This week, Lebanese and Israeli military representatives are meeting in Tampa, Florida, to discuss implementation of the so-called “pilot zones” plan to advance the Lebanese army’s disarmament of Hezbollah. It’s improbable that there will be any breakthroughs, but more significantly, it’s unlikely Israel actually seeks one.
Reportedly, the meeting is being held to discuss, among other things, the technical dimensions of the pilot zones, including a verification mechanism to report on the disarmament process. Also on the table may be discussions of the Lebanese refusal to conduct searches in private homes, where Hezbollah has allegedly stored large quantities of weapons, because this would represent a violation of the law. Article 14 of the Constitution, for instance, affirms “the citizen’s place of residence is inviolable”.
These technical matters notwithstanding, the reason the pilot zones scheme has not advanced significantly since the signing of June 26 Tripartite Framework Agreement between Lebanon, Israel and the US has to be sought elsewhere. It is mainly a consequence of Israel’s refusal to cede any territory to allow the Lebanese army to advance in the plan. This is largely tied to an Israeli desire to pursue a security doctrine in Lebanon that is independent of any of the constraints that an agreement would impose.
Israel appears to have accepted negotiations with Lebanon for two primary reasons: to placate the administration of US President Donald Trump, which pushed for such a process; and to have on paper an agreement with Lebanon that would justify Israel’s continued presence in Lebanon if Beirut failed to fulfil the central condition of disarming Hezbollah.
The Israelis have succeeded on both counts. The US administration is on board with Israel, putting no pressure on it to withdraw its forces from Lebanese land. At the same time, the June agreement imposed all conditions on the Lebanese side, above all Hezbollah’s disarmament, without requiring Israel to fulfil any of its own. Indeed, the term “withdrawal” is not even in the document, and there is no timetable for what the text describes as a progressive [Israeli] redeployment out of Lebanese territory.
The agreement makes vague promises on Israeli actions that can only be implemented in the case of prior Lebanese actions, without recognising Lebanon’s sovereign rights over its own territory. Its sovereignty over Israeli-occupied parts of the south is qualified. Israel doesn’t expect Lebanon’s government to disarm Hezbollah by force, so it now has a formal excuse to remain in the south indefinitely.
What we have, therefore, is a structurally flawed agreement that, by failing to gain traction, will give the Israelis wide latitude to pursue their own security agenda in southern Lebanon. Already, the Israelis have razed dozens of mainly Shiite villages, burned large swathes of agricultural fields and olive groves and bombed land using white phosphorous, thereby making it impossible to grow fruits and vegetables.
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Smoke rises after an Israeli strike near the southern Lebanese city of Tyre. AFP -
A woman makes her way through the rubble of a residential building hit in an Israeli attack, near Burj Al Shamali, on the outskirts of Tyre. AFP -
The aftermath of bombing by Israeli jets in the city of Nabatieh. AFP -
Civil defence members search for victims in the rubble in Burj Al Shamali. AFP -
Strikes near Beaufort Castle, seen from Marjayoun. Reuters -
Lebanese soldiers in Burj Al Shamali. AFP
The objective here is similar to the one employed in Gaza, namely to make the southern border region uninhabitable, in what could very well be an open-ended occupation. This comes at a time when Israel’s security doctrine has changed radically, and differs significantly from what it was in the past.
In a much-discussed article for Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, for which he serves as executive director, Tamir Hayman, a former chief of the Israeli military’s Intelligence Directorate, outlined what he saw as a new Israeli approach to security. This will have a fundamental impact on how Israel deals with Lebanon.
Five of Mr Hayman’s conclusions stand out. The first is that Israel views peace as a means rather than an end, and that “any arrangement with Arab actors is temporary and deceptive”. The second is that Arab states are not genuine nation states, but “collections of ethnic groups lacking a shared history and a foundational national vision”. In light of this, “undermining their stability is viewed as a natural process”.
A third conclusion of Mr Hayman is that, for Israel, “war is essential to national security, and cannot be replaced by a state of peace”. A fourth conclusion is that Israel must no longer be dependent on the US, which is a “declining power”, whose shifts will ultimately lead to the abandonment of Israel. And a fifth conclusion is that the Israelis must adopt a forward defence strategy through “defence zones” that “enable Israel to move the war into enemy territory as quickly as possible”.
Mr Hayman’s bleak analysis is based on his deep knowledge of Israeli strategic thinking, but others too have reached similar conclusions. In light of this, those who believe that a Lebanese-Israeli peace is a priority for Israel are naive. Instead, Israel seeks to fragment and destabilise its neighbours, such as Lebanon and Syria, retain buffer zones inside their territory, pursue perpetual war, and will not hesitate to turn against Washington’s preferences if these run against Israeli priorities.
That is principally why we should not expect much from the Lebanese-Israeli talks, and why Lebanon is right in avoiding domestic conflict with Hezbollah just to placate the Israelis. Hezbollah is a major problem for Lebanon, undoubtedly, but it makes little sense today to risk internal Lebanese strife just to satisfy an Israel that appears to be committed to destabilising Lebanon and consolidating its occupation.
