One interpretation of the April 4 chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun in Syria is that Russia was aware that it was coming. It permitted the attack to happen, principally because it sought to test the administration of Donald Trump and renew with the Americans the unwritten arrangement over Syria that had prevailed with the administration of Barack Obama.
No doubt much remains unclear in such a view. Did the Russians really know about the attack? An unidentified senior US official made this assertion in the second week of April, pointing out that a Russian-operated drone had flown over the hospital where the victims of the chemical attack were being treated, after which the hospital was bombed, evidently to remove any evidence of what had happened.
But beyond that, the close collaboration of Russian and Syrian officers at the Shayrat airbase, from which the aircraft that bombed Khan Sheikhoun took off makes it unlikely that Moscow was caught unaware. Russia has strongly denied any responsibility, but the political context of the attack was itself revealing.
The Russians recall that the United States granted them considerable latitude in Syria after the Ghouta chemical attack in August 2013. At the time the Russians had headed off an American military response in exchange for removing Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. Yet the move also turned Russia into an indispensable partner for any progress in Syria. Moscow was given considerable power to affect outcomes there.
When Mr Trump came into office, Russia had no guarantees that the unwritten arrangement would be revived. It is quite possible that the Khan Sheikhoun chemical attack was a way of obliging the Americans to reopen a dialogue with Moscow over Syria in which the previous understanding would prevail.
The assumption could well have been that Mr Trump’s declared desire to avoid any involvement in Syria would push him to cede political progress in Syria to Russia. Though the Americans did bomb Shayrat airbase, this seemed more a cosmetic form of retaliation than any fundamental shift in the US role in Syria. Nothing since then has suggested that Mr Trump plans a different approach in Syria from that of Mr Obama.
That is, perhaps, where we must seek an explanation for Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement on April 29 that Russia wanted to cooperate with the United States over Syria, particularly on the issue of fighting ISIL and Al Qaeda. The statement, made in the presence of the Jordanian foreign minister, Ayman Al Safadi, was a subtle shift from previous statements by Russian officials, in which they had insisted that it was up to the coalition to adopt Russian positions on Syria.
By affirming Russia’s willingness to participate in the anti-ISIL and Al Qaeda coalition, Mr Lavrov was hinting at a return to the previous Russian-American understanding over Syria, whereby the Obama administration had allowed Moscow to take the lead in addressing a political endgame there, in exchange for collaborating with Washington against ISIL. That Mr Al Safadi endorsed Mr Lavrov’s statements was a sign that the mood in the region is changing in a way that suits Moscow.
A conversation on Tuesday between Mr Trump and Russian president Vladimir Putin, the first since the American bombing of the Syrian airbase, suggests the Russians are making headway. The two men agreed to intensify their cooperation over Syria. The US also agreed to send a representative to the Russian-led Astana talks over Syria, a key forum allowing Moscow to shape diplomatic outcomes there.
Russia has not wavered on this. It initiated the Astana process to put a foot in the door, without however challenging the United Nations negotiating framework. Moscow realises that the UN is the only path towards an internationally recognised solution in Syria. Rather than replace this, it has sought to create parallel momentum elsewhere – in Astana and through its improved relations with Turkey and the Arab states – to give itself greater diplomatic weight in the UN process.
The Syrian situation is becoming ever more complicated for the Trump administration, which has no clear Syria policy. The Americans find themselves lost amidst an escalating Turkish-Kurdish confrontation in northern Syria.
By offering to work with the international coalition, Russia presents itself as the party most able to mediate between all sides. Given this position, its say in a Syrian settlement can only increase.
It doesn’t take great perspicacity for Mr Putin to see that there is disarray in Washington, especially over Syria. What better time to push the US into a corner and force it to make a choice that benefits Russia? After all, Mr Putin easily did so with the far more clearheaded Obama administration.
