The shift in US-Saudi relations marks the beginning of a new chapter for the Middle East, born of a convergence between the visions of the two countries’ leaderships. At the core is a belief that peace and continuity are bedrocks for investment and prosperity.
Global, regional and domestic dimensions now intersect in this strategic relationship, which was crystallised during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington this month. But where is this partnership headed? And who among the regional and global players could gain or lose from it?
A qualitative leap has taken place in the military and security co-operation aspects of the partnership, with the US designating Saudi Arabia a “major non-Nato ally”. This classification grants Riyadh advantages in military and defence collaborations, facilitates the purchase of advanced US weaponry on favourable terms and opens the door to joint weapons production, defence systems development and shared technological projects in the military sector.
This designation also enables joint drills and exercises, intelligence sharing and co-ordinated military operations. A Strategic Defence Agreement was signed, along with a Strategic Partnership on AI, a strategic framework for co-operation on securing critical minerals and uranium supply chains, as well as financial and economic partnership arrangements. Memorandums of understanding were signed, along with frameworks for continued negotiations on civilian nuclear energy co-operation, Saudi investment facilitation, as well as economic and financial partnerships.
Some demands, made by both sides, remain under negotiation. Others collide with longstanding US conditions, particularly those related to the specifications of the F-35 fighter jets sought by Riyadh.
While US approval to sell these jets to Saudi Arabia constitutes a qualitative shift in the partnership, Riyadh had hoped to secure American guarantees akin to a mutual defence treaty. The aim was to prevent use of the jets being limited by stringent US-Israeli restrictions or strict legal conditions that would constrain deployment of these aircraft.
Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump is focused on how the partnership could affect global energy dynamics. His ambition appears to be to squeeze Russia out of the markets, believing that Saudi Arabia, with its lower production costs, will benefit from lower oil prices. The crucial element here is an oil partnership with global economic implications and strategic consequences.
The chemistry between the US President and the Saudi Crown Prince could signal a future trajectory for bilateral ties anchored in unprecedented institutional co-operation across domains.
This shift might unsettle Israel, as the longstanding US guarantee of that country’s military edge in the region has, for decades, precluded any Arab state from approaching its special status. It was previously unthinkable for any Arab country to be granted such a strategic status and alliance recognition by the US. That era seems to be over.
Indeed, the US-Saudi relationship has entered a phase that surpasses bilateral benefits and extends across numerous dimensions. Mr Trump harbours global ambitions and understands that Saudi Arabia is the lynchpin of both the Middle East and the Islamic world. He believes the kingdom’s leadership can help his administration realise its regional and global objectives.
But while Riyadh has anchored the kingdom’s security, alliances and economy in the US orbit, this doesn’t mean it will take a hostile stance towards China. In fact, mutual interests between Riyadh and Beijing are solid. But these do not extend to security matters, which remain the exclusive domain of the US.
Moreover, even though America’s willingness to supply high-quality AI infrastructure could help Riyadh reduce its need for Beijing, Saudi Arabia will continue benefitting from Chinese technology and AI, particularly given their lower cost.
These are critical elements in Riyadh’s long-term strategic planning.
Saudi diplomacy, meanwhile, has succeeded in tying any potential establishment of ties with Israel to the latter’s recognition of Palestinian statehood and a commitment to the two-state solution. This has surprised observers who believed such positions were mere public posturing. On the contrary, Riyadh has secured commitments from Mr Trump that he would prevent Israel from annexing the West Bank or reoccupying Gaza.
This doesn’t imply that a Palestinian state is imminent, or that Israel will embrace the two-state solution. But an Israeli leadership rattled by the course of the US-Saudi ties could be forced to publicly state that it is “considering” the two-state option or to leave open the door to some form of Palestinian statehood.
Mr Trump’s recognition that Prince Mohammed’s vision aligns with his own aspirations for a radically transformed Middle East became all the clearer when he made a point of repeatedly telling the Crown Prince that he is open to a deal with Iran. It seems both the Trump administration and Iran’s leadership view Saudi Arabia as a critical intermediary, separate from Oman’s role in hosting US-Iran nuclear talks.
However, both Washington and Riyadh believe that no progress is possible unless Tehran ceases to use armed proxies across the Arab world. This is most apparent in Lebanon, where Iranian-backed Hezbollah continues to resist pressure from within and outside the country to disarm.
If a US-Iran agreement does come to fruition, Tehran may agree to persuade Hezbollah to lay down its arms. But trust in Iranian promises is thin, and so the Trump administration has made clear its insistence that the group be disarmed either peacefully by Lebanon’s authorities or forcibly by Israel’s armed forces.
How all this pans out remains to be seen. What is crystal clear, however, is Saudi Arabia’s place in a region that is ripe for transformation.
