Syria’s transitional authorities have announced indirect parliamentary elections for September, the first since the fall of Bashar Al Assad’s government. After more than a decade of war, fragmentation and failed peace efforts, the revival of parliamentary life represents both a critical turning point and a rare glimmer of hope.
On paper, the process offers modest but meaningful improvements over previous transitional efforts. It promises broader representation, multiple consultative phases, appeal mechanisms and an attempt to boost women’s participation.
Yet these promising elements are clouded by structural ambiguities and unresolved questions. Who will select the powerful electoral subcommittees, and by what criteria? How will representation quotas be enforced? What voice will areas beyond Damascus’s control have? And crucially, who will ensure independent supervision to guarantee credibility?
Without clear answers and genuine transparency, these elections risk becoming another top-down exercise – reinforcing public cynicism rather than restoring trust.
The process was formally set in motion on June 13, when interim President Ahmad Al Shara announced the formation of an 11-member Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections. This body is responsible for designing and overseeing an indirect electoral system based on electoral colleges, not public voting, to form the new assembly. Originally set at 150 members, the assembly’s size was expanded to 210 under a draft electoral law submitted to Mr Al Shara on July 26. Two thirds of the members will be chosen through the committee-led process, while one third will be appointed directly by the interim President.
Once the draft law is approved, the Supreme Committee will have one week to establish two-member subcommittees in each of Syria’s 14 governorates. These bodies will then have 15 days to form district-level electoral colleges, whose size will depend on the number of seats allocated to each district. Seat distribution at both the governorate and district levels will be based on 2010 census data. Only electoral college members can run for, and vote in, these district elections. Voting for the 210-member People’s Assembly is scheduled between September 15 and 20.
Notably, the committee’s composition and participatory approach mark a departure from previous transitional efforts. Crucially, it moves away from the dominance of a single actor – most notably Hayat Tahrir Al Sham – that characterised earlier initiatives. The current 11-member body is more diverse: seven members formerly affiliated with the formal opposition, two linked to the HTS-led Salvation Government, and two independent civic figures. While the inclusion of just two women falls far short of equitable, it nonetheless represents a modest step towards greater female participation.
Procedurally, the committee has adopted a more transparent and consultative stance than many of its predecessors. It has held public forums and provincial outreach meetings to present its proposed electoral framework and solicit feedback. Several procedural safeguards have also been introduced, including a period for submitting objections related to the selection of electoral bodies and candidate nominations, as well as the establishment of appeal committees to review these challenges. The committee has also committed to enforcing representation quotas, including a minimum of 20 per cent for women and 2-3 per cent for people with disabilities.
Beneath the surface, however, the process remains fraught with significant ambiguities. Despite the committee’s outreach efforts, critical questions remain unanswered, particularly regarding the formation of provincial electoral subcommittees. While officials claim these bodies will be neutral and thoroughly vetted, there is no clarity on how members will be nominated or what standards will be used to assess their independence.
The small size of these two-person subcommittees compounds concerns. Responsible for selecting district-level electoral colleges and consulting local communities to ensure inclusivity, expecting two individuals to fulfil such responsibilities for an entire province within two weeks strains credibility. Their limited size also makes them more vulnerable to political manipulation, especially in a context shaped by deep-rooted factional loyalties and regional power dynamics. If those making selections are politically aligned or handpicked by vested interests, the process risks being compromised.
There is also uncertainty over how representation quotas, such as 20 per cent for women and a 70/30 split between professionals and traditional notables, will be enforced. Allocating seats at the district rather than provincial level makes these targets even harder to achieve. Most districts will have only one seat, increasing the likelihood of elites dominating at the expense of technically qualified professionals and leaving women well short of the 20 per cent threshold. While reserving one third of seats for presidential appointments could help mitigate these imbalances, relying on this mechanism merely to “tick boxes” risks weakening the assembly’s functional capacity in favour of meeting representational benchmarks.
Compounding these challenges is the lack of clarity on how members will be chosen from areas outside Damascus’s authority, particularly Sweida and the north-east. Selecting representatives from these regions without political agreements that secure the buy-in of respective de facto authorities risks entrenching Syria’s fragmentation. This is particularly concerning as the legislative body represents the last missing piece in completing the country’s core transitional institutions.
Perhaps most concerning is the lack of clarity on monitoring. While observers are expected to be involved, crucial questions remain. Who will select and train them? At which stages of the process will they be present? If observation is limited to the final vote, their role will be largely symbolic. In reality, the early phases – forming subcommittees and district electoral bodies – are where foundational decisions are made and where the potential for manipulation is greatest. These stages require the same level of oversight, if not more, as the final vote.
Syria’s legislative reboot is urgently needed to break from the legal and political legacy of the former establishment and set the country on a path towards meaningful reform. But this process is more than a bureaucratic milestone, it is a test of the transitional authorities’ political will to chart a truly inclusive course for the country. If Syrians are to believe in their leaders, the process must prove that it is not simply about filling seats, but about laying the foundations for a state that serves all its citizens.
