Solving Syria's Kurdish question remains a work in progress

Late last month, the Syrian government reached an agreement with Kurdish-led militia in the country’s north-east that would allow for the latter’s gradual integration into the central armed forces. The deal ended a military conflict between the two sides that had threatened to destabilise Syria and spill into neighbouring countries where large numbers of Kurdish people live. But even as the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces is expected to proceed, their agreement with Damascus doesn’t necessarily settle the question regarding the future of the two million Kurds in the country. That will depend, as has long been the case, on the powers that rule Damascus today. Syria’s Kurds have suffered many injustices over the decades, particularly during the long rule of the now-erstwhile Assad regime. During those 53 years, they were deprived of equal rights and citizenship, as well as the right to speak and learn their own language. They couldn’t, for the most part, openly enjoy their rich culture – like celebrating Nowruz at the birth of spring every year. They were often referred to as “Maktoum” in Arabic, which translates to “hidden” or “unknown”. That’s because after the 1962 census – which predates even the Assad regime – most Kurds were not registered in the national records, hence they didn’t officially exist. They didn’t have identity cards, nor did they receive good-quality higher education and decent jobs. But the fall of Bashar Al Assad’s government in December 2024 and the ongoing debates on what the new Syrian republic should look like have inevitably led to questions about the status of its minorities – including that of the Kurds. Last month, interim President Ahmad Al Shara did something the Assad establishment had never done during its time in power: he issued a decree granting Kurds their place as equal citizens while recognising their distinctiveness within Syria’s complex social fabric. The announcement was viewed with suspicion by many, particularly due to the military conflict that was going on between Damascus and the SDF at the time. Since coming to power, Mr Al Shara has sought to reunify Syria and bring all its outlying regions under his government’s control. As part of this mission, he demanded that the SDF be integrated into the state. The militia’s months-long intransigence over the issue eventually culminated in a lightning offensive by government forces last month and the capture of the Arab-majority areas that were then under SDF authority. A 15-day truce was announced thereafter to give a severely weakened SDF a chance to agree on how best to integrate themselves into the state apparatus – which they did on January 30. But what explains the SDF’s obduracy in the months prior, despite having agreed in principle to Mr Al Shara’s reunification plan in March last year? There are a few theories, but it appears the violence that government-aligned forces meted out in other minority regions , dominated by the Alawite and Druze communities, last year gave the Kurds pause. Both sets of clashes led to what many experts describe as crimes against minorities. And so, even though Damascus acknowledged these crimes and conducted investigations, with promises to bring the perpetrators to justice, Syrian unity has remained a work in progress to this day. Alawites in exile have since called for their own state in the country’s west – as have the Druze in the south. The situation had been different with the Kurds. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, they had enjoyed de facto autonomy, with the SDF controlling large swathes of land and resources. The question they were therefore asking was, why should they give it all up? Many among them still feel that they deserve payback, by way of autonomy, for the ground support the SDF had provided to the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Syria. After helping to destroy the so-called caliphate, the SDF took responsibility of running the prisons and camps housing members of the terrorist group and their families. The SDF’s critics have often pointed to their record of repression in the areas previously under their control, including arresting minors and forcing them to enlist in their ranks, as well as mounting attacks on government personnel and property in Syria’s second city of Aleppo late last year. In the end though, Damascus proved stronger militarily as well as diplomatically , with the US – which previously supported the SDF – urging the militia to disband or else. The new agreement, brokered in part by Washington , gives the SDF the ability to continue maintaining a few brigades and retain partial control over ethnically mixed cities such as Hasakah and Qamishli. Yet what stands in the way of Syrian unity and territorial integrity is the scepticism with which many, particularly within minority groups including the Kurds, view Mr Al Shara and his promises to forge an inclusive state that protects all Syrians, regardless of religion, sect and ethnicity. Doubts over the President’s stated commitment exist, in large part, due to his proclivity to surround himself with loyalists and individuals long linked to Hayat Tahrir Al Sham , the now-defunct extremist group he used to head during the civil war before ascending to power in Damascus. But at the end of the day, even if many Syrians disagree over what sort of state they want , what they do concur on is the idea of unity in diversity . While they accept that their Kurdish brothers and sisters should enjoy equal rights as the rest, they object to the idea of an independent Kurdish entity. Whether the Kurds themselves feel that way in the months and years to come will depend almost entirely on Mr Al Shara’s ability to walk the walk on minority rights – beyond simply issuing decrees. That will be the ultimate test of his leadership.