Quite literally at the 11th hour on Saturday night, a ceasefire between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces was extended by 15 days.
The announcement is a welcome development as it provides diplomacy with much-needed breathing space to douse the flames of war, prevent a regional escalation and perhaps even secure a negotiated solution without which Syrians of all stripes cannot live together in peace.
The spark for the conflict is a fundamental disagreement over who should run the country’s resource-rich north-east, under SDF control since 2015. The SDF, Kurdish-led forces, control areas in Syria that are of mixed communities.
After the fall of Bashar Al Assad’s regime in December 2024, and the subsequent establishment of a transitional government, interim President Ahmad Al Shara has sought to bring Syria’s outlying regions under state control and integrate militias like the SDF into its armed forces. The new authorities in Syria cannot succeed without full sovereignty over all its territories. The SDF, on the other hand, has long resisted integration and demanded autonomous status for the areas it governs.
This has brought matters to a head with Damascus, culminating in the Syrian army’s lightning offensive last week to capture large parts of SDF-held territory, save for its three strongholds: the Kurdish-dominated cities of Kobani, Qamishli and Hasakah.
Reports of excesses committed by forces loyal to Damascus, including executions and looting, haven’t gone unnoticed. The release of ISIS militants from prisons previously run by SDF personnel has also raised the alarm for many, particularly amid long-held suspicions that a minority of the forces involved in the operation – as well as the release of the prisoners – include men with past links to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS.
The SDF notably also has a reputation for violence and repression. Its most important constituents are closely linked to the PKK, an organisation that claims to fight for autonomy of Turkey’s Kurdish-majority regions but is considered a terrorist group by Ankara, Washington and Brussels.
Nonetheless, the recent setbacks to the SDF have left millions of Syrian Kurds anxious about possible mass displacement and human rights abuses, after having watched from afar violent clashes involving government forces in the Alawite-dominated and Druze-majority areas last year.
The offensive by Damascus has had a galvanising effect on Kurds in neighbouring Turkey and Iraq. Motivated by a sense of solidarity and shared peril, many are reportedly streaming across the borders to bolster defences in SDF strongholds – an influx that could prolong the conflict and heightens the risk of escalation.
Syria, after all, has long been considered a geopolitical lynchpin where local grievances often ignite regional and even global crises. The events of the past week illustrate this truth.
The country’s current challenge concerns to the future status of its ethnic minorities – including that of its Kurds. Mr Al Shara deserves credit for trying to assuage minority concerns, recently issuing a decree recognising Kurdish rights, citizenship and language. But the SDF demands more, including control of territories that do not have a Kurdish majority.
The current ceasefire has bought a narrow window for talks on how the SDF could be integrated into the central government. But the question is also whether Damascus can accommodate Kurdish demands over political representation, resource-sharing and protection against forced assimilation. Such an accommodation is not only critical in the fight against ISIS, but for the country’s very future.
Stakeholders, both inside and outside Syria, therefore need to urgently reach a negotiated settlement on these issues. Failing that, Damascus might win the war, but runs the risk of never winning lasting peace.