Michael Young is a writer and editor in Beirut
On Twitter: @BeirutCalling
UAE currency: the story behind the money in your pockets
How Voiss turns words to speech
The device has a screen reader or software that monitors what happens on the screen
The screen reader sends the text to the speech synthesiser
This converts to audio whatever it receives from screen reader, so the person can hear what is happening on the screen
A VOISS computer costs between $200 and $250 depending on memory card capacity that ranges from 32GB to 128GB
The speech synthesisers VOISS develops are free
Subsequent computer versions will include improvements such as wireless keyboards
Arabic voice in affordable talking computer to be added next year to English, Portuguese, and Spanish synthesiser
Partnerships planned during Expo 2020 Dubai to add more languages
At least 2.2 billion people globally have a vision impairment or blindness
More than 90 per cent live in developing countries
The Long-term aim of VOISS to reach the technology to people in poor countries with workshops that teach them to build their own device
Mercer, the investment consulting arm of US services company Marsh & McLennan, expects its wealth division to at least double its assets under management (AUM) in the Middle East as wealth in the region continues to grow despite economic headwinds, a company official said.
Mercer Wealth, which globally has $160 billion in AUM, plans to boost its AUM in the region to $2-$3bn in the next 2-3 years from the present $1bn, said Yasir AbuShaban, a Dubai-based principal with Mercer Wealth.
“Within the next two to three years, we are looking at reaching $2 to $3 billion as a conservative estimate and we do see an opportunity to do so,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Mercer does not directly make investments, but allocates clients’ money they have discretion to, to professional asset managers. They also provide advice to clients.
“We have buying power. We can negotiate on their (client’s) behalf with asset managers to provide them lower fees than they otherwise would have to get on their own,” he added.
Mercer Wealth’s clients include sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and insurance companies among others.
From its office in Dubai, Mercer also looks after Africa, India and Turkey, where they also see opportunity for growth.
Wealth creation in Middle East and Africa (MEA) grew 8.5 per cent to $8.1 trillion last year from $7.5tn in 2015, higher than last year’s global average of 6 per cent and the second-highest growth in a region after Asia-Pacific which grew 9.9 per cent, according to consultancy Boston Consulting Group (BCG). In the region, where wealth grew just 1.9 per cent in 2015 compared with 2014, a pickup in oil prices has helped in wealth generation.
BCG is forecasting MEA wealth will rise to $12tn by 2021, growing at an annual average of 8 per cent.
Drivers of wealth generation in the region will be split evenly between new wealth creation and growth of performance of existing assets, according to BCG.
Another general trend in the region is clients’ looking for a comprehensive approach to investing, according to Mr AbuShaban.
“Institutional investors or some of the families are seeing a slowdown in the available capital they have to invest and in that sense they are looking at optimizing the way they manage their portfolios and making sure they are not investing haphazardly and different parts of their investment are working together,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Some clients also have a higher appetite for risk, given the low interest-rate environment that does not provide enough yield for some institutional investors. These clients are keen to invest in illiquid assets, such as private equity and infrastructure.
“What we have seen is a desire for higher returns in what has been a low-return environment specifically in various fixed income or bonds,” he said.
“In this environment, we have seen a de facto increase in the risk that clients are taking in things like illiquid investments, private equity investments, infrastructure and private debt, those kind of investments were higher illiquidity results in incrementally higher returns.”
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of the largest sovereign wealth funds, said in its 2016 report that has gradually increased its exposure in direct private equity and private credit transactions, mainly in Asian markets and especially in China and India. The authority’s private equity department focused on structured equities owing to “their defensive characteristics.”
Who's who in Yemen conflict
Houthis: Iran-backed rebels who occupy Sanaa and run unrecognised government
Yemeni government: Exiled government in Aden led by eight-member Presidential Leadership Council
Southern Transitional Council: Faction in Yemeni government that seeks autonomy for the south
Habrish 'rebels': Tribal-backed forces feuding with STC over control of oil in government territory
