US president-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration next month is widely expected to herald the return of the “maximum pressure” policy that his administration enforced on Iran during his first term.
The implications for Yemen can, therefore, also be expected to be wide-reaching. Indeed, after rebel groups toppled the Tehran-aligned government of Bashar Al Assad in Syria, the winds of change could blow there, too.
There is puzzlement over how little dynamics have changed in Yemen since the attacks mounted by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels on Israel led to retaliatory air strikes by the US and UK this year. Therefore, all eyes are on how Washington will focus on the country as part of a revamp in its approach to the Middle East.
Syria was such a vital plank for Iran’s regional policy of expanding its influence all the way to the Mediterranean that Tehran will be braced for the full blaze of Mr Trump’s headlights. That leaves the Houthi position in Yemen looking more and more like an intolerable outlier in the regional situation as it dramatically shifts.
In the decade since the collapse of the internationally recognised government in Sanaa, the Houthis have consolidated their footprint to rule the north of the country and about three quarters of the population. A de facto ceasefire has held between the Houthi lines and that of the government, which through its allies runs Aden and other parts of the south, including the port of Al Mukalla. Internal conflict in Yemen, in fact, dropped by about half last year.
But that tells only half the story. Not only has the Houthi leadership orchestrated attacks on Israel in solidarity with Palestinians living in Gaza, but it has posed a threat to the global economy by mounting a number of attacks on global shipping and disrupting trade through the Red Sea.
For example, as a result of the threat posed from Houthi missiles and drones on this lane, Egypt’s revenues from the Suez Canal are thought to have reduced by about $300 million a month this year. The attacks haven’t ceased, with two US warships coming under attack during their transit through the Bab Al Mandeb last month.
The US and its allies have restored a global terror designation on Ansar Allah, the Houthi movement’s official name, but that has had little real-world impact. The group’s propaganda operations and digital networks have received little or no disruption.
In other words, the efforts at containment are not working and are leading some Yemenis to argue that a much more comprehensive approach is needed to put the country on a better path.
The instability in the Red Sea has hurt food and fuel supplies to Aden more than it has the UN-supervised route to Yemen’s Houthi-controlled Red Sea port of Hodeidah. When Israel bombed the port in July, on a Saturday, it was receiving its first big shipment by Tuesday. The corridor for supplying the north from Djibouti has remained operational while shortages, not least caused by the operational and insurance costs of importing grain from Ukraine, ravage the south.
Calls for a more integrated approach that doesn’t just rely on air strikes and designations are being made to the Trump team. The internationally recognised government, for example, is being forced to make up its fuel deficit by buying from Houthi refineries with hard currency.
Officials in Aden are aghast that the UN agencies make subsistence payments to Houthi banks in US dollars, but these are then dispersed in local currency at a substantial conversion fee, which yields resources for their rivals. Similarly, Houthi control over the country’s mobile telecoms systems is also a substantial money spinner.
Tackling all these issues could be an essential part of a more comprehensive campaign of external and internal pressure on the Houthi leadership that could be presented to Washington in the coming weeks.
It would also make sense if there was some political reform in Yemen’s eight-member Presidential Leadership Council, which was set up when interim president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi stepped down two years ago. The council is neither very representative of the area that it governs, nor is it functioning daily.
A shake-up in those structures to produce something more effective is now overdue, for the people living in Houthi-controlled areas need to be able to see for themselves that the regions under government control are faring better. This would increase the pressure for a real political track.
Just as importantly, it would curb the aggression coming from the Houthis. There are those who argue against viewing the group as a proxy for Tehran – in that it has its own regional ambitions, agenda, web of relationships and resources. There is, therefore, a specific need to contain the globalisation of the Ansar Allah movement, including its procurement networks.
Decades of alliance-building by Iran in a string of Arab countries have dramatically come to a halt and slipped into reverse gear in recent months. How far this momentum carries on is the question on many a lip. It is unrealistic in the current conditions to think that the Yemeni stalemate will endure untouched.
UN-style management of the dreadful humanitarian outcomes of Yemen’s conflict and divisions has been for a long time the only alternative on the table.
The crisis in the Levant will inevitably be a top priority for the incoming Trump administration. And few can doubt the pressure that will indeed be directed towards Tehran. Houthi aggression must be dealt with, too.
It is inconceivable that with so much change across the region, Yemen’s deadlock will not be priority within this agenda.
