Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Pakistan problem became his Trump problem after the 88-hour air war between India and Pakistan in May of this year. US President Donald Trump’s repeated claims that he personally forced the warring parties to quit fighting have put Mr Modi in an extremely difficult position, which he has dealt with largely by avoiding direct contact with the American leader.
The result is not just the collapse of a nearly complete trade deal and the imposition of 50 per cent tariffs on Indian imports to the US, but a global engagement problem, as Mr Modi appears to be avoiding international summits, such as the recent Asean conference in South Korea, where he would encounter the American president and his embarrassing claims.
This is a sea change from Mr Trump’s first term, where the personal relationship between the two leaders was a driver of the deepening engagement between the two countries. The fundamental shift here is not so much Mr Trump’s views on India, but his overall priorities.
In his first term, Mr Trump sought to challenge and contain China – policies the succeeding Biden administration took even further. In his second term, he has sought, with the exception of Iran and Venezuela, to use American leverage to de-escalate and end international armed conflicts. He has certainly made no secret of his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize; but he has also made clear that he strongly believes a world with fewer wars is better for American security and American business.
This peace drive has caught India in a double pincer between the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the India-Pakistan one. Although Mr Trump is willing to get involved in conflicts as obscure (to the American public) as the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, his special respect for nuclear weapons means that any India-Pakistan shooting war goes very high up his list.
On the one hand, Mr Trump has been keen to improve his leverage over his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, who has so far had little reason to take mediation efforts with Ukraine seriously. Fossil fuel exports are the most important source of state revenue and hard currency for Moscow; India is the second largest importer of Russian oil, gas and coal after China. Washington has failed to pressure Beijing into reducing its reliance on Russian energy, but it believes New Delhi will be moved by the 25 per cent tariff rate imposed on Indian exports to the US.
Although Indian officials have refused to publicly confirm that they have addressed these demands, reports suggest that state-owned Indian refineries had started cutting back purchases of Russian oil. And now, following US Treasury sanctions on the two biggest Russian crude oil exporters, Reliance Industries, the politically well-connected private Indian conglomerate, has announced it will halt purchases from Russia in order to avoid falling afoul of American law enforcement.
The Modi government’s approach to its conflict with Pakistan also appears to be undergoing some very significant changes. The November 10 car bomb which exploded near the iconic Red Fort in New Delhi and killed 15 innocents is a striking example. Since 2016, the government has launched high-profile media campaigns after major terrorist incidents to rally public opinion, which crescendo with retaliatory strikes against militant groups in Pakistan.
Although the Indian press has reported on the ties of the Red Fort attackers to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), the Indian government has avoided any public attribution, despite the JeM leadership’s base in Pakistan. This was despite a major election in the Indian state of Bihar, and a previous history of electoral rewards for tough talk about terrorism, Pakistan and religious minorities.
Clearly, any overt conventional retaliation will bring a renewed push by Mr Trump to at least be seen as imposing a pax americana and thus setting back all efforts to normalise the Indo-American relationship.
For over a quarter of a century, the war against first Al Qaeda, and then the Afghan Taliban, meant that the US was willing to quietly support India in its confrontations with Islamabad. The destruction of Al Qaeda, the US departure from Afghanistan, and the falling out between the Pakistani army and the Taliban after 2021 ended that dynamic.
If India cannot count on American support, then its best bet is to avoid American attention.
Although the Indian decision to avoid rhetorical and military retaliation against Pakistan is extremely positive, there are still reasons to worry. The evidence suggests that the covert war between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan is intensifying and becoming increasingly intertwined.
Explosions in New Delhi have been preceded by others in Islamabad and Kabul in the last two months. Constraints on overt retaliation may make doubling down on covert retaliation more attractive, and that dynamic will eventually force open responses.
The Red Fort attack, although highly visible, did not produce the kind of casualty count that might have forced the Modi government’s hand. But another, large-scale terrorist attack in Pakistan by groups perceived as friendly to Kabul and New Delhi might very well produce such tragic results.
The Indian and Pakistani armies have maintained a headquarters level “hotline” to stay in touch and prevent misperceptions about troop movements or actual scuffles on the border from spiralling out of control.
Unfortunately, it is believed that no such mechanism at this time to control the temperature when it comes to the actions of the intelligence agencies of both sides. But such channels are badly needed now more than ever.
