Lebanese President Joseph Aoun was recently welcomed by US President Donald Trump in Washington, in what was interpreted as an effort by Mr Aoun to seek US backing in Lebanon’s negotiations with Israel. Upon his return to Beirut, the President travelled to Turkey, amid reports he would soon visit Saudi Arabia.
In other words, Mr Aoun appeared to be diversifying his regional contacts, at a time when his critics had warned him to not put all his eggs in the Trump administration basket. This situation highlighted a disconnect in how the Lebanese state and senior officials – Mr Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri – are conducting foreign policy, and the role of regional dynamics in their calculations.
Not long before Mr Aoun’s visit to Turkey, Mr Salam had also visited the country, shortly after Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Mitri had done so in June for a meeting with Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin. Mr Berri, in turn, remains a perennial contact for foreign officials, who view him as a major interlocutor with Hezbollah.
Whatever one can say about the benefits for Lebanon to develop a heterogeneous foreign policy, so segmented an approach can seem odd. Part of the explanation lies in Mr Aoun’s determination to be the main driver of Lebanon’s foreign policy. The President has completely marginalised Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, who himself has made little effort to fashion a role for himself on this front.
While the cumbersome system only highlights that Lebanon is a house of many mansions in its foreign contacts, it does allow for a more balanced, pluralistic approach to regional and international actors that is necessary in the increasingly complex regional environment that is forming. Balance is precisely what the country needs at a time when power blocs are emerging in the region, with the aim of preventing any one country, or group of countries, from imposing their hegemony on all.
This classic balance-of-power situation was best demonstrated last week by the signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. While touted as a mutual defence agreement, the real objective was political: to create the cornerstone of a coalition of countries that could act as a counterweight to both Iranian and Israeli ambitions to impose their dominance in the region, in light of the increasingly probable US disengagement, and assert, in the words of Saudi analyst Hesham Al-Ghannam, that “the security of the region is first and foremost an Arab and Muslim responsibility”.
Lebanon’s leaders once had different understandings of the impact of this regional situation on the country’s future. Mr Berri has always been sensitive to regional dynamics, while Mr Salam, a Sunni, realises the importance of maintaining strong relations with the region’s major Arab countries. It took him more time to deal with Turkey, and he initially turned down several invitations to the country, feeling the time was not right.
Yet Mr Salam has the advantage of being well advised. Both Mr Mitri and Minister of Culture Ghassan Salameh have played important diplomatic roles with the UN, know the region well and are willing to take risks on regional matters. Both are also less wedded to the centrality of Lebanon’s ties with Washington, even if they are not hostile to the US, which means they are more apt to thinking outside the box.
Mr Aoun, in turn, came into office appearing less attuned to the transformations in the region and their impact on Lebanon, perhaps believing, like many Lebanese politicians, that the country’s safety raft was the US. This was not surprising given that the institution he once headed, the armed forces, relied so heavily on American assistance and training.
A repercussion of this was that the President took more time than Mr Salam to engage with one of Lebanon’s most important foreign policy challenges, namely ties with Syria. The armed forces had fought Syrian extremist groups in August 2017, including the one once led by Syrian President Ahmad Al Shara, so it was perhaps natural that Mr Aoun would move slowly in this regard.
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Smoke rises after an Israeli strike near the southern Lebanese city of Tyre. AFP -
A woman makes her way through the rubble of a residential building hit in an Israeli attack, near Burj Al Shamali, on the outskirts of Tyre. AFP -
The aftermath of bombing by Israeli jets in the city of Nabatieh. AFP -
Civil defence members search for victims in the rubble in Burj Al Shamali. AFP -
Strikes near Beaufort Castle, seen from Marjayoun. Reuters -
Lebanese soldiers in Burj Al Shamali. AFP
However, Mr Aoun’s and Mr Salam’s initial awkwardness in shaping Lebanon’s policies to align them with regional priorities, seems to have changed over time. Both have met numerous regional envoys in recent months, making them more sensitive to how Lebanon should position itself. They now appear to all agree that steps involving peace negotiations with Israel that push Lebanon into an Israeli sphere of influence could isolate Lebanon from major Arab and regional actors that enjoy considerable influence inside their country.
Several months ago, before the US and Israeli war with Iran, Mr Aoun was more amenable to concluding a peace treaty with Israel. However, since then he has taken a step back as Lebanon has reaffirmed its commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, which demands that Israel accept a Palestinian state first if it wants peace.
All three Lebanese leaders are gravitating towards a consensus that Lebanon should not be torn apart by the rivalries among the region’s main power blocs, must retain strong ties with all major Arab and Islamic countries and has to avoid being absorbed into an Israeli sphere, thereby isolating itself as much as possible from regional tensions.
Lebanon’s sovereignty has always been a relative concept, but the country would lose by picking sides in a regional struggle over which it has little influence. Being open to all sides and preserving a margin of manoeuvre make much more sense.
