Both sides will insist they’ve won. That’s a Middle East classic in war. But the truth is less flattering: militarily, diplomatically and strategically, Israel is weaker and Hamas is in survival mode.
Two years and two days after the Hamas attacks of October 7, the region has spent lives and resources only for the war to end up exactly where it was always headed, back to the table, with arguments over timetables and logistics.
The ceasefire deal agreed to in Sharm El Sheikh potentially charts a critical path towards regional stability, creating space for a broader, more comprehensive agreement – one that could eventually draw in all the long-standing power players, including Iran.
For now, though, the main political verdict is unmistakable: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his country’s wars across the region have failed to “change the face of the Middle East” in the way his extremist government had claimed it would.
Mr Netanyahu, who has spent 24 months trying to claim victories to erase his failure to prevent the Hamas attacks, sought to cast Israel as the region’s policeman, authorising cross-border strikes and setting new precedents. Yet, he found no strategic finish line, and the result is Israel’s longest war, seemingly ending with fewer options, more critics and a diplomatic landing.
His vision of a “little Sparta” turned into something closer to a little North Korea: feared, increasingly isolated, and nearly a pariah. The deal, now approved, is not the transformative victory he promised. It’s a managed climb-down through a ceasefire, hostage-prisoner swaps, Hamas’s gradual disarmament and an interim international administration for Gaza.
The toll in Gaza tells its own story. Tens of thousands are dead; many more are wounded and entire neighbourhoods have been erased. The scale of loss is beyond imagination. Hospitals are hollowed out, families are scattered in tents and ruins, and an entire generation will spend many of its years ahead among rubble.
The Israeli war, classified by a UN commission of inquiry as a genocide, has killed almost 67,200 Palestinians, the majority of them civilians. That’s nearly 55 Palestinians for every Israeli killed on October 7. According to Israeli army intelligence leaks, the stated aim was to kill at least 50 Palestinians for each Israeli as a “message” to future generations, both Palestinian and Israeli. That is not victory; it is a level of devastation that will echo for decades inside Israel itself.
Israel’s attempt to redraw deterrence elsewhere through force and to rewrite the rules of engagement has also revealed its limits. Yes, Hezbollah has been bloodied; yes, Iran tasted direct confrontation; yes, the Houthis were punished. But the pain delivered was not a knockdown. The northern front ended in a ceasefire, and Hezbollah is still breathing. Iran’s other networks have been bent, not broken. And as the conflict dragged on, Israel’s diplomatic isolation deepened.
Everything Mr Netanyahu claimed to have changed now looks temporary.
The absence of strategy alone didn’t bring us here. Israel’s failed attempt to assassinate Hamas’s top leadership in Doha was one of the main turning points that shifted calculations. Arab capitals have applied real pressure, insisting that any “day after” must serve prosperity, not vengeance. Qatar and Egypt have carried the mediation burden. The UAE has made clear that annexation is a dead end, and other Gulf partners have signalled that normalisation depends on political realism. The message finally sunk in that there will be no regional order built on permanent siege and collective punishment.
Now comes the essential work. How to disarm Hamas? When and how will Israeli forces withdraw? Who secures the crossings, pays the salaries and signs the reconstruction bills? On paper, it’s all there. In practice, it will be a trench war of diplomacy if the guns stay silent.
For Palestinians, this is both a sliver of opportunity and a mountain of responsibility. Whatever system emerges in Gaza must be legitimate enough to govern, disciplined enough to maintain order amid the threat of emerging gangs and militias, and representative enough to bridge the gap with the occupied West Bank. The US proposal outlines a path towards recognised Palestinian statehood, in writing, and it should not be taken lightly.
For Israel, the choice is starker than its right-wing politics will admit. It can pocket a tactical pause and reload, or it can finally trade land and illusions for borders and normality through accepting the two-state solution as the only path forward.
As for the region, the main lesson is obvious. The countries that thrive next will be those that build prosperity faster than they instigate wars. That is the change the face of the Middle East requires.
