What is the US's role in the Middle East given the Qatar strike?

US President Donald Trump arrives to address troops at the Al Udeid airbase, south-west of Doha, on May 15. AFP

Israel’s outrageous bombing attack in Doha, designed to further stymie ceasefire negotiations that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is systematically sabotaging, may greatly complicate the US role in the region.

Israel has pledged to kill major Hamas leaders. What’s shocking and alarming is when, where and how its latest assassination effort against those they hold responsible for the October 7, 2023, attack took place.

When Ismail Haniyeh, then the titular leader of Hamas, was assassinated in Iran last July, the “when” and “where” were neither shocking nor surprising. But the question of “how” was stunning, given the massive penetration of Iran’s domestic security and intelligence services that was undoubtedly necessary to plant the bomb in advance and know when to detonate it so that no Iranians were killed. But Haniyeh was in Iran to attend the inauguration of its new president, and had no particular expectation of safety from Israeli revenge in Iran.

Could the Doha strike change the direction of US-Gulf relations?

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The attack in Qatar is completely different.

Doha had become Hamas’s main patron and supporter for more than a decade before the October 7 attack. It adopted this role after the Hamas politburo fled Syria after siding with the uprising against Bashar Al Assad’s government, in which the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was an important early part, thereby breaking with Iran and its network, particularly the Assad establishment.

Did the US really warn Qatar about an Israeli attack on Doha?

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Following the attack on southern Israel in 2023, Qatar, Hamas and the US all realised the day would soon enough come when Doha could no longer host the Hamas leadership while maintaining good relations with Washington.

Qatar skilfully offered to expel Hamas at times when the preceding Joe Biden administration would almost certainly reject the idea because it would interfere with crucial moments in ceasefire and hostage-release talks. But by last October, Mr Biden publicly asked Doha to expel the Hamas leaders. Qatar and Hamas had been preparing for months by relocating virtually all senior Hamas figures to Turkey.

But even under US President Donald Trump, Qatar has continued to be urged to host the indirect talks on Gaza that had led to a major ceasefire and hostage release deal that began on January 19, only to be violated by Israeli air strikes in Gaza in early March. After that, it became clear that Mr Netanyahu wanted nothing to do with any additional measures to further wind down, let alone stop, the Gaza war.

Washington and its Arab partners still need each other, but trust is being eroded quickly and decisively

This is despite repeated statements by Mr Trump that he wants the war to end – though he does not appear to be interested in pressuring Mr Netanyahu to co-operate – and the objections of Israeli generals that they are continuing to lose men in significant numbers to the growing Hamas insurgency with no clear military mission or political goal. In response, Mr Netanyahu shrugged and ordered a major attack on Gaza City.

Israel’s attack on Qatar has exposed a major weakness in the US strategic posture in the Gulf region. Given Doha's close relations with Washington, especially hosting for Al Udeid airbase – the forward headquarters of the US Central Command and centre of US military positioning in the Gulf region – should have shielded it from such a shocking air attack, which took the life of a Qatari security officer.

The message to the region appears to be "if you think close ties with, and major military support for, Washington provides protection from sudden and massive attacks on civilian buildings during negotiations by Israel, think again".

It again demonstrates that the 1980 doctrine of then US-president Jimmy Carter – which still defines America’s commitment to some of its Arab partners – is passe. It promises US support against major armoured ground invasions such as Iraq’s 1990 assault on Kuwait. The US successfully expelled Iraqi troops, and it would quite possibly do so again if any Gulf countries were similarly attacked.

But such fears no longer define most Gulf Arab security concerns. Instead, the focus is on new forms of warfare – like drone attacks, cyber and electronic warfare, sabotage, terrorism, other “gray zone” or deniable assaults, and above all sudden missile strikes or air attacks such as the one that struck Qatar on Tuesday.

This is why at least two of Washington’s key Gulf Arab partners have been pressing for new mutual defence agreements with Washington, potentially modelled on the US-Japan agreement of 1954.

Under the Biden administration, Saudi Arabia and the US essentially finalised terms of such a deal, but a “significant Palestinian component” regarding the occupied territories – which would have been necessary for both parties to go forward along with the requisite Saudi normalisation with Israel – were being consistently rebuffed by Mr Netanyahu.

During the decade of unrest following the 2011 Arab uprisings in various republics, and especially towards the end of that period, Washington’s most important Middle East partners began focusing on strategic diversification to maximise their options beyond simply relying on increasingly uncertain US support regarding 21st-century threat perceptions. The US sought to persuade its partners that it remains the most reliable and effective guarantor of security.

That argument already looked threadbare after Washington totally failed to respond to the Iranian-linked attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in 2019 and deadly Houthi drone strikes on similar facilities in the UAE in 2020. There is every danger that if Washington does not move quickly to effectively reassure these partners that it has their back on security issues, even involving Israel, a renewed and irreversible focus on strategic diversification will be unavoidable.

That would be a tragedy for the US-Gulf Arab partnerships that have been the most effective forces for security and stability in the still highly volatile Middle East. Washington and its Arab partners still need each other, but trust is being eroded so quickly and decisively that only new and potent American commitments – perhaps even updating the plainly obsolete Carter doctrine – can save it.

This is especially true if Israel continues to act as a predatory power in countries like Syria and a new potential hegemon, as well as a dangerous rogue state that has become a major source of regional instability, without any pushback from Washington.