The problem with US President Donald Trump’s political optimism lies in his use of rhetoric that evokes a sense of accomplishment while distracting from failures and obstacles. He and his inner circle appear to be repeating ungrounded promises or espousing optimism that is detached from realpolitik.
Whether this communication strategy involves deliberate deception or is driven by sheer determination, its negative consequences are real. The Trump administration, its envoys and cabinet members alike, would do well to acknowledge them in order to correct course.
The cornerstone of Mr Trump’s Middle East strategy remains the “Deal of the Century”. He’s been developing it since his first term in office, as he seeks to refashion US relations with the region. While securing the support of key Arab states remains fundamental to achieving his goal of full normalisation between Israel and the Arab world, Mr Trump aims to expand this normalisation to include Turkey and Iran.
Some may argue that Mr Trump’s persistence in pushing forward his political objectives is more than mere political optimism; rather it is a coherent strategy grounded in patience and resolve, bordering on what could be called strategic stubbornness. And that he is determined to find a way out of the impasse created by Israel’s categorical rejection of the two-state solution in its traditional form.
Following multiple meetings between the US President and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – after which Mr Netanyahu left Washington with financial aid, weapons, and political and logistical support for any track Israel desired – hints emerged that Israel might accept a quasi-state for Palestinians in Gaza, on the condition that Israel retains full security control over the territory.
Mr Netanyahu made clear that he was unconcerned with whether the world would view such an arrangement as a “real state” but that what mattered to him was the appearance of a solution. Mr Netanyahu insisted that Hamas must disarm, or else face continued Israeli military operations, regardless of the planned 60-day ceasefire.
Steve Witkoff, Mr Trump’s Middle East envoy, has been tasked with the Gaza and Iran files. Yet the man working to implement the Deal of the Century from behind the scenes is Mr Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. But these are men known for dealmaking in real estate ventures, hence the idea of transforming Gaza into a Riviera – as Mr Trump proposed earlier this year – resurfaced again during Mr Netanyahu’s recent visit to Washington.
This may explain why Mr Trump insisted that a ceasefire is imminent in Gaza, why Mr Witkoff is working on achieving a 60-day truce, and why Mr Kushner is working on the Deal of the Century.
The victims of this open-ended optimism are ordinary Gazans, caught between Israel’s determination to annihilate them, America’s readiness to displace them and Hamas’s use of them as a bargaining chip to advance its own interests.
Meanwhile, Thomas Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey, is playing an active role in implementing the Syrian component vital to the Deal of the Century. This component is being openly broadcasted in direct and indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel to settle their border disputes with eventual diplomatic normalisation in mind.
While much of the Arab world is making progress towards normalising relations with Israel, Iran is preventing progress. It has prohibited its proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon from surrendering its weapons to the state or agreeing to border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel. It also opposes border demarcation between Syria and Israel, as keeping borders open facilitates its land bridge with Hezbollah.
The Trump-Witkoff duo is working to reformulate US-Iran relations, and they don’t want the issue of Tehran’s proxies to derail their nuclear-focused agenda. Political optimism towards Iran is leading Mr Trump’s team to overlook Iran’s dangerous entanglements with its regional clients.
This Trump administration has also avoided confronting Iran over its differences with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which Tehran has blocked from operating within Iran pending guarantees regarding the safety of its nuclear facilities. This is because Iran is pressing ahead with restoring its nuclear programme.
Tehran is taking advantage of Mr Witkoff’s eagerness to resume negotiations, setting astonishing conditions simply to return to the table. It is doing this to delay talks that might tie its hands or force it to allow inspectors to observe past and present activities. Iran’s goal remains to buy time while it puts its house in order on the nuclear, missile, proxy and domestic fronts.
It needs time, and Mr Trump’s political optimism suits it perfectly.
Tehran is now embracing an old Russian proposal – a compromise between Moscow’s insistence on Iran’s sovereign right to enrich highly enriched uranium on its soil and its acknowledgment of American, Israeli and European anxieties over Iran stockpiling this uranium. Russia’s offer is to transfer the excess uranium to its territory.
Mr Witkoff, also tasked with the Russia file, may find it appealing to let Moscow use the Iran nuclear issue as leverage to improve its standing with the US. But European powers won’t agree to Russia’s role in the matter, given the bitter fallout from Russian-Iranian co-operation in the Ukraine war.
It won’t be easy for Mr Trump to abandon his strategy of political optimism, particularly because realpolitik doesn’t favour him. He prefers making lofty promises over conceding that his policies have yet to yield striking success anywhere. Even when he sent B-2 bombers to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, he still ended up offering Tehran concessions to secure a ceasefire.
Indeed, Iran got Mr Trump to withdraw his demand for unconditional surrender. It secured American guarantees that its establishment would remain in power, in exchange for co-ordinating its retaliatory attacks in such a way as to ensure no harm would come to US soldiers stationed in the region. It now holds the upper hand in its dealings with the Trump administration, setting the terms for negotiations – or the lack thereof – while preventing any international monitoring of its nuclear or missile programmes and dictating terms to its proxies.
None of this changes the fact that Iran remains weak, and that it still fears military operations or targeted assassinations at Israel’s hands. Moreover, Mr Netanyahu has secured from Mr Trump an implicit green light for Israel to resume operations against Iran should its intelligence services conclude that Tehran has restarted its nuclear activities.
Nonetheless, Mr Trump’s political optimism isn’t working. It would be better for him to revert to his trademark blunt rhetoric, if only because it is clearer and less cloaked in fig leaves.
