The enormous US naval armada dispatched to the maritime regions within striking distance and from all directions of Iran – coupled with continuing American threats of a major military strike (although the stated goals have shifted somewhat over time) – make it more than likely that a significant, and possibly devastating, US military action may well be forthcoming. But then what?
Whatever the hopes of millions inside and outside of Iran, regime change as a result of aerial bombardments are, historically, virtually unknown. Regimes only change because local elites and/or the general population (including the military) decide a change of rule is absolutely necessary in the national interest, or due to an overwhelming foreign military intervention (such as the 2003 US invasion of Iraq). But, like sanctions, bombing attacks, no matter how intense, historically simply don't produce those results.
Undoubtedly, US President Donald Trump and his administration are well aware of this. Yet, we can easily anticipate the likely targets of a massive – albeit limited in time – American bombardment.
The intentions would likely be to cripple the regime's ability to continue to threaten its neighbours, and possibly undermine control in ethnic minority areas of the country, by attacking key strategic targets including missile and drone supplies and depots, still-existing nuclear sites, crucial aspects of command and control, intelligence capabilities and possibly even oil production.
If such an attack occurs – and it's hard to imagine such a conflagration of forces being simply for show – then historical precedent and conventional wisdom would suggest that Iran would retaliate as best it could, in various ways, and quickly pull back to lick its wounds and attempt to rebuild. But if the blow is severe enough – combined with pressure from the unprecedented recent public protests that were reportedly suppressed by unspeakable massacres of undetermined scope, and which could easily renew at any time because of unrelieved economic distress – a new possibility arises.
In fact, Mr Trump may not be interested in regime change at all. If the Venezuela scenario is any guide, he may be perfectly happy with a set of key concessions, possibly along with a symbolic change at the top.
Former Venezuelan president Nicholas Maduro and his wife were captured and taken to jail in Manhattan, where they await trial for drug smuggling and other charges. But the rest of the regime is completely intact and, while it is making some concessions to Mr Trump and the US oil industry, it continues to rule Venezuela much as before.
The CIA is reportedly attempting to re-establish a presence in the country, and that may well happen, but regime change has decidedly not occurred. Exactly the same people are running Venezuela in almost exactly the same way as they were, except without Mr and Mrs Maduro in charge. The only real change is who is benefiting from Venezuela's oil, the revenues of which are currently being held in Qatar to shield them from lawsuits by western businesses and creditors.
The Iranian regime is so weakened at home and abroad that, should the blow be sufficiently crippling, it's just possible Tehran may consider proposing or accepting a similar arrangement: a series of key concessions to Washington in order to relieve pressure on the regime. If a change at the top is absolutely required, the supreme leader is 86 and may conveniently retire or be deemed unfit to continue in that role.
The most obvious obstacle is that Washington may be unable to identify anyone in Iran they regard as reasonable, as they claim to regard Mr Maduro's former vice president and now replacement, Delcy Rodriguez. She has a long history of being a left-wing firebrand and strong supporter of the late Hugo Chavez as well as Mr Maduro. But she seems to have convinced Washington that she is a “pragmatist” and has made the petroleum concessions that appear to have been the only real demand Washington made in return for taking custody of Mr Maduro.
Does any such person exist in the upper echelons of the Iranian power structure? Do they have to? Or is anyone willing to sign off on the minimum required American concessions going to be deemed, by definition, suddenly as “reasonable” as Ms Rodriguez? Why not?
Perhaps even the current supreme leader could undergo a sudden rehabilitation with Mr Trump in the manner that Kim Jong-un of North Korea did during his first term. If that bizarre and fruitless bromance were possible, then anything is.
But would Iran be willing to make any such concessions? If, as usual, it's all about money for Mr Trump, then opening Iran's oil industry to US investors could suffice, and Tehran might be happy with that. It would be a tragic mistake.
If it has the opportunity to truly squeeze Tehran, Washington should certainly demand Iran limit its missile and drone capabilities, verifiably promise not to enrich uranium above civilian reactor levels and surrender its remaining stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and, above all, abandon the "axis of resistance" network of armed gangs that menace the Arab world.
These militia groups, ranging from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, are essentially cancerous rogue cells in the Arab state body politic. Like the pro-Iranian militia groups in Iraq, they did not necessarily create state disintegration, fragmentation and failure, but they certainly are the primary element, in each and every case, preventing the reintegration and reconstruction of these multi-confessional and multi-ethnic majority-Arab republics.
Israel focuses on Iran's nuclear project, and many regional states are correctly alarmed by the ongoing missile and drone threat. But any hopes for a return to widespread peace and stability in the Middle East requires Iran to stop supporting substate armed gangs in neighbouring Arab countries and allow organisations like Hezbollah in Lebanon to turn into legitimate political parties rather than little armies that usurp state authority, including the ability to routinely drag the whole country into war without consulting anyone.
If Mr Trump strikes Iran with a crippling blow, that alone may be a temporarily useful development, although it would depend greatly on the scope, nature and success of any Iranian retaliation. But if it produces the possibility of a Venezuela-style deal that allows the regime to continue, with or without its current leader, but with such crucial, potentially game-changing and overwhelmingly positive concessions, it could prove that Mr Trump actually knows what he's doing.
