in Riyadh. 

It will require sustained investment in mining and processing capacity, long-term contracts with trusted partners, and clear policy signals that outlast election cycles.

Ukraine’s resource-for-support deal may remain an outlier: born of war, scarcity and political imbalance. The Middle East, by contrast, is rich and assertive.

Mr Trump may hope to carve out a mineral foothold, but the region is unlikely to surrender its resources without extracting something far more valuable in return.

And in the transactional world of today’s geopolitics, the price of access is always going up.

Karl Schmedders is professor of finance at IMD