It would take a lot more than sheer force to disarm Hezbollah

Hezbollah is believed to have weapon caches across the country, despite Israel's bombing campaign. AP

On her recent trip to Lebanon, the US deputy Middle East envoy Morgan Ortagus reportedly indicated the Trump administration wanted a more rapid disarmament of Hezbollah. Ms Ortagus even took to X, formerly Twitter, to attack the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, who had said in a television interview that her conditions were “impossible” when it came to the Lebanese army’s seizing the party’s weapons.

Whether Mr Jumblatt was correct or not, it is a mistake to think – as some in the US, Israel and even inside Lebanon do – that the problem of Hezbollah’s weapons can be resolved by force. Sectarian relations in the country are too fragile to ignore the very real risks of a violent move against the party.

Any decision by the state to resort to a military option is likely to backfire. First, Hezbollah is not so weak that it wouldn’t defend its arsenal effectively if its leadership decided to do so. Fighting would quickly bog down in the midst of civilian areas, causing destruction and polarising Lebanon even more. This, in turn, would rally to its side many from its support base within the country's Shiite community, who are today suffering from the consequences of the party’s war against Israel.

If fighting were to escalate, the Lebanese Army would also have to face the repercussions of sectarian tensions in its own ranks. When the army was used previously against part of the Lebanese population, it split into rival factions – as in 1976, or in 1989-1990. That is why, for example, during the short civil war of 1958, the army commander at the time, Fouad Chehab, ensured that the military remained neutral.

In such a situation, it is likely the Trump administration would wash its hands of Lebanon and allow the country to be engulfed in domestic conflict. In other words, US officials want Lebanon to take a tougher line on Hezbollah, but if things were to go south, in all probability they would blame the Lebanese for the outcome.

Lebanon’s President, Joseph Aoun, must know these dangers. He was an officer in 1990 when the army fought a ruinous war with the Lebanese Forces militia. Though the army was stronger, the militia defended its areas with ferocity, leading to many civilian casualties. Mr Aoun won’t want to repeat that experience, and he recently told Al Jazeera that any disarmament process with Hezbollah would have to take place through dialogue.

Another factor imposes caution – namely, that the ultimate decider on Hezbollah’s arms is Iran. Since the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict last year, which led to the killing of most of the party’s military commanders, its secretary general Hassan Nasrallah and his likely successors, Hashem Safieddine and Nabil Qaouq, it is the Iranians, by most accounts, who have taken over direct control of the party.

The ultimate decider on Hezbollah’s arms is Iran

In other words, it makes little sense for Lebanese officials to take a harsh line on Hezbollah’s weapons when the actual decision-makers are in Tehran. In light of this, Mr Aoun and his Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, appear to have adopted an alternative strategy that is far more advisable in the situation today.

This approach involves gradually narrowing Hezbollah’s margin of manoeuvre and reasserting state power in important national institutions. The state has done so by ensuring that the area south of the Litani River is free of weapons, a major condition of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, denying Hezbollah an active front with Israel.

The army has also enforced its authority over major entry points into Lebanon – the airport, port, and major border crossings and zones. This is critical to ensuring Hezbollah cannot arm or finance itself through illicit cross-border activities, and Beirut has sought to improve co-ordination with the Syrian authorities in this regard.

At the same time, the state is portraying this process as being directed against all armed groups in the country, not just Hezbollah. That is why Mr Aoun and Mr Salam are also keen to address disarming Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Mr Aoun does not want a situation where it appears Hezbollah alone is being targeted by the state.

Another prong of Mr Aoun’s and Mr Salam’s gradualist approach is to place the burden on Hezbollah to break with the state. A vast majority of Lebanese today desire nothing more than a functioning state after years of chaos. Therefore, Hezbollah wants to avoid being held responsible for a breakdown of contacts with the president and government.

This soft approach is exactly what the realities today require. In public, Hezbollah is still resisting any discussion of disarmament, but there is a price for this. Israel is continuing to attack its arms caches at will, with US support, and the party is more isolated than ever at home, where many Lebanese no longer regard an independent Hezbollah arsenal as desirable, nor will accept a new conflict with the Israelis.

Ultimately, Mr Aoun and Mr Salam may be calculating that even the Iranians, seeing that the question of weapons is harming Hezbollah more than it is helping the party, may come around to adopting a more compromising position. This could involve a quid pro quo of surrendering weapons in exchange for more constitutional prerogatives for the Shiite community.

For Mr Aoun, this would represent a breakthrough. If disarmament is the lever that prompts greater integration of all Lebanese communities into the state, he would have achieved a great deal. In the meantime, both he and Mr Salam prefer to be patient, play the long game, and avoid rash actions that some people inside and outside Lebanon are encouraging.