Last week, Hezbollah secretary general Naim Qassem issued a statement in which he said his group would not disarm while Israel pursued its occupation of Lebanon and its attacks. He also described the Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement of last June as “devoid of legitimacy”, adding that it was the memorandum of understanding agreed by the US and Iran, also signed in June, that represented a source of strength for Lebanon.
Mr Qassem went on to declare that Iran placed “ending Israeli aggression in Lebanon at the forefront of its priorities”. His remarks underlined how Hezbollah is operating on a different plane than the Lebanese authorities. While the latter have sought to contain Israel’s military actions by engaging in negotiations backed by the administration of US President Donald Trump, Hezbollah has hitched its wagon to Iran, and to an Iranian agreement with the Americans.
That’s not surprising, as Hezbollah today effectively appears to be run by Tehran. Since the group’s political and military cadre were devastated by Israel in 2024, and Mr Qassem took over from the assassinated Hassan Nasrallah, all the signs are that the group has been led directly by members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Since March 2, when Hezbollah entered the war between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other, it has suffered significant setbacks. The Israelis have occupied a large area in southern Lebanon’s border region up to the Litani River, and in some places beyond it, before systematically razing all Shiite-majority villages in that area.
In light of this, Hezbollah is facing rising, if understated, anger from within its Shiite community for the calamity that has befallen it. Given such circumstances, the only path open to the group is to remain close to Iran, which has imposed a headlock on the Americans in the Strait of Hormuz, in the hope that any future agreement will encompass Lebanon. Moreover, some Iranian funds have reportedly been released to help the Shiite community cope with its dire situation, so Hezbollah’s sole option is to navigate close to Tehran.
Iran is wagering on several things to revive Hezbollah’s fortunes. The first is the failure of the Lebanon-Israel framework agreement because of Lebanese inaction and Israeli intransigence. The group isn’t wrong. The Israelis have made only token concessions on the “pilot zones” dimension of the agreement. Israel is supposed to hand over certain occupied areas to the Lebanese army so that the latter can impose state authority there and replace that of Hezbollah.
Despite its claims to the contrary, Israel does not trust the Lebanese authorities to disarm Hezbollah, but prefers to unilaterally impose its own security order on neighbouring countries, such as Lebanon and Syria. In light of this, Iran and Hezbollah hope to revive the Lebanese resistance, which would give them a new pressure point against the Israelis.
A second wager derives from an Iranian understanding that countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, but also Egypt and Jordan, seek to counterbalance Israeli dominance in the region. Amid the rise of regional middle powers and the probable military disengagement of the US from the Middle East, a classic balance of power game is taking shape, whereby countries are seeking to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon, such as Israel.
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A man stands in the rubble of a building destroyed in an overnight Israeli air strike on Haret Hreik, in Beirut's southern suburbs. AFP -
Emergency workers at the site of an Israeli air strike on an apartment building in Haret Saida, on the outskirts of Sidon. AFP -
A banner bearing portraits of slain Hezbollah leaders Hassan Nasrallah, left, and Hashem Safieddine at the site of a strike on Burj Al Barajneh, in Beirut's southern suburbs. AFP -
Damage from an Israeli air strike in Haret Hreik. AFP -
Downed power lines and destroyed buildings in Beirut’s southern suburbs. AFP -
Emergency personnel tackle a fire after an apartment building in Haret Saida was hit. AFP -
A man holds missile debris in Haret Saida. EPA -
Plumes of smoke rise following Israeli strikes on Beirut's southern suburbs, seen from Baabda. Reuters -
The aftermath of an Israeli air strike in Haret Hreik. AFP -
Emergency workers respond after an apartment was hit in Beirut's Burj Hammoud suburb. AFP -
A damaged building in Burj Hammoud. AFP
It was noteworthy that Turkey reportedly hosted Hezbollah and Syrian government representatives in September, in “an effort to de-escalate”, according to a Reuters story reporting on the meeting. While the Turks do not want to see Hezbollah regain a foothold in Syria, they do regard the group as a counterweight to Israel in Lebanon, and have allegedly allowed Iranian funds to reach Hezbollah through Turkey.
A third wager of the Iranians is that the Trump administration will be unable to prevail if the conflict with Iran resumes – as many are expecting in the coming weeks. It’s unclear why the Americans, who have been unable to weaken the Iranian regime after months of trying, would triumph this time. Nor is the economic strangulation of Iran necessarily nearing a climax. According to a CIA assessment highlighted by The Washington Post, Iran has stockpiled several months of food and fuel, allowing it to mitigate the effects of war for a while.
In light of this, Iran’s and Hezbollah’s strategy is to stay the course in Lebanon, refuse to surrender Hezbollah’s weapons to the Lebanese state and organise resistance operations against Israel, while probably also trying to ensure that the Israelis will not widen their occupation zone in southern Lebanon. One by-product of this is the marginalisation of the state, which would like the Lebanese army to impose a monopoly over weapons.
However, is Hezbollah’s revival feasible? The nature of war has changed since the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in May 2000. Today, the Israelis have a panoply of remote means – drones, use of AI for intelligence gathering and armed robots – to control Lebanon, which does not require a heavy deployment of ground forces. Moreover, the Israelis have escalation dominance, which can include bombing Beirut, to impose its will on Lebanon, whereas Hezbollah’s ability to similarly escalate appears more limited.
What Iran and Hezbollah do have is the means to sustain a low-level conflict against Israel, provided they can re-establish an infrastructure to support this in southern Lebanon. That may not be easy if the Israelis and the Lebanese government and army work to prevent it. At the same time, if the population backs such an initiative, which is not certain, the government could find itself in a similar situation as the Palestinian Authority.
Whatever happens, the ship has sailed on Hezbollah’s forcible disarmament by the state. Given the domestic security risks, this was never a serious option, especially after Israel derailed the pilot zones scheme. For the foreseeable future, Lebanon will remain a proxy battlefield for regional rivalries, and the country will suffer as a consequence.
